State ex rel. Grubstein v. Cambell

• Decision Date: 04 April 1941
• Citation: 146 Fla. 532,1 So.2d 483
• Parties: STATE ex rel. GRUBSTEIN v. CAMBELL, Tax Assessor et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

1 So.2d 483

146 Fla. 532

STATE ex rel. GRUBSTEIN v. CAMBELL, Tax Assessor et al.

Florida Supreme Court

April 4, 1941

Frank P. Ingram, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.

Alonzo B McMullen and Ralph A. Marsicano, both of Tampa, for defendant in error Cambell.

Thomas A Dyer, of Tampa, for defendant in error Housing Authority.

TERRELL, Justice.

Alternative writ of mandamus was directed from the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County to the Tax Assessor and the Housing Authority of the City of Tampa commanding that all lands described therein and belonging to the latter be entered on the tax rolls and assessed for taxes in like manner as taxes are imposed on relator and other property owners in the City. Returns were duly filed and a stipulation as to essential facts was entered by counsel. Motion for peremptory writ of mandamus was overruled and relator announcing that he did not desire to plead further, the alternative writ was quashed, the cause was dismissed and final judgment was entered for respondents. The case is here on writ of error to the final judgment.

The first question presented is whether or not the property of respondent, Housing Authority of the City of Tampa, created under Chapter 17981, Acts of 1937, and used exclusively for the purposes therein provided, is exempt from taxation under Section 1, Article 9 and Section 16, Article 16 of the Constitution of Florida.

A similar question was presented and answered fully in State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, Fla., 200 So. 100, decided January 7, 1941. We do not deem it necessary to say more than cite the latter case in answer to this question.

It is next contended that even if Chapter 17983, Acts of 1937, may legally exempt the properties of housing authorities from taxation as contemplated by Section 1 of Article 9 and Section 16 of Article 16 of the Constitution, such properties would nevertheless be subject to taxation for the payment of the principal and interest of bonds and other obligations incurred prior to the effective date of said act.

We do not think there is any merit to this contention. The exemptions provided for in Section 1 of Article 9 and Section 16 of Article 16 have been in effect since 1868, and in so far as this case is concerned, are limited to municipal purposes. All purchases of securities of the City were on notice of these provisions of the Constitution and the exemptions they provide and purchased with knowledge thereof. They are not now in position to complain.

We are urged in amici curiae brief signed by counsel for numerous other housing authorities to prescribe a standard by which taxing officials may know when and under what circumstances to allow the exemption provided by Chapter 17983.

In answer to this question, it is sufficient to say that Chapter 17981, Acts of 1937, as amended by Chapter 19510, Acts of 1939, provides the only standard we would be authorized to approve for the governance of taxing officials. As we construe Section 2 (a), (b) and (c), Section 3(h) and (i) and paragraph 2, Section 4 of the Housing Authority Act, it authorizes housing projects in slum areas or in areas where there is a shortage of accommodations for those of low income as defined by the act. The project may not necessarily occupy the identical area occupied by the slum but the purpose and result must be the clearance of the slum area. The theory of the act is that such areas become the breeding places of disease and crime, a menace to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the State and that such conditions require a disproportionate expenditure to preserve the public health and to prevent crime, fire, accident, and for other services furnished by the public. The act further declares that the clearance of such areas is one that does not attract private enterprise, that it is a duty devolving on the public and one for which public expenditures may be made.

Such is the criterion prescribed by the Legislature as a predicate for the play of the Housing Act. If the Housing Authority attempts to promulgate a housing...