Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co.
| Decision Date | 17 October 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 10259,10259 |
| Citation | 61 S.E.2d 633,134 W.Va. 719 |
| Parties | ADKINS, v. UNITED FUEL GAS CO. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
'The owner of the mineral underlying land possesses as incident to this ownership the right to use the surface in such manner and with such means as would be fairly necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral estate.' Squires v. Lafferty, Pt. 1, Syl., 95 W.Va. 307, 121 S.E. 90.
Bernard J. Pettigrew, Claude E. Goodwin, Charleston, for plaintiff in error.
No appearance for defendant in error.
LOVINS, President.
This action of trespass on the case was brought in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, West Virginia, by Andrew Adkins, the owner of the surface of a 50-acre tract of land, against United Fuel Gas Company, a corporation, the defendant, owner of the oil and gas underlying said land, for the purpose of recovering damages allegedly caused by defendant drilling a gas well on such land. A trial by jury was had, resulting in a verdict and judgment in the sum of $350, and defendant brings the action to this Court by writ of error.
Samuel Eddy was the owner of the surface and minerals of a tract of land containing one hundred seventy-seven acres, which included the tract now owned by plaintiff. In February, 1899, he conveyed the surface of said land to Louis Fry, with the following reservation: 'Reserving, however, to the said party of the first part, being Samuel Eddy, the absolute ownership and control of all minerals, oils, natural gas, salt brine, and the right to mine for the same, and the rights of way over, through and under said lands, with wagon, rail or tramroads for the purpose of transportation, subject to the right of the party of the second part to mine all coal upon said premises required for his domestic use.'
It is stipulated that after the severance of the minerals and surface, the title to fifty acres of the surface was and is now vested in the plaintiff, and that the title to the minerals, with appurtenant rights as above stated, was and is now vested in the defendant. The record does not disclose the mesne conveyances by which plaintiff and defendant acquired their respective titles.
A well was located near the center of the 50-acre tract of land in the month of December, 1947. Drilling of the well was actually started May 6, 1948, and was completed on or about July 21, 1948. The plaintiff seems to have used a portion of his land to grow alfalfa, corn and vegetables. Defendant constructed a road over a portion of the land approximately six hundred fifty feet in length, grading the road by means of a bulldozer; constructed through the corn and alfalfa fields a ditch approximately two hundred fifty feet long for the purpose of carrying the water and other refuse from the well; constructed a ditch in which a gas pipe was laid; and installed a pipe on the surface of the land for the purpose of piping gas to the place of drilling for the operation of the machinery used in drilling the well.
Testimony in behalf of plaintiff shows that considerable water, oil and refuse were deposited on his garden, which was close to the well drilled by defendant.
Defendant shows that the gas pipe laid on the surface of the land was removed; that the ditches in which the permanent gas pipe was buried and through which the sand, water and other refuse were drained, were refilled after the completion of the well; that the debris had been removed from the ground around the well; and that very little, if any, oil was left on the garden.
Plaintiff shows that about three-tenths of an acre of the crop of alfalfa was destroyed; that approximately seven-tenths of an acre of such alfalfa could not be cut and was thus lost to plaintiff; and that the corn land could not be plowed, because of the open drainage ditch.
It is shown by defendant's evidence that although the ditch was dug through tillable land, such land could have been cultivated with a minimum of inconvenience and labor.
At the request of the defendant the Judge of the trial court propounded the following question to the jury panel: 'Do any of you gentlemen own the surface to land only wherein others own the minerals?', to which question thirteen of the jurors answered in the affirmative. Thereupon, defendant, out of the presence of the prospective jurors, moved the court to discharge those who had answered in the affirmative, because they were disqualified. This motion was overruled.
Defendant contends: (1) That the thirteen jurors were disqualified and should have been discharged; (2) that the court erred in admitting, over objection, improper testimony offered by plaintiff, and in refusing to admit proper testimony offered by defendant; (3) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict, and that the court should have directed a verdict for the defendants; (4) that the evidence offered by plaintiff does not show negligence on the part of the defendant; and (5) that defendant in drilling and operating the gas well on plaintiff's land did not exceed its rights as the owner of the gas underlying such land.
The disposition of this case on this writ of error renders an extended discussion of some of plaintiff's contentions unnecessary. The determination of defendant's contentions with reference to the admission and rejection of evidence and concerning proof of the quantum of damages are not decisive.
But we deem the contention relative to qualifications of prospective jurors of sufficient importance to call for some discussion.
The right of a litigant to have a finding of fact by unbiased jurors acting without prejudice cannot be doubted, if by juries are to continue as an integral part of our system of jurisprudence. The minds of prospective jurors should be 'wholly free from bias or prejudice * * * for or against either party in civil cases.' State v. Hatfield, 48 W.Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626. But does the fact that thirteen of the jury panel owned the surface of lands from which the title to the minerals has been severed disqualify them? No statutory basis for disqualification of these jurors has been pointed out. We do not...
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...Masterson, Adverse Possession and the Severed Mineral Estate, 25 Tex.L.Rev. 139, 141 (1946). 20.See, e.g., Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W.Va. 719, 723, 61 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1950) (“Although oil and gas are fugaceous and vagrant in character, an estate therein may be severed from the su......
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Andrews v. Antero Res. Corp.
..., 165 W. Va. 10, 267 S.E.2d 721 (allowing mineral owner to construct an electric line across surface); Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co. , 134 W. Va. 719, 724, 61 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1950) (concluding "[t]here was nothing done which was unnecessary or unreasonable in the construction of the road t......
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Russell v. Island Creek Coal Co.
...the rights of the surface owner, and thus exceeded the rights possessed by the owner of such minerals." Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W.Va. 719, 724, 61 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1950). In two cases concerning broad form mineral severance deeds that resulted in the diversion or contamination of......
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Oresta v. Romano Bros., Inc., 10455
...on the land used by the defendants, upon the lands of the plaintiffs, the defendants cite and rely upon the cases of Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Company, W.Va. 61 S.E.2d 633; Robinson v. South Penn Oil Company, 112 W.Va. 114, 163 S.E. 857; Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W.Va. 307, 121 S.E. 90; Prest......