Jones v. Alcorn State Univ.

• Citation: 337 So.3d 1062
• Decision Date: 12 May 2022
• Docket Number: 2020-CA-01238-SCT
• Parties: Ernest T. JONES v. ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY, Darren J. Hamilton Ph.D., in his Individual Capacity, and Board of Trustees of Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

337 So.3d 1062

Ernest T. JONES

v.ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY, Darren J. Hamilton Ph.D., in his Individual Capacity, and Board of Trustees of Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning

NO. 2020-CA-01238-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 12, 2022

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JIM WAIDE, Tupelo, MICHAEL EARL KEYTON, Port Gibson, WAYNE E. FERRELL, JR., Jackson

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: AMANDA GREEN ALEXANDER, Jackson, J. CAL MAYO, JR., Oxford, SARAH KATHERINE EMBRY

EN BANC.

RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Ernest T. Jones appeals the decision of the Claiborne County Circuit Court that granted the motion for summary judgment of the Board of Trustees of the State of Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi (IHL) because the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred his claims. After a review of the record, the trial court's rulings, the briefs, and arguments presented, this Court affirms the circuit court's findings that Jones failed to reveal his lawsuit against the IHL in bankruptcy filings in Florida, one in 2015, and another in 2017. We discern no abuse of discretion in applying judicial estoppel to the facts found in this record. The circuit court exercised sound discretion in concluding that the judicial estoppel doctrine barred Jones's action and was eminently correct when she granted summary judgment for the IHL. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this case with prejudice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On January 2, 2008, Ernest Jones became the head football coach at Alcorn State University. Subsequently, Jones filed a breach of contract action against the IHL on December 5, 2008. Jones was fired in January 2009.

¶3. In October 2015, Jones petitioned a bankruptcy court in Florida for protection from his creditors.¹ Jones attested under oath that documents filed in electronic form would be treated for all purposes (both civil and criminal) in the same manner as though signed and subscribed. On October 30, 2015, Jones filed his bankruptcy disclosures. Jones swore under penalty of perjury that he had no "contingent or unliquidated" claims of any nature. Jones further failed to disclose the breach of contract suit against the IHL in the bankruptcy schedule's "list of suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor was a party within one year immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case." Jones never revealed this suit in that proceeding, prior to voluntarily dismissing the proceeding.

¶4. In January of 2016, Jones's suit in Claiborne County resulted in a jury verdict of $500,000. On the very same day of receiving the verdict, Jones filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the 2015 bankruptcy proceeding. Jones had never disclosed the Claiborne County suit to the bankruptcy court or any of his creditors at that time.

¶5. The IHL filed a post-trial motion for JNOV or a new trial. On July 7, 2016, the circuit court granted the IHL's motion and set aside the verdict. On July 20, 2016, Jones appealed the circuit's court decision. Jones v. Miss. Insts. of Higher Learning (Jones I) , 264 So. 3d 9 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied , 263 So. 3d 666 (Miss. 2019) (table).

¶6. Then in April 2017, while Jones's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, he filed a second bankruptcy petition. On May 25, 2017, Jones proposed and filed his Chapter 13 plan. Despite the pending appeal, Jones again failed to disclose this suit to the bankruptcy court, attesting under oath that no such claims exist. Jones also swore that all documents contained within his plan were true and correct. The bankruptcy court confirmed his plan on December 4, 2017, accepting Jones's false statements that he had no actual or potential claims against third parties unrelated to the bankruptcy action.

¶7. In August 2018, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Jones I , 264 So. 3d at 34. In December 2018, Jones modified his bankruptcy plan, which was accepted by the bankruptcy court in January 2019. Later in 2019, Jones filed a supplemental complaint in Claiborne County.

¶8. Subsequently, the IHL moved for summary judgment, averring that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred him from recovery. Within ten days of the IHL's seeking dismissal, Jones moved to amend his bankruptcy plan and for the first time disclosed this lawsuit. Thereafter, the circuit court held a hearing on the IHL's motion for summary judgment.

¶9. On October 15, 2020, the trial judge granted the IHL's motion, dismissing Jones's case. The trial judge found that "Jones contends that his wife, and not he, electronically signed the bankruptcy documents, and therefore there was an inadvertence." The trial judge further explained, "[Jones] simply states that because there was a lack of intent to deceive, judicial estoppel should not apply. However, the test for inadvertence is not that there is a lack of intent to deceive." Jones offered no material evidence that the actions described were inaccurate. See supra ¶¶ 3-7. The trial judge found the elements for application of judicial estoppel had been satisfied.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. We review a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Copiah Cnty. v. Oliver , 51 So. 3d 205, 207 (Miss. 2011). The standard of review when considering a trial court's application of judicial estoppel is abuse of discretion. Adams v. Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC , 208 So. 3d 575, 579 (Miss. 2017) ; Jourdan River Ests., LLC v. Favre , 278 So. 3d 1135, 1153 (Miss. 2019) ; Rogers v. Gulfside P'ship , 206 So. 3d 1274, 1278 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) ; Jackson v. Harris , 303 So. 3d 454, 457 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).

¶11. The dissent's disagreement with the standard of review for judicial estoppel's application is inconsistent with our precedent. The proper standard of review for cases of this type has been addressed by this Court previously, and de novo review only has been rejected.

¶12. A Court of Appeals plurality opinion, penned by then- Judge James and joined by then-Judge Griffis, conflated the standard of review. See Adams v. Graceland Care Center of Oxford , LLC , 208 So. 3d 597 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). A plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a trial on the merits, over a spirited dissent penned by now-Presiding Judge Wilson. Id.

¶13. Graceland sought certiorari, which we granted. Adams , 208 So. 3d at 578. Graceland argued that the Court of Appeals "usurped the trial court's discretion by imposing the wrong standard of review." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court found the Court of Appeals’ opinion erred by utilizing a de novo review of the circuit court's application of judicial estoppel, despite its statement that abuse of discretion was the appropriate standard of review. Adams , 208 So. 3d at 579 ; Adams , 208 So. 3d at 600. This Court found that the Court of Appeals had conflated the standards. Adams , 208 So. 3d at 579.We explicitly held the appropriate analysis requires an appellate court to use the abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's application of judicial estoppel. Id. As more eloquently stated by Justice Maxwell's opinion, the standard of review for judicial estoppel has been well developed in federal jurisprudence. Most federal circuits hold that the application of judicial estoppel is a discretionary call that must be reviewed for abuse of discretion, analogous to Adams . See Sp. Con. Op. ¶¶ 42-50. Additionally, multiple Mississippi decisions apply similar framework as Adams , some of which then-Judge Griffis or now-Justice Griffis has joined.

¶14. Before Adams , Rogers v. Gulfside Casino Partnership , 206 So. 3d 1274, 1278-79 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted), penned by now-Presiding Judge Wilson and joined by then-Presiding Judge Griffis, discussed in depth how judicial estoppel implicates a "twofold standard for review[.]" "Although we commonly state that we review the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, a trial court's imposition of judicial estoppel ... is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 1278. The Rogers court referenced this Court in its opinion inferring that a two-pronged standard of review was not a foreign or novel concept. "If a grant of summary judgment depends on an underlying evidentiary ruling, an appellate court applies "a twofold standard of review," first reviewing the evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, then removing the remaining question of law de novo." Id. at 1279 (quoting Bennett v. Highland Park Apartments, LLC , 170 So. 3d 450, 452 (Miss. 2015) ).

In this case, however, the circuit court's grant of summary judgment was based entirely on its ruling on the issue of judicial estoppel. Thus, if the court's imposition of judicial estoppel was not an abuse of discretion, it necessarily follows that its grant of summary judgment was proper. Therefore, the only question we must address is whether the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

Id . Like Rogers , the Claiborne County trial judge's ruling was based entirely on the issue of judicial estoppel.

¶15. After Adams, Jourdan River Estates v. Favre , 278 So. 3d 1135, 1153 (Miss. 2019), penned by Presiding Justice Kitchens and joined by Justice Griffis, applied the two-pronged standard of review. In that case, the defendants argued in the circuit court that Jourdan River Estates should be judicially estopped from bringing its suit for damages because Jourdan River Estates did not list that potential damages suit in its bankruptcy schedules in 2009. The Court noted, "we review the circuit court's application of judicial estoppel using the abuse of discretion standard,’ but we ‘use the [de novo] standard to determine whether summary judgment was or was not appropriate.’ " Id. (alteration in original); Adams , 208 So. 3d at 580 ). The standard of review as set forth in Adams...