Adams v. Housing Authority of City of Daytona Beach

• Decision Date: 12 August 1952
• Citation: 60 So.2d 663
• Parties: ADAMS v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 663

60 So.2d 663

ADAMS v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

Aug. 12, 1952.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1952.

Maurice F. Foster, De Land, for appellant.

W. Cecil Grant, John L. Graham and Hull, Landis, Graham & French, Daytona Beach, for Housing Authority of the City of Daytona Beach.

Wm. W. Judge, Daytona Beach, for City of Daytona Beach.

MATHEWS, Justice.

Acting under the authority of Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945, now Section 421.08 note, F.S.A. and amendments thereto, the appellees authorized and undertook a redevelopment project for the purpose of clearing a blighted area by acquiring by purchase or eminent domain real estate of the blighted area and to make it available for sale or lease to private enterprises. Appellant, the owner of some of the land in the blighted area and an affected taxpayer of the City of Daytona Beach, instituted this suit by bill in equity to restrain or enjoin the appellees from acquiring the land in question by eminent domain or purchase and to adjudicate the constitutionality of Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945, and the amendments thereto. At final hearing before the Chancellor, at which testimony was taken by the Chancellor, he denied application for injunctive relief and upheld the validity of the Statutes in question. This appeal is from that final decree. Mr. J. N. Miller, the Executive Director of the Housing Authority, testified at the hearing before the Chancellor as follows:

'Q. Mr. Miller, is it not the plan of the Housing Authority after these proposed new structures are built upon the area that the same shall be disposed of to private owners? A. That is true. I would like to make an explanation there. We dispose of the land only; private enterprise must do the development.'

It is urged that Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945 and the amendments thereto, violate Sections 1 and 12 of the Declaration of Rights and Section 29 of Article XVI of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because they attempt to authorize the taking of private real property by eminent domain, or purchase, all of which may be sold or leased for private commercial and industrial purposes. It is further urged that the Act violates Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights and Sections 5, 7 and 10 of Article IX of the Constitution of Florida because of the attempt to expend public funds and tax revenues of the City of Daytona Beach and to provide a cash grant which will total one-third of the cost of the development when all of the land is to be leased or sold for private use by corporations, associations, institutions or individuals.

Prior to 1945, this Court had upheld the validity of Section 421.02, et seq., F.S.A., which was Chapter 17981, Acts of 1937. The Act of 1937 was entitled:

'An Act to Declare the Necessity of Creating Public Bodies Corporate and Politic to be Known as Housing Authorities to Undertake Slum Clearance and Projects to Provide Dwelling Accommodations for Persons of Low Income * * *.'

It is quite evident that the purpose of Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945, was to extend the power of Housing Authorities so as to authorize them to acquire by voluntary purchase or by eminent domain real property in blighted areas for development purposes and make it available to private enterprise for commercial and industrial uses.

The City Council of Daytona Beach and the Housing Authority had taken the steps provided for by Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945, for the redevelopment of a blighted area.

The questions presented by this appeal are of first impression in this Court. The cases of Marvin v. Housing Authority, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145; Lott v. City of Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 196 So. 313; Higbee v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 143 Fla. 560, 197 So. 479; and State ex rel. Grubstein v. Campbell, 146 Fla. 532, 1 So.2d 483, were with reference to slum clearance and where the real estate was to be acquired and the slums demolished for the purpose of erecting low cost houses on the acquired land in order to take care of the people displaced by reason of the slum clearance and others in the low income tax brackets. Every case so far adjudicated by this Court has had these elements present. Up to the present time there has been no case presented where a Housing Authority attempted to acquire by purchase or condemnation lands which constituted a slum area in order to devote such lands to private commercial and industrial enterprises. Each of the above cases was decided before the enactment of Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945. The last mentioned case of State ex rel. Grubstein v. Campbell, supra, was decided in April, 1941.

We are not unmindful of the fact that laws similar to Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945, have been upheld by some of the Courts of last resort of other states in the Union. We have our own Constitution and adjudicated cases by this Court which are controlling in this case.

The proceedings in this case have been taken under Chapter 23077, Acts of 1945, as amended. The amendments are not material to the discussion here because they simply fix the application of the Act to municipalities of certain population.

The very title of the Act in question shows that its main purpose appears to be:

'* * * to Acquire by Purchase or Eminent Domain Real Property in Blighted Areas and Make It Available under Certain Conditions for Redevelopment by Private Enterprise or by Public Agencies in Accordance with Approved Redevelopment Plans'. (Italics supplied.)

At the outset we should bear in mind that there is a clear distinction between the power of eminent domain and the police power. The power of eminent domain is that sovereign power to take property for a public use or purpose and this cannot even be done without just compensation. On the other hand, the police power is that power by which the Government may destroy or regulate the use of property in order to 'promote the health, morals and safety of the community', and the police power may be exercised without making compensation for the impairment of the use of property or any decrease in the value of property by reason of the regulated use. See Blitch v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406; City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364; Pasternack v. Bennett, 138 Fla. 663, 190 So. 56; Lott v. City of Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 196 So. 313; 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 6, p. 784; and 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, p. 639, Sec. 11.

The appellees urge that it is admitted that the area in question is a blighted area and unless they can acquire title to and ownership of this land and carry out their redevelopment plan, they have no means or method of coping with the situation and clearing up this blighted area. There is no merit in this contention. If the only purpose is to remove or abate a blighted area, the police power is ample.

Our general laws relating to cities and towns, Chapter 176, F.S.A., with reference to zoning and Section 167.05, F.S.A., with reference to abatement of nuisances and the preservation of the public health confer sufficient power. These provisions of our Statutes have been liberally construed by this Court.

In the case of Standard Oil Company v. City of Tallahassee, 87 F.Supp. 145, in an opinion by Judge Dozier Devane, United States District Judge, it was held that an ordinance requiring discontinuance of the gasoline service station in the City of Tallahassee near the State Capitol, the State Supreme Court Building, and several other state office buildings, and a public school, was justified as a reasonable exercise of the police power, later affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410.

If after notice, the City has the authority to order the discontinuance of a filling station, it would likewise have the power to order the discontinuance of the occupation of houses which are unsafe, unsanitary or breeding grounds for disease, or if it desired, it could condemn the houses by the process of eminent domain and leave the real estate for the owners to redevelop or use within the limits of a zoning ordinance. See City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., supra; City of Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616, 194 So. 368, 128 A.L.R. 350; Rowland v. State, 129 Fla. 662, 176 So. 545, 114 A.L.R. 443; City of Miami v. Direct Distributors, 134 Fla. 430, 183 So. 841; and Citizens Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 98 Fla. 933, 124 So. 722.

The question in this case is not simply the abatement or discontinuance of a nuisance or a blighted area. This is not simply a case of slum clearance in order to promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the inhabitants and citizens of Daytona Beach. On its face it is a 'redevelopment' plan and a mere inspection of the plan shows it to be a real estate promotion. The very words of the plan declare it to be for the purpose of acquiring title to and ownership of several blocks of property constituting six and one-half acres now used for residences to be redeveloped and sold or leased to private individuals, associations or corporations for private commercial and industrial purposes. As will be shown hereafter, it is not the purpose of the plan to acquire this land to erect new residences to be rented to persons in the low income brackets.

In the plan, which was approved by the City authorities, it is shown that the area now has 70 residential structures containing 75 dwelling units and 5 non-residential structures. The plan states 'the majority of the structures are in such a dilapidated condition that they are dangerous to the occupants and not worth the consideration of being rehabilitated'.

In order to remove these structures it is not proposed that the police power be exercised to accomplish this purpose. It is proposed that the power of eminent domain or the power...