Adkins v. Stanly County Bd. Of Educ.

• Decision Date: 04 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. COA09-638.,COA09-638.
• Citation: 692 S.E.2d 470
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Mary ADKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.STANLY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Nelson Tally, in his individual and official capacity; Melvin Poole, in his individual and official capacity; Mitchell Edwards, in his individual and official capacity; Dan McSwain, in his individual and official capacity; and Christopher Whitley, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

692 S.E.2d 470

Mary ADKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.STANLY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Nelson Tally, in his individual and official capacity; Melvin Poole, in his individual and official capacity; Mitchell Edwards, in his individual and official capacity; Dan McSwain, in his individual and official capacity; and Christopher Whitley, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. COA09-638.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 4, 2010.

Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 9 January 2009 by Judge Michael E. Beale in Superior Court, Stanly County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November 2009.

Ferguson, Stein, Chambers, Gresham, & Sumter, P.A., by John W. Gresham, Charlotte, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Jill R. Wilson and Elizabeth V. LaFollette, Greensboro, for Defendants-Appellees.

Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Burton Craige, Raleigh, and Narendra K. Ghosh, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice; Katherine Lewis Parker, Raleigh, Legal Director, for ACLU of North Carolina; Thomas M. Stern, Durham, for North Carolina Association of Educators; and J. Michael McGuinness, Elizabethtown, for North Carolina Troopers Association, amici curiae.

Katherine J. Brooks, Staff Attorney, and Allison B. Schafer, General Counsel, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae.

McGEE, Judge.

Mary Adkins (Plaintiff) was employed as an Assistant Superintendent by the Stanly County Board of Education (the Board) in 2004, when the Board reviewed Plaintiff's employment contract and voted five to four not to renew her contract. Plaintiff filed a complaint on 3 May 2007, alleging two causes of action: one filed pursuant to “the provisions of Article I, §§ 1, 14, 18, and 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina;” and the second filed pursuant to “the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” In her complaint, Plaintiff named as Defendants the Board and Board members Nelson Tally, Melvin Poole, Mitchell Edwards, Dan McSwain, and Christopher Whitley (the Board Members), each in his individual and official capacity.

Defendants filed an answer and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), on 30 July 2007. In an order filed 21 December 2007, Judge Erwin Spainhour denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to: (1) Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the Board and Board Members in their official capacity for injunctive relief, (2) Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for damages against the Board members in their individual capacity, and (3) Plaintiff's state constitutional claim against the Board Members in their official capacity. Judge Spainhour determined that these claims, in the present action before us, survived Defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff had filed a complaint in 2000 (the 2000 complaint) against Defendant Tally and the Board for allegedly violating certain statutory rights regarding her employment; (2) the 2000 complaint touched on a matter of public concern; and (3) therefore Plaintiff properly stated certain claims in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as the North Carolina Constitution, alleging that Defendants declined to renew her employment contract in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed the 2000 complaint. Judge Spainhour granted Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's remaining state constitutional claim against the Board and the Board Members in their individual capacity.

Following discovery and mediation, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on 4 December 2008. Judge Michael Beale granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in an order filed on 9 January 2009. Plaintiff appeals.

Factual Background

The dispute addressed in Plaintiff's appeal originated in 2000, when Plaintiff and another Assistant Superintendent, Larry Wood (Wood), filed the 2000 complaint against Nelson Tally (Tally) and the Board. In 2000, recently-elected board members Tally and Melvin Poole (Poole) raised questions about the salaries being paid to Plaintiff and Wood. Tally voiced these questions to the local press and made what Plaintiff characterized as “defamatory statements concerning Plaintiff and Wood.” These statements led to a reduction in the salaries of Plaintiff and Wood by the Board.

In their 2000 complaint, Plaintiff and Wood alleged claims against Tally for slander and libel and for violation of their statutory rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-319, 321, and 325; and claims against the Board for breach of their employment contracts. Plaintiff and Wood resolved their claims with the Board and Tally in 2001, with their salaries restored, their contracts extended through 30 June 2004, and a confidential monetary settlement with Tally.

Plaintiff's contract again came before the Board for consideration in May 2004. The acting Superintendent of Schools recommended that the Board renew Plaintiff's contract; however, the Board voted five to four not to renew her contract. Wood had already retired and was not under consideration for contract renewal. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants in 2007, alleging that the Board failed to renew her contract in retaliation for Plaintiff's having filed the 2000 complaint.

Analysis

We review a trial court's order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the “light most favorable to the nonmoving party [.]” Carolina Bank v. Chatham Station, Inc., 186 N.C.App. 424, 428, 651 S.E.2d 386, 389 (2007) (citations omitted). We are to determine “whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Taylor v. Coats, 180 N.C.App. 210, 212, 636 S.E.2d 581, 583 (2006).

Plaintiff first argues that Judge Beale erred by granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Judge Beale erred in finding that Plaintiff's 2000 complaint did not relate to a matter of public concern, because Judge Beale was “[w]ithout [a]uthority to [d]isregard [a] [p]rior [j]udicial [d]etermination” to the contrary.

Our Supreme Court has held

that no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another's errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action.

State v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549, 592 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2003) (quoting Calloway v. Ford Motor Company, 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972)).

In Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C.App. 34, 415 S.E.2d 74 (1992), our Court addressed the question of one trial judge reconsidering an issue already decided by another trial judge in a case involving a procedural situation similar to the case before us. The plaintiff in Madry filed for divorce after the defendant was stricken by a cerebral hemorrhage causing “severe and permanent brain damage and partial paralysis.” Id. at 35, 415 S.E.2d at 75. The defendant filed an answer and later moved to amend that answer to assert that the parties separated due to the defendant's “incurable insanity [,]” and that the divorce action must therefore be brought in accordance with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-5.1 Id., 415 S.E.2d at 75-76. At the hearing on the motion to amend the defendant's answer, Judge James Fullwood “ruled that [the] defendant had failed to present evidence that she was ‘incurably insane’ and concluded that ‘[N.C.G.S. § 50-5.1] does not apply in [that] action.’ ” Id. at 36, 415 S.E.2d at 76.

The defendant in Madry later moved to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that, because the defendant was “incurably insane [,]” the plaintiff's divorce action must be brought in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 50-5.1. Id. At the hearing for the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Judge Fred Morelock “converted [the] defendant's motion to one for summary judgment ... [and] granted summary judgment in favor of [the] defendant and dismissed [the] plaintiff's claim for relief pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. § ] 50-6 stating that ‘[N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 50-5.1 provides the exclusive remedy’ ” for the plaintiff under those circumstances. Id.

The plaintiff appealed Judge Morelock's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and our Court reversed. We discussed the case as follows:

Despite the fact that Judge Morelock's order is denominated a summary judgment, the legal issue decided by that judgment, whether G.S. 50-5.1 bars this plaintiff's claim for absolute divorce pursuant to G.S. 50-6, was precisely the same issue decided to the contrary by Judge Fullwood's earlier order denying defendant's motion to amend. The materials and arguments considered by Judge Morelock were essentially the same arguments and materials considered by Judge Fullwood. Simply labeling the order a summary judgment did not change its essential character nor authorize Judge Morelock to overrule Judge Fullwood.

[The d]efendant's motion to amend was a request addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. There were no changed circumstances however which would justify Judge Morelock's reconsideration of this issue.... It is obvious from the record that, in filing her 12(b)(6) motion, [the] defendant was simply attempting to again put before the court those contentions that Judge Fullwood had rejected.

We hold that Judge Morelock committed reversible error in ruling that G.S. 50-5.1 is the exclusive remedy for this plaintiff when Judge Fullwood had previously ruled otherwise.

Id. at 38, 415 S.E.2d at 77 (citation omitted, emphasis added).

Our Courts have thus clearly held that one judge may not reconsider the legal conclusions of another judge. Woolridge, 357 N.C. at 549-50, 592 S.E.2d at 194. There is a limited exception to this rule for interlocutory orders addressed to the discretion of ...