South Carolina Dep't Of Corr. v. Cartrette

• Decision Date: 05 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 4670.,4670.
• Citation: 387 S.C. 640,694 S.E.2d 18
• Parties: SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent,v.Billy Joe CARTRETTE, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

387 S.C. 640

694 S.E.2d 18

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent,v.Billy Joe CARTRETTE, Appellant.

No. 4670.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted March 1, 2010.

Decided April 5, 2010.

Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled May 28, 2010.

Rehearing Denied May 28, 2010.

Billy J. Cartrette, pro se, for Appellant.

Lake E. Summers, of Columbia, for Respondent.

CURETON, A.J.

Billy Joe Cartrette filed a grievance with the South Carolina Department of Corrections concerning conditions of his participation in the Prison Industries Program (PIP). Cartrette appeals the circuit court's order remanding his case to the Administrative Law Court (ALC) for a determination of the prevailing wage for similar work, reversing the ALC's finding that Cartrette was an employee of the private sponsor, affirming the ALC's denial of overtime wages, and affirming the ALC's denial of reimbursement for certain pay deductions.¹ We reverse as to overtime wages, remand that issue to the ALC for further proceedings as outlined in this opinion, and affirm the circuit court's decisions on all remaining issues.²

After we issued our original opinion affirming in part and reversing in part, both parties petitioned for rehearing. We deny Cartrette's petition for rehearing, grant the Department's petition for rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute this opinion.

FACTS

Cartrette was an inmate of the Ridgeland Correctional Institution. As a participant in PIP, Cartrette provided on-site labor at the Ridgeland Correctional Institution, sometimes working in excess of ninety hours per two-week period, for PIP sponsor Kwalu Furniture. Cartrette was compensated at a rate of $5.50 per hour. Cartrette filed a grievance with the Department complaining his hourly wage was insufficient compared to the prevailing wage for similar work performed in the private sector. He asserted non-inmate employees earned $11.00 to $14.00 per hour for the same work. Cartrette further complained he did not receive additional pay for overtime hours and the Department improperly withheld funds from his paychecks. Specifically, Cartrette challenged as unconstitutional the withholding of funds for his room and board and additional funds for Victim's Assistance.³

The Department denied Cartrette's grievance, and Cartrette appealed to the ALC. The ALC reversed the Department's refusal to pay Cartrette the prevailing wage and found the prevailing wage was $5.25. Furthermore, the ALC affirmed the Department's denials of overtime and reimbursement for wage deductions.

Both Cartrette and the Department then appealed to the circuit court. After a hearing, the circuit court found $5.25 was not the prevailing wage and remanded that issue to the ALC with seven questions for the ALC to consider in determining the correct prevailing wage. The circuit court reversed the ALC's apparent finding that Cartrette “worked for ... or was otherwise ever an employee of Kwalu.” Finally, the circuit court affirmed the ALC's determinations Cartrette was ineligible for overtime or reimbursement of wage deductions for room and board and for Victims Assistance. Cartrette now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The ALC has subject matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to hear properly perfected appeals from the Department's final orders in administrative or non-collateral matters. Slezak v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 361 S.C. 327, 331, 605 S.E.2d 506, 507 (2004). Our standard of review derives from the APA. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 379, 527 S.E.2d 742, 755 (2000). We may affirm, remand, reverse, or modify the appealed decision if the appellant's substantive rights have suffered prejudice because the decision is:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp.2009).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Overtime Pay

Cartrette contends he is entitled to time-and-a-half pay for overtime worked. We agree.

In South Carolina, a non-inmate employee's right of action for overtime pay lies in § 207(a)(1) of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1998 & Supp.2009). Under the FLSA, non-inmate workers receive compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their hourly rate for hours worked in excess of forty per week. 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(2) (1998). This court recently examined the legislative intent underlying the FLSA and found:

The purpose of the FLSA is to protect “the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.” Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944). The FLSA was enacted in response to a congressional finding that some industries, engaged in commerce, maintained labor conditions which were detrimental to a minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and the general well-being of workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1998). The Act attempts to eliminate unfair labor practices without substantially curtailing employment or earning power. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b). Because the FLSA is remedial and humanitarian in purpose, it should be broadly interpreted and applied to effectuate its goals. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 597, 64 S.Ct. 698; Benshoff v. City of Virginia Beach, 180 F.3d 136 (4th Cir.1999).

Miller v. Blumenthal Mills, Inc., 365 S.C. 204, 221, 616 S.E.2d 722, 730 (Ct.App.2005).

Our supreme court has held the FLSA does not extend to inmate workers because, for purposes of payment of wages, inmate workers are not employees of PIP sponsors. Williams v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 372 S.C. 255, 260, 641 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2007). Other courts, including the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, have also declined to extend the protections of the FLSA and state labor statutes to inmates. See, e.g., Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 135 (4th Cir.1993).

Nonetheless, South Carolina law requires that inmate workers in a PIP enjoy pay and working conditions comparable to those enjoyed by non-inmate workers. According to our supreme court, the overall purpose of these statutes “is to prevent unfair competition.” Adkins v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 360 S.C. 413, 418, 602 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2004).

The [Department] must determine prior to using inmate labor in a [PIP] that it will not displace employed workers, that the locality does not have a surplus of available labor for the skills, crafts, or trades that would utilize inmate labor, and that the rates of pay and other conditions of employment are not less than those paid and provided for work of [a] similar nature in the locality in which the work is performed.

S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-315 (2007). “No inmate participating in [PIP] may earn less than the prevailing wage for work of [a] similar nature in the private sector.” S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D) (2007). “Inmate participation in the program may not result in the displacement of employed workers in the State of South Carolina and may not impair existing contracts for services.” S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-430(E) (2007). While inmates are not entitled to a private right of action in tort, they may protest through the grievance process the Department's failure to comply with these statutes. Adkins, 360 S.C. at 419, 602 S.E.2d at 55.

We expand upon the analysis of this issue in our original opinion, as that analysis appears to have been incomplete. Cartrette properly brought this matter as a grievance and alleged the Department denied him time-and-a-half overtime wages for the hours he worked beyond forty each week. As observed above, both federal and South Carolina courts have held inmate workers do not qualify as “employees” and are therefore excluded from the coverage of the FLSA.⁴ See Williams, 372 S.C. at 260, 641 S.E.2d at 888; Harker, 990 F.2d at 135. However, our General Assembly has required the Department to ensure inmate workers receive “rates of pay and other conditions of employment” comparable to those afforded non-inmate workers performing similar labor in the same locality. See § 24-3-315. Consequently, we hold that although the FLSA does not apply to inmate workers, sections 24-3-315 and 24-3-430(D) compel the Department to ensure inmate workers who are employed under those sections receive the same pay rates and employment conditions as their non-inmate peers.⁵

The statutory mandate of comparable pay rates and employment conditions does not expressly exclude time-and-a-half pay for overtime hours worked. Instead, sections 24-3-315 and 24-3-430(E) require that inmate workers receive comparable compensation and prohibit inmate workers from displacing non-inmate workers. These provisions appear to support Cartrette's argument for overtime pay. Failure of the Department's contracts with PIP sponsors to provide inmate workers with time-and-a-half pay for overtime hours when their non-inmate counterparts receive it would create an impermissible and unfair advantage for inmate labor over private labor. Moreover, any failure on the Department's behalf to pay inmates time-and-a-half overtime pay when non-inmate workers receive it for comparable work in the same area contradicts the Department's obligation under section 24-3-315.⁶ Consequently, the circuit court erred in denying Cartrette time-and-a-half pay for overtime work without first determining whether non-inmate workers performing the same work in the same locality receive time-and-a-half pay for overtime. ⁷

In addition, we observe section 24-3-430(D) requires inmates receive the “prevailing wage” paid to their non-inmate peers...