Adams v. Graceland Care Ctr. of Oxford, LLC
| Decision Date | 03 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2013–CA–00724–COA.,2013–CA–00724–COA. |
| Citation | 208 So.3d 597 |
| Parties | Shirley ADAMS, individually and as Survivor and Only Heir of Dorothy Turner, Deceased, Appellant v. GRACELAND CARE CENTER OF OXFORD, LLC, Graceland Management Company, Inc., Lafayette Ltc, Inc., and Yalobusha General Hospital and Nursing Home, Appellees. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Bobby Floyd Martin Jr., Ralph Stewart Guernsey, Jennifer Lyn Miller Bermel, attorneys for appellant.
Thomas L. Kirkland Jr., Ridgeland, John G. Wheeler, Andy Lowry, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellees.
Before GRIFFIS, P.J., FAIR and JAMES, JJ.
JAMES, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Shirley Adams filed a complaint as the sole heir of her deceased mother, Dorothy Turner, against Graceland Care Center of Oxford LLC (Graceland Care Center), Graceland Management Company Inc. (Graceland Management), Yalobusha General Hospital and Nursing Home (Yalobusha), and Lafayette LTC Inc. (Lafayette) (collectively "Defendants"). The Defendants moved for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel because Adams failed to disclose the lawsuit by amending her schedule of assets in her pending bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, Adams argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. We agree and remand this case to proceed to trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. On August 9, 2004, Adams filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Mississippi. On February 1, 2005, Adams's five-year bankruptcy plan was confirmed, and she made regular payments in accordance with her plan. On December 7, 2007, Adams's mother, Turner, died while living in Graceland Care Center's nursing-home facility. On May 14, 2008, Adams initiated a personal-injury/wrongful-death cause of action against Graceland Care Center, Graceland Management, and Lafayette in her individual capacity and as the survivor and heir of her deceased mother. On January 12, 2009, Adams, the only child and sole wrongful-death beneficiary, filed a second amended complaint adding Yalobusha as a defendant, alleging that Turner suffered personal injuries and death as a result of substandard healthcare services provided to her while she was a resident at Yalobusha. Although Adams's bankruptcy case was still pending, she failed to amend her schedules to add the cause of action as an asset of her bankruptcy estate prior to completing her payment plan and the bankruptcy court granting her a discharge on March 31, 2009.
¶ 3. On August 19, 2009, the Defendants discovered through Adams's deposition testimony that she had previously filed bankruptcy, and did not list the cause of action as an asset in her bankruptcy estate. On August 28, 2009, Yalobusha moved for summary judgment based on Adams's failure to disclose her lawsuit, and argued that judicial estoppel barred her from pursing the claim. The remaining Defendants joined in Yalobusha's motion. On October 13, 2009, Adams moved to reopen her bankruptcy case for the purpose of adding her cause of action to the schedules. On October 16, 2009, the bankruptcy court granted Adams's motion, and she amended her schedules listing the cause of action as an asset on October 20, 2009.1 The trial court, by letter dated September 13, 2010, stated that it would grant the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. However, on October 15, 2010, Adams filed a motion for reconsideration in light of the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Copiah County v. Oliver, 51 So.3d 205, 207 (¶ 12) (Miss.2011).
¶ 4. On December 19, 2011, the trial court, following the supreme court's decision in Oliver, entered an order staying the proceedings until the bankruptcy court made a decision on the sole question of "whether Adams had a duty to disclose her personal injury/wrongful death cause of action as an asset of her bankruptcy estate." The bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing on Adams's and the Defendants' cross-motions for declaratory judgments on whether the affirmative defense of judicial estoppel was applicable. Following the hearing, the bankruptcy court wished to ascertain whether the Chapter 13 trustee had an interest in pursuing the state cause of action. The trustee was given an opportunity to review the factual issues in both the bankruptcy case and the state court proceeding before submitting a response to the bankruptcy court. On July 30, 2012, the trustee submitted a letter to the bankruptcy court, which stated:
After reviewing the timely filed and allowed general unsecured claims which total $4,719.53, the trustee reports that she would abandon any settlement or judgment proceeds and not administer the payment of such on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.
¶ 5. On October 12, 2012, the bankruptcy court rendered its opinion finding "that Adams had a continuing duty throughout the pendency of her bankruptcy case to disclose the state law cause of action." In re Adams, 481 B.R. 854, 859 (Bankr.N.D.Miss.2012). However, the bankruptcy court left the issue of judicial estoppel for the trial court to decide. Id. at 861–862.
¶ 6. Following the bankruptcy court's decision, the Defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment. On April 13, 2013, the trial court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment finding that "based on [Adams's] own affidavit and deposition testimony, she had knowledge of the facts supporting her cause of action prior to the discharge of her [C]hapter 13 proceeding." Adams argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. We agree and find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Adams's failure to amend her bankruptcy schedules was an intentional self-contradiction, knowingly made, or amounted to a willfully false representation. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision granting summary judgment and remand the case to proceed to trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7. A trial court's imposition of judicial estoppel is subject to review under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Kirk v. Pope, 973 So.2d 981, 986 (¶ 11) (Miss.2007) (citing Superior Crewboats, Inc. v. Primary P & I Underwriters, 374 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir.2004) ; Hall v. GE Plastic Pacific PTE Ltd., 327 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir.2003) ). However, in Oliver, 51 So.3d at 207 (¶ 7), the supreme court applied the de novo standard in reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. Because the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, we will review the trial court's decision under a de novo standard. See id. at 206–07 (¶¶ 6–8).
¶ 8. In Karpinsky v. American National Insurance Co., 109 So.3d 84, 88 (¶ 10) (Miss.2013), the Mississippi Supreme Court summarized the summary-judgment standard:
Summary judgment is appropriate and shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Importantly, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, will be entered against him.
(Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Additionally, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made." One S., Inc. v. Hollowell, 963 So.2d 1156, 1160 (¶ 6) (Miss.2007). "The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact." Duckworth v. Warren, 10 So.3d 433, 437 (¶ 9) (Miss.2009). "Further, summary judgment is inappropriate where there are undisputed facts which are susceptible to more than one interpretation." Id.
DISCUSSION
¶ 9. The sole issue before this Court is whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Adams from pursuing her cause of action against the Defendants for failing to amend her schedule of assets in the bankruptcy court to include her cause of action prior to the completion of her plan and discharge.2 Adams argues that summary judgment was not proper because her nondisclosure was inadvertent.
¶ 10. The doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied to prevent a party from achieving an unfair advantage by taking inconsistent positions in litigation. Oliver, 51 So.3d at 207 (¶ 9). "In order to protect the integrity of the judiciary, judicial estoppel must be invoked in the Court in which the apparent self-serving contradiction occurred and in which the defense is first asserted." Kirk, 973 So.2d at 991 (¶ 31).
¶ 11. In Kirk v. Pope, the supreme court identified three elements of judicial estoppel. Clark v. Neese, 131 So.3d 556, 560 (¶ 16) (Miss.2013). "A party will be judicially estopped from taking a subsequent position if (1) the position is inconsistent with one previously taken during litigation, (2) a court accepted the previous position, and (3) the party did not inadvertently take the inconsistent positions." Id.
¶ 12. "Judicial estoppel is designed to protect the judicial system and applies where intentional self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining [an] unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice." Kirk, 973 So.2d at 991 (¶ 31) (emphasis added). "The purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent parties from knowingly taking a position in one court that is contrary to a position that party has asserted in, and that has been accepted by, another court." Clark, 131 So.3d at 562 (¶ 21) (emphasis added).
¶ 13. In Kirk, this Court applied judicial...
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