Adams v. North Carolina Dept. of Natural and Economic Resources
Decision Date | 28 November 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 28,28 |
Citation | 249 S.E.2d 402,295 N.C. 683 |
Parties | , 12 ERC 1468, 9 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,064 Jack ADAMS, Claude Brown, Henry Davis, Thurman and Roda M. Lawrence and Crow Hill Properties (a partnership) v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES and North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission, and Alphious K. EVERETT, Sr., Ray Hartsfield, Jr., Julius B. Parker and Liston Yopp v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES and North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Turner, Enochs, Foster & Burnley by C. Allen Foster, Wendell H. Ott and E. Thomas Watson, Greensboro, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., A. C. Dawson, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. A. Raney, Jr., Special Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for defendants-appellees.
John S. Curry, Carrboro, for amicus curiae (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Sierra Club, Conservation Council of North Carolina, New Hope Chapter of The Nat. Audubon Society in support of appellees).
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the Act on two grounds: (1) The Act constitutes local legislation prohibited by Article II, section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution; and (2) The Act unconstitutionally delegates authority to the Coastal Resources Commission (CRC) to develop and adopt "State guidelines" for the coastal area.
The scope of review exercised by this Court when passing on the constitutionality of a legislative act is well stated in Glenn v. Board of Education, 210 N.C. 525, 187 S.E. 781 (1936):
Accord, McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 119 S.E.2d 888 (1961). Implicit in this presumption of constitutionality accorded to legislative acts is the principle that this Court and the General Assembly Nicholson v. Education Assistance Authority, 275 N.C. 439, 168 S.E.2d 401 (1969). In passing upon the constitutionality of a legislative act it is not for this Court to judge its wisdom and expediency. These matters are the province of the General Assembly. Rather, it is the Court's duty to determine whether the legislative act in question exceeds constitutional limitation or prohibition. "If there is a conflict between a statute and the Constitution, this Court must determine the rights and liabilities or duties of the litigants before it in accordance with the Constitution, because the Constitution is the superior rule of law in that situation." Id. Thus, this Court "will not disturb an act of the law-making body unless it runs counter to a constitutional limitation or prohibition." McIntyre v. Clarkson, supra.
The first issue for consideration is whether the Act is a local act prohibited by Article II, section 24 of the Constitution or is a general law which the General Assembly has the power to enact.
In distinguishing between a general law and a local act it is important to note at the outset that Article XIV, section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that: "General laws may be enacted for classes defined by population or other criteria." In Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, Sheriff, 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965), we said: "For the purposes of legislating, the General Assembly may and does classify conditions, persons, places and things, and classification does not render a statute 'local' if the classification is reasonable and based on rational difference of situation or condition." Thus, the mere fact that a statute applies only to certain units of local government does not by itself render the statute a prohibited local act. Only if the statutory classification is unreasonable or underinclusive will the statute be voided as a prohibited local act.
The above discussion indicates that the distinguishing factors between a valid general law and a prohibited local act are the related elements of reasonable classification and uniform application. A general law defines a class which reasonably warrants special legislative attention and applies uniformly to everyone in the class. On the other hand, a local act unreasonably singles out a class for special legislative attention or, having made a reasonable classification, does not apply uniformly to all members of the designated class. In sum, the constitutional prohibition against local acts simply commands that when legislating in certain specified fields the General Assembly must make rational distinctions among units of local government which are reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation. A law is general if "any rational basis reasonably related to the objective of the legislation can be identified which justifies the separation of units of local government into included and excluded categories." Ferrell, "Local Legislation in the North Carolina General Assembly," 45 N.C.L.Rev. 340, 391 (1967). This rule of reasonable classification was formally announced in McIntyre v. Clarkson, supra, and reaffirmed in Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964); Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, Sheriff, supra; Smith v. County of Mecklenburg, 280 N.C. 497, 187 S.E.2d 67 (1972).
Plaintiffs make a two-part argument in support of their position that the Act constitutes a prohibited local act. First they contend the General Assembly may not reasonably distinguish between the coast and the remainder of the State when enacting environmental legislation; and next, that even if the coast is sufficiently unique to justify separate environmental legislation, the twenty counties covered by the Act do not embrace the entire area necessary for the purposes of the legislation. We will address these arguments seriatim.
In support of the first contention plaintiffs argue that the natural resources and environmental needs of the coastal counties are not sufficiently unique to warrant special legislative treatment in the form of "a comprehensive plan for the protection, preservation, orderly development, and management of the coastal area of North Carolina." G.S. 113A-102(a). We disagree. The legislative findings on their face highlight the importance of the unique and exceptionally fragile coastal ecosystem:
The following passages from 46 N.C.L.Rev. 779 and 49 N.C.L.Rev. 889-90 help to convey the exceptional qualities of the coastal zone which make it so important to this State and the nation:
The above cited legislative findings are confirmed by the trial record and indicate that the unique, fragile and irreplaceable nature of the coastal zone and its significance to the public welfare amply justify the reasonableness of special legislative treatment. We conclude that the coastal counties constitute a valid legislative class for the purpose of addressing the special and urgent environmental problems found in the coastal zone. Accord, Toms River Affiliates v. Department of Environmental Protection, 140 N.J.Super. 135, 355 A.2d 679 (1976); Meadowlands Regional Development Agency v. State, 112 N.J.Super. 89, 270 A.2d 418 (1970), aff'd. 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973). See generally, Turnpike Authority v. Pine Island, 265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965).
Plaintiffs' contention that the environmental problems of the mountains and piedmont are equally deserving of legislative attention is not a valid constitutional objection to the Act in light of our finding that the coastal area is...
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