Adams v. Lamb-Fish Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1913
• Docket Number: 15,376
• Citation: 61 So. 6,104 Miss. 48
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ADAMS, STATE REVENUE AGENT v. LAMB-FISH LUMBER CO

61 So. 6

104 Miss. 48

ADAMS, STATE REVENUE AGENT v. LAMB-FISH LUMBER CO

No. 15,376

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 3, 1913

APPEAL from the Chancery court of Tallahatchie county, HON. M. E DENTON, Chancellor.

Suit by Writ Adams, state revenue agent, for the use of the town of Charleston against the Lamb-Fish Lumber Company. A decree for defendant was reversed in 60 So. 645 and plaintiff moves to set aside the judgment reversing the case and for final judgment in the supreme court.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

May &amp Sanders, attorneys for the appellant.

Dinkins & Caldwell and Tim E. Cooper, attorneys for appellee.

Counsel on both sides filed elaborate briefs too long for publication.

OPINION

COOK, J.

The Lamb-Fish Lumber Company was assessed for taxes by the county assessor, and the roll as prepared by him was approved by the board of supervisors. This roll was copied by the town assessor, and either by nonaction, or by affirmative action was approved by the board of aldermen during the months of September and October. In November the board of supervisors reduced the assessed valuation of the property of appellant as it appeared on the roll at the time the same was copied by the town assessor. In this suit by the revenue agent to enforce the collection of the unpaid town taxes, appellee answered that it was exempted from municipal taxation by ordinance duly and legally adopted by the authorities of the municipality. The contention of appellee was sustained by the chancellor, and this court, on appeal, reversed the chancellor, holding that the ordinance exempting appellee from the payment of town taxes for a period of eight years was ultra vires and void. The matter is now before the court upon the motion of the revenue agent to set aside the judgment reversing the cause, and for final judgment here for the amount due the town, upon the valuation of the property, as fixed by the roll approved by the board of supervisors, and copied by the town assessor and approved by the board of mayor and aldermen of the town of Charleston.

It is the contention of appellee that it should only be required to pay upon the valuation as reduced by the board of supervisors in November. The point presented is precise, and no middle ground exists. Sections 3421 and 3422 of the Code of 1906, in the chapter on "Municipalities," contain the law controlling municipalities in the assessment and valuation of property embraced within the corporate limits. It is believed that the titles of the two sections are, in some degree, significant, and throw light upon their proper construction. Section 3421 is entitled, "Revenue; the assessment." Section 3422, "Assessment valuations." The subject-matter treated in section 3421 is the assessment roll and what it shall contain, if the roll adopted be the roll approved by the board of supervisors, while section 3422 deals with the valuation of property assessed for the purpose of the municipality.

Of course, in its broader sense, assessment embraces valuation, but at the same time the assessment roll embraces, not only the valuation placed upon property, but the names of the owners thereof and an accurate description of same. It is observable, therefore, that valuation is only one of the elements of assessment--the most important element it is true, nevertheless only one of the elements. Turning, now, to the chapter of Code of 1906, entitled "Revenue," section 4312 provides that for certain causes the board of supervisors "shall have the power at any time to change the assessment so as to reduce or increase the true valuation of the property." Returning to section 3421, we find these words, "and all changes in the county assessment thereafter made shall likewise be made in the copy." Upon the construction and application of this language, appellant and appellee part company, and the solution of this precise point is now submitted to this court.

In City of Biloxi v. Biloxi Real Estate Co., 94 Miss. 653, 48 So. 729, it is held that the board of mayor and aldermen have no power to equalize assessments after the expiration of October, because "it was plainly the purpose of the legislature to limit the time in which there shall be a preparation of the rolls for the purpose of taxation." In the above-cited case the exact point now before the court was not presented, but it is quite clear that the reasons given for the decision in that case are applicable to the present case. After October the board of mayor and aldermen are without power to change the rolls, because the rolls are then in the hands of the collector for the purpose of collecting the taxes, and for the further reason--and this is all-sufficient--the statute does not confer this authority upon the board of mayor and aldermen. Taking the provision in section 3421, which requires all changes in the county assessments to be made in the copy made for municipalities, disconnected from the general scheme for the collection of taxes, it would seem that, when the board of supervisors made changes in the county assessments under section 4312, the collectors of municipalities should immediately change their rolls to harmonize with the county roll.

The municipality, in this instance, instead of adopting a scheme of assessment of its own, elected to adopt the method of copying the county rolls; and, when the rolls had passed from the control of the town board, the county reduced appellee's assessment. Clearly the statute gives no power to the town board to change the assessment roll ...