Adams v. State, 42671
| Decision Date | 17 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 42671,42671 |
| Citation | 338 S.E.2d 860,255 Ga. 356 |
| Parties | ADAMS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert F. Oliver, Oliver & Oliver, Clarkesville, Timothy P. Healy, for Charles William Adams.
Michael H. Crawford, Dist. Atty., Clarkesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen. Dennis R. Dunn, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for State.
Charles Adams was indicted for the murder of Chipper Brewer and for aggravated assaults upon Betty Mashburn, Marie Bennett and David Davenport. He was tried by a jury and found guilty on all counts. He brings this appeal. 1
Adams' convictions arise out of an incident that occurred on the afternoon of May 3, 1984. Brewer was driving a pickup truck and was accompanied by the other three victims, one of whom, Betty Mashburn, was his common law wife. At about 4 p.m., Brewer stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of Fairview Church Road and Highway 76 in Union County. The defendant, driving his pickup truck and with his daughter in the passenger seat, pulled up behind Brewer's truck. These facts are undisputed.
The defendant, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and relying on his testimony and that of his daughter, urges that the evidence was not sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of murder.
We would agree, except that the defendant's reliance on his and his daughter's testimony is wholly misplaced. "Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. On appeal of a criminal conviction, the evidence is to be viewed "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" (i.e., in the light most favorable to the jury's determination that the defendant is guilty), not in the light most favorable to the defendant. 2
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, is as follows: When the defendant pulled up behind the victim's truck, he started revving his engine. The deceased responded by revving his engine. The defendant got out of his truck, walked to the driver's side of the deceased's truck, told the deceased he had no right to park in the road, cursed him, and invited him to get out and settle the matter. Davenport and the deceased got out of the truck and the defendant knocked the deceased to the ground. 3
When Davenport and the deceased started to get back into the truck, the defendant knocked the deceased to the ground again. As the deceased was getting into his truck, the defendant got his pistol from his truck and fired several shots into the deceased's pickup truck, breaking its windows. 4 The defendant then walked to the driver's side of the deceased's truck and fired the shot which caused the deceased's death. A passing motorist corroborated parts of the surviving victim's testimony.
1. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This enumeration of error therefore provides no ground for reversal.
2. In his second and third enumerations of error, the defendant complains of instructions given to the jury on impeachment of witnesses. As to the first of these, viewing the instructions and charge as a whole, we find no error. Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 207 (236 SE2d 365) (1977).
The trial court also charged the jury: (Emphasis supplied.) The defendant attacks the emphasized language as invading the province of the jury, and for being vague and ambiguous in not specifying what is meant by "other competent evidence."
The charge is not in accord with the law. OCGA § 24-9-85(a) provides: OCGA § 24-9-85(b) provides: "If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence." See Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451(1), 307 S.E.2d 471 (1983); see also Alexander v. State, 247 Ga. 780(4), 279 S.E.2d 691 (1981). The pattern jury charges undertake to clarify this matter. Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. 2, Criminal Cases, pp. 38, 39 (1984).
It may be that the trial judge's charge was taken from Pike v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., 140 Ga.App. 863, 864, 232 S.E.2d 143 (1977), which is an oversimplification of a charge approved in Davis v. Newton, 217 Ga. 75(3), 121 S.E.2d 153 (1961). In any event, the jury found that the defendant and his daughter were successfully contradicted as to material matters, as opposed to other matters, OCGA § 24-9-85(a), supra, the jury was repeatedly instructed that it was the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and, viewing the charge as a whole in light of the facts of this case, we find no reversible error.
3. In his fourth and seventh enumerations of error, the defendant objects to the "malice shall be implied" language of the statutory definition of murder as burden shifting. OCGA § 16-5-1(b). In fact, the trial court recharged the jury at the state's request, correcting the language to "malice may be inferred" so as to avoid any conflict with Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). There is no error in the substituted language, "malice may be inferred." House v. State, 252 Ga. 409, 412, 314 S.E.2d 195 (1984); see also Walden v. State, 251 Ga. 505(1), 307 S.E.2d 474 (1983). Thus, these enumerations do not require a new trial.
4. The defendant's complaint that the trial court committed reversible error in initially charging "let's do everything...
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