City of Greenwood v. Humphreys
| Decision Date | 14 April 1930 |
| Docket Number | 28333 |
| Citation | 127 So. 694,157 Miss. 879 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF GREENWOOD v. HUMPHREYS |
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Back assessment. Property on assessment rolls. Void assessment. Municipality had authority to back assess property actually on assessment rolls which had been adjudged void (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 7004). Hemingway's Code 1927, Section 7004, authorized assessment in all cases where persons or property of kind and description referred to had escaped taxation for any previous year. It was contended by the taxpayers that, since the property was actually on the assessment rolls, it had not escaped taxation by reason of not being assessed.
2 JUDGMENT. Void assessment. Res judicata. Subsequent assessment.
Judgment holding assessment of property void was not res judicata, as respected back assessment under statute (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 7004).
3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Independent assessment. Municipality may make its own independent assessment so long as general form of rolls used in county is followed and fundamental principles observed (Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 7004, 7005). Hemingway's Code 1927, section 7004 provides for assessment by copying county assessment rolls with changes as made therein, and Code 1906, section 3422 (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 7005), provides for hearing taxpayers in respect to changes in valuation.
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Assessment. Valuation system. Assistance.
Use by assessing authorities of realty valuation system as assistance in making assessments is not objectionable.
5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Assessments. Valuation system. Judgment of assessor.
Assessments by city assessor pursuant to valuation shown by realty valuation system without using own judgment were invalid.
ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR. (Division B. June 9, 1930.) [128 So 885. No. 28333.]
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Taxpayer failing to appeal from ordinance of annexation was estopped to question validity of ordinance in collateral proceeding (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 6734). 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Neither state nor taxpayer could question legality of ordinance of annexation several years later and after territory annexed had ceased to function as separate municipality.
APPEAL from circuit court of Leflore county HON. S. F. DAVIS, Judge.
Proceedings by the city of Greenwood for back assessment of property belonging to Susan B. Humphreys. From a judgment holding assessment invalid, the city appeals.
Affirmed.
On suggestion of error. Suggestion of error overruled.
Judgment affirmed. Suggestion of error overruled.
A. H. Bell, of Greenwood, for appellant.
A city has power to reassess property when a prior assessment has been declared null and void.
Section 100, Constitution of 1890.
Morris Ice Company v. Adams, Rev. Agt., 75 Miss. 410, 22 So. 944; Sec. 7004, Hemingway's Code of 1927; Sec. 5980 of Hemingway's Code of 1917; Section 3421 of Code of 1906; Reed, Tex Collector, v. Norman Breaux Lumber Company, 149 Miss. 395, 115 So. 724.
A municipality has the right to change the valuations placed on the property in the city by the board of supervisors, but this must be done before the end of October in any year.
Adams, Revenue Agent, v. Lamb-Fish Lbr. Company, 61 So. 6.
If the work is done under the personal supervision of the assessor, or if he personally considers and adopts it, the assessment is valid, although another is employed in a clerical capacity to write up the assessment roll and put the valuation of the property thereon.
Property should be assessed on a basis of equality taking the city as a whole. The value of property for assessment in taxing district like a city is a difficult matter, and different men will have different views, all reasonably formed and entertained with reference to such matters.
Redmond v. City of Jackson, 108 So. 444.
The attack on the annexation ordinance is a collateral attack. Where there has been an irregular exercise of a given power, such acts are not subject to collateral attack.
Saunders v. Starkville, 128 Miss. 742, 91 So. 422; Adams, State Rev. Agt., v. Lamb Fish Lbr. Co., 103 Miss. 491, 60 So. 645; Dye v. Sardis, 119 Miss. 359, 80 So. 761; Morgan v. Wood, 140 Miss. 137, 106 So. 435; Liddell v. Noxapater, 129 Miss. 513, 92 So. 631.
The rule as to prior judgments in tax proceedings is that such judgment is not conclusive as to the validity of a new assessment or reassessment superseding the original assessment.
34 C. J. 967; Johnson v. Seattle, 53 Wash. 564, 102 P. 448; Kuehl et al. v. City of Edmonds, 157 P. 850; Allen v. City of Bellingham et al., 137 P. 1016; Johnson v. City of Seattle, 102 P. 448; Hardy v. O'Pry, 59 So. 73; Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co., 77 Miss. 194, 24 So. 200; Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co., 81 Miss. 90, 32 So. 937.
S. L. Gwin and Means Johnston, both of Greenwood, and S. Rosenthal, of Jackson, for appellee.
If annexation or other like proceedings, are absolutely void as for want of jurisdiction, or for failure to comply with jurisdictional requirements of the statute, they are subject to collateral attack.
City of Pascagoula v. Krebs et al., 151 Miss. 675, 118 So. 286; Fabric Fire Hose Co. v. Vicksburg, 117 Miss. 89, 77 So. 911; Gandsi v. Seminary, 95 Miss. 315, 48 So. 908; Borrom v. Purdy Road District, 131 Miss. 778, 93 So. 679; Bryant v. Board of Supervisors, 133 Miss. 714, 98 So. 148; City of Guthrie v. Wylie (Okla.), 55 P. 103; State ex rel. Clancy v. Porter (New Mex.), 169 P. 441; State v. Wofford (Texas), 39 S.W. 920; Atty.-Gen. v. Marr, 55 Mich. 445, 21 N.W. 882; State ex rel. Rosenberger v. Town of Bellflower (Mo.), 108 S.W. 117; Angel v. Town of Spring City (Tenn.), 53 S.W. 191; State ex rel. Harms v. Alexander (Iowa), 105 N.W. 1021; 28 Cyc., page 213.
A city clerk does not have power to back-assess property which has already been assessed, even though said assessment be declared void.
Section 7004, Hemingway's Code 1927.
What is meant by the term "escaped taxation" has been definitely settled and implies that the property has never been found or known, or listed for taxation.
Adams v. Luce, 87 Miss. 220, 39 So. 418; Long Bell Co. v. McLendon, 127 Miss. 636, 90 So. 356; Robertson v. Bank of Yazoo City, 123 Miss. 380, 85 So. 177; Miller v. Grand Lodge of Miss. A. F. & A. M., 114 So. 37.
An assessment can only be made by the officer designated by law to make it.
When an attempt to back-possess property which had been assessed for the years 1926 and 1927, which assessments had been declared void, and the parties are the same, the property involved is the same, and all questions with reference to said assessment before the court in the previous cases are now before this court in this case, such previous cases are res adjudicata.
Von Zondt et al. v. Town of Braxton, 115 So. 557; Dean v. De Soto County, 135 Miss. 208, 99 So. 563; Fisher v. Browning, 107 Miss. 729, 66 So. 132; Hardy v. O'Pry, 102 Miss. 197, 59 So. 78; Stewart v. Stebbins, 30 Miss. 66; Harrison v. Turner, 116 Miss. 550, 77 So. 528; Dean v. Bd. of Supervisors, 135 Miss. 268, 99 So. 563; Bates v. Strickland, 139 Miss. 636, 103 So. 432; Home Ins. Co. v. Tate Mer. Co., 117 Miss. 700, 78 So. 700.
The appellee might have appealed from the void ordinance, but was under no duty to do so, and had a perfectly legal right to rely for his protection upon the known invalidity of the ordinance.
Pascagoula v. Krebs, 151 Miss. 676, 118 So. 286.
A decree, order, or judgment absolutely null and void may be assailed anywhere when it is sought to impose such void order or decree upon one who is injured thereby.
Pascagoula v. Krebs, 151 Miss. 676, 118 So. 286.
Argued orally by A. H. Bell, for appellant, and by Means Johnston and Simon Rosethal, for appellee.
Certain town lots, the property of appellee, in the city of Greenwood, escaped municipal taxation for the years 1926 and 1927 because of the fact that the statutory equalization notices were not given in respect to the city assessments of those years. Therefore in 1928 the city clerk, as municipal assessor, made a back assessment of said property for said years, proceeding therein as provided in section 7004, Hemingway's 1927 Code, which section so far as pertinent to the case in hand reads as follows.
Appellee contends that there is no authority under said section to back assess said property, because, for the two years mentioned,...
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