Adkins v. SC DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
Decision Date | 23 August 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 25860.,25860. |
Citation | 360 S.C. 413,602 S.E.2d 51 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | Richard ADKINS, Shakur Ali, Kelly Ayers, Phillip Barnett, Terry Beachum, Phillip Bennett, Bobby Boozer, John Brannon, Christopher Brown, Norman Bryson, Bernard Byrd, Sirrico Burnside, Bradley Cain, Donnie Clark, Francis Coker, John Cosby, Robert Davila, Billy Joe Davis, Bobby Davis, Terry Elliott, David Ellison, Robert Elmore, Garnell Evans, Anthony Frazier, Calvin Garrett, Charles Gove, Willie Gray, William Griffin, Claude Hamrick, Floyd Hamilton, David Harig, James Heatherly, James Hicks, Demetric Hill, Joey Irby, William Joel Jackson, Hubert Jacobs, James Jeffries, Robert Jones, Robert Johnson, Andrew Kelly, Willie Ladson, Ricky Major, Alvin Manigault, Lavaul Manigault, Larry McClary, Earl McCoy, Benjamin McInnis, Phillip Meredith, Randall Miller, John Millwood, Johnny Minter, Timothy Moore, Tony Mossberg, Jerry Neal, Kendrick Nesbitt, Walter Owens, Ricky Paige, Gerald Pridmore, Darrell Pryor, Ronald Pryor, David Teiner, Gregory Scott, Michael Scott, Michael Shell, Robert Simpson, Ralph Sims, Christopher Smith, Arthur Stephenson, Dean Stevens, Leroy Sullivan, Dennis Thomason, Douglas Thompson, Eric Thompson, Douglas Tittus, Albert Todd, Donald Todd, Stevie Upton, Richard Ward, Frank Weathers, Herman Whitehead, Anthony Wilson, and Charlie Wright, Appellants, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
Harry Leslie Devoe, Jr., of New Zion, for appellants.
Lake E. Summers and Vinton D. Lide, both of Vinton D. Lide & Associates, of Lexington, for respondent.
This case involves interpretation of S.C.Code Ann. Sections 24-3-40, 24-3-410, and 24-3-430 (Supp.2002) (the Prevailing Wage statutes). Appellants, Inmates confined within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC), instituted this action asserting they were entitled to certain wages pursuant to the statutes. The circuit court ruled the statutes provided no private right of action for Inmates. We affirm in result.
Inmates, while housed at Tyger River Correctional Institute, were employed in a Prison Industries/Private Sector Program, for Standard Plywoods, making "Anderson Hardwood Floors." At the time of their initial employment, Inmates were paid a .25 per hour "training wage." After 160 hours, they were paid a .75 per hour "training wage."1 After completion of 320 hours, Inmates were paid the minimum wage of $5.15 per hour.
Inmates filed this Tort Claims action,2 maintaining their training wages and hourly wages did not satisfy the Prevailing Wage statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D);3 they contended the prevailing wage for work of a similar nature ranged from $9.00-$14.00 per hour, and that DOC's failure to pay wages in accordance with the statute was grossly negligent.
The circuit court ruled the applicable statutes did not give rise to a private cause of action in Inmates. The court further held the DOC was paying Inmates in accordance with the statutes, and that, in any event, Inmates had not established DOC's method of payment was grossly negligent, as required to maintain a Tort Claims action.
Did the circuit court err in holding the Prevailing Wage statutes did not create a private right of action in Inmates?
In 1995, the General Assembly enacted 24-3-430, authorizing the DOC to use inmate labor in private industry. Section 24-3-430 provides:
Inmates assert the circuit court erred in ruling the "the prevailing wage statute did not create a right to sue for [them] and was not enacted for [their] benefit."
Initially, we note that the DOC's failure to pay a certain wage simply does not constitute a tort so as to be cognizable under the Tort Claims Act. Further, even if this were a Tort Claims case, the circuit court correctly ruled the DOC was immune from liability under S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-60(5) ( ). In any event, we agree with the circuit court that the statutes relied upon by Inmates do not give rise to a private, civil cause of action.
The primary consideration in deciding whether a private cause of action should be implied under a criminal statute is legislative intent. Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990). Whitworth v. Fast Fare Markets of South Carolina, Inc., 289 S.C. 418, 420, 338 S.E.2d 155, 156 (1985). Where a statute does not specifically create a private cause of action, one can be implied only if the legislation was enacted for the special benefit of a private party. Citizens for Lee County v. Lee County, 308 S.C. 23, 416 S.E.2d 641 (1992) (emphasis supplied). Given that the overall purpose of the prevailing wage statute is to prevent unfair competition, and to aid society and the public in general, we cannot conclude that the statutes in question were enacted for the special benefit of Inmates.
Section 24-3-410 is entitled "Sale of prison-made products on open market generally prohibited; penalties." Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, a person must be fined not less than two hundred nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for not less than three months nor more than one year, or both. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-410(C). Although section 24-3-430 does not specifically set forth criminal penalties, section 24-3-420 states that "Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this article other than § 24-3-410 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be confined in jail not less than ten days nor more than one year, or fined not less than ten dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or both, in the discretion of the court." Nothing in the statutes indicates a legislative intent to create civil liability for a violation of the statutes. Accordingly, they do not give rise to a private right of action.6Cf., Linder v. Insurance Claims Consultants, Inc., 348 S.C. 477, 560 S.E.2d 612 (2002) ( ); Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990) ( ).7
However, notwithstanding our holding that Inmates have no private civil cause of action, they are not without a remedy. In accordance with the companion case of Wicker v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, ___ S.C. ___, 602 S.E.2d 56, 2004 WL 1877947 (2004), we hold Inmates may file an inmate grievance to protest DOC's failure to pay wages in accordance with the mandatory statutory provisions.
AFFIRMED IN RESULT.
I agree with the majority that the inmates in this matter do not have a cause of action...
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