Adams v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 05–11–00618–CV.,05–11–00618–CV.
• Citation: 385 S.W.3d 678
• Parties: Bruce ADAMS, Appellant v. ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY COMPANY, L.L.C., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

385 S.W.3d 678

Bruce ADAMS, Appellant

v.ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY COMPANY, L.L.C., Appellee.

No. 05–11–00618–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Oct. 31, 2012.

John E. Wall, Jr., Kolter C. McKenzie, Law Offices of John E. Wall, Jr., Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

Julie I. Ungerman, Hunton & Williams, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Appellee.

Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice MORRIS.

In this suit for retaliatory discharge, Bruce Adams appeals the trial court's summary judgment dismissing his claim against Oncor Electric Delivery Company, L.L.C. Adams brings five issues arguing that he presented sufficient evidence of a causal connection between his workers' compensation claim and his termination to preclude summary judgment and his claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Because we conclude Oncor conclusively showed that Adams was discharged pursuant to a reasonable absence control policy and Adams failed to present sufficient evidence to create a fact issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I.

Adams began working for Oncor in April 1979 and, by 1993, he had achieved the position of senior troubleshooter. On September 1, 2007, Adams was severely injured when he fell twenty-five feet from a utility pole while attempting to restore power to a residential customer. Shortly after the accident, Oncor filed a workers' compensation claim on Adams's behalf.

Adams's injuries required weeks of hospitalization and multiple surgeries including having rods installed in his spine. Adams was confined to a wheelchair for a substantial period of time but ultimately progressed to using a walker. During this period, Adams continued to receive his full salary pursuant to Oncor's salary continuation policy. The salary continuation policy states that, subject to Oncor's approval, an employee who is unable to perform his “essential job duties” due to illness or injury may receive his regular base pay for a period of up to six months. The policy further states, “if you reach the end of your salary continuation period and have not returned to work performing the essential job duties of your position, your employment with [Oncor] terminates on the date the salary continuation period ends.”

Adams testified that, as he was recovering from his injuries, he was repeatedly told by his supervisor, Keith Berry, that he would be “taken care of” and that, when he was able to return to work, the company would find him a position inside, such as working in dispatch. In December 2007, Adams received a letter from the benefits coordinator at Oncor informing him that his participation in the salary continuation program would end on February 29, 2008. The letter also informed him that if he did not return to work performing “the essential job duties of [his] occupation” by that time, his employment with Oncor would be terminated. Finally, the letter stated that the termination of his employment would have no effect on his ability to receive long-term disability payments and set forth the procedure for applying for disability benefits.

Adams returned to work in a restricted capacity on February 11, 2008 and was given a temporary position as a dispatcher. Adams testified that he was told by Berry that, if he could work for Oncor for forty hours a week in any capacity, he would not have to go on long-term disability. Berry retracted the statement a short time later and told Adams he was mistaken. But Berry also stated that if Adams continued to work as a dispatcher “it would look good and demonstrate [his] willingness and ability to return to work.” Adams began by working four hours a day in his first week back and six hours a day in his second week. By the last week of February, Adams was working eight hours a day. A second letter was sent to Adams in February reiterating that if he did not return to performing the “essential job duties of [his] occupation” before February 29, his employment status with Oncor would be terminated.

During the last week of February, Adams met with Lonna Snow, the dispatch supervisor, who told him that she was going to have a dispatch position opening soon. Snow stated that she had been watching Adams work and wanted him to submit an application for the position. The position became available on March 4, 2008, four days after Adams's employment with Oncor was terminated under Oncor's salary continuation policy.

Adams applied for the dispatcher position the day it became available. According to Adams, Berry indicated to him that he shouldn't have any problems getting the job. Snow interviewed Adams and later called him to offer him the position. Snow's phone call was followed by a letter formally offering Adams the job but stating the offer was contingent upon his “successful completion of a fitness for duty evaluation with Dr. Ryan Razner.”

Adams met with both Razner and a physical therapist. Adams testified that he passed all of the tests given to him by the physical therapist and then met with Razner to discuss the accident, his condition, and his medications. At the time of the meeting, Adams was still taking narcotic pain medications. When the meeting concluded, Razner stated that he was not going to release Adams to full duty but, according to Adams, Razner also stated that he would not tell Oncor that Adams was incapable of performing the duties of dispatcher.

Adams checked regularly with Snow in the following weeks to see if she had received the fitness for duty report from Razner. After two months, Snow told Adams that Oncor had complained to Razner's office and informed the doctor that Oncor “need[ed] to fill this position” and he had “put [Adams's] life on hold.” Two weeks later, Adams received a letter from Snow stating that his fitness for duty evaluation was not satisfactory and Oncor's offer of employment was withdrawn.

On March 1, 2010, Adams filed this suit alleging that Oncor violated section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code by wrongfully terminating his employment in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Oncor filed a motion for summary judgment asserting both traditional and no-evidence grounds. Oncor argued that there was no evidence to show that Adams was terminated because he filed a workers' compensation claim and that it had articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Adams's discharge. Specifically, Oncor contended that Adams was discharged based on the uniform application of its salary continuation policy. Oncor also argued in the alternative that Adams's wrongful termination claim was barred by the statute of limitations. After reviewing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court granted Oncor's motion. Adams then brought this appeal.

II.

Adams raises five issues on appeal. In his first four issues, Adams generally contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against him because he produced sufficient evidence of a causal connection between his termination and his workers' compensation claim. We review the trial court's summary judgment de novo, examining the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference in his favor, and resolving any doubt against the movant. See Kalyanaram v. Univ. of Tex. Sys., 230 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). We will affirm a no-evidence summary judgment unless the nonmoving party brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element of his cause of action. Id. For a defendant to obtain summary judgment on traditional grounds, he must either disprove at least one element of the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law or conclusively establish all elements of an affirmative defense. Id.

Adams brought his claim for wrongful termination solely under the provisions of section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code. Section 451.001 states that an employee may not be discharged or otherwise discriminated against because he has, in good faith, filed a workers' compensation claim. SeeTex. Lab.Code Ann. § 451.001 (West 2006). The discriminatory acts prohibited by the statute must occur during the period of employment and do not include a later refusal to rehire. See Smith v. Coffee's Shop for Boys & Men, Inc., 536 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ). To prove a retaliatory discharge claim, the employee must show that his discharge would not have occurred when it did if the employee had not filed a workers' compensation claim. See Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex.2005). The Texas Supreme Court has held that if the plaintiff's discharge results from the uniform enforcement of a reasonable absence control policy, there is no violation of section 451.001 as a matter of law. See Tex. Division–Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex.1994).

Oncor moved for summary judgment on the ground that Adams was discharged due to the uniform application of its salary continuation policy, which includes an absence control plan. The policy submitted by Oncor as part of its summary judgment evidence states that if an employee receiving salary continuation benefits does not return to work performing “the essential job duties” of his position within six months of the date he begins receiving benefits, his job will be terminated. Oncor also submitted two letters sent to Adams informing him that his employment with the...