Admin. Office of the Courts v. Miller

• Decision Date: 20 August 2015
• Citation: 468 S.W.3d 323
• Parties: Administrative Office of the Courts, Appellant/Cross–Appellee v. Beverly Miller, Appellee/Cross–Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

468 S.W.3d 323

Administrative Office of the Courts, Appellant/Cross–Appellee

v.Beverly Miller, Appellee/Cross–Appellant

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

2013–SC–000373–TG

RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2015

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREON TRANSFER FROM COURT OF APPEALS, CASE NOS. 2013–CA–000257–MR AND 2013–CA–000269–MR, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01–CI–008128

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Margaret Eileen Mary Keane, Brent Robert Baughman, Melissa Norman Bork, Reva Dawn Campbell, Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP, 3500 National City Tower, 101 S. Fifth Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Thomas E. Clay, Clay Daniel Walton & Adams, PLC, Meidinger Tower, Suite 101, 462 South Fourth Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202

OPINION OF THE COURT BY SPECIAL JUSTICE JOHN S. REED

This matter is before the Court for the second time on transfer from the Court of Appeals. We now consider the appeal and cross-appeal from the December 3, 2012 summary judgment order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, entered after this Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court on December 22, 2011.

We reverse the Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Beverly J. Miller (“Miller”) and denying summary judgment to the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) on Miller's claim that she was a tenured employee of the Court of Justice (“COJ”) and, therefore, before she was terminated, she was entitled to the due process provided in the COJ Personnel Policies. As a matter of law, we hold that, on the undisputed record, Miller was not a tenured employee and was not entitled to termination due process under the COJ Personnel Policy.

We affirm the Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment to the AOC and dismissing Miller's claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Statute. On the record, we hold as a matter of law that Miller did not report or disclose previously concealed or non-public information that would entitle her to protection under KRS 61.102.

I. Procedural Background

The course of this long-running public employment dispute is recounted in the December 22, 2011, opinion of this Court. Miller v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 361 S.W.3d 867, 869–71 (Ky.2011). There, this Court considered Miller's appeal from the Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing her claims as being barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the issues in question had already been decided in federal court. This Court concluded:

There is nothing in the record below, or in the federal action, indicating that there has been a finding of whether Miller's position with the AOC was tenured or “at will,” and if tenured whether she was afforded her rights under the administrative procedures of the AOC.

... The finding of the federal district court dismissing Miller's whistleblower claims was not necessary to the opinion of the Sixth Circuit that sustained the district court's dismissal of Miller's claim on other grounds, thus depriving the final decision of the federal courts of one of the required tests in order for issue preclusion to apply to the state court action.

Id. at 877.

This Court reversed the dismissal of Miller's claims and remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court

for further proceedings in regard to Miller's status as a tenured employee entitled to due process protection afforded by the administrative policies of the AOC, and if she was a tenured employee, a finding of whether those policies were followed in regard to Miller's termination, and in regard to whether Miller reported information that would entitle her to protection under the Kentucky whistleblower statute.

Id.

II. Relevant Facts

As when this Court last considered this dispute, “[t]he specific facts leading up to [Miller's 2001] termination are not necessary to resolution of this matter.” Id. at 869.

A. Miller's status as a tenured or at-will employee.

Effective July 15, 1976, Miller (then known as Beverly Doyle) was appointed by the Chief Judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court “as coordinator for the Jefferson Circuit Court,” “to serve at the pleasure of the Court,” i.e., as an at-will employee. The position she filled was created in 1976 under a temporary grant from the United States Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (“LEAA”) to develop the Jefferson County Jury Management Project—a more efficient and effective jury management system for the largest county in the Commonwealth. This represents the first time, and still the only time, a Kentucky trial court has separated jury management from the rest of the trial court administrator's traditional functions.

Effective March 1, 1977, Miller's “position title” was reclassified from “Aid Coordinator” to “Jury Pool Manager.” She continued in the same job with the same duties. By the time grant funding for the Jefferson County Jury Management Project ended, the COJ had budgeted funds to continue the Jefferson County jury management program and make permanent the jury pool manager position that had been temporary when it was created under grant funding. ¹

Miller continued as Jefferson County Jury Pool Manager until early 1999, when a change in Kentucky law allowed employees to draw both retirement and salary simultaneously. To take advantage of the new law, she retired as full-time Jury PoolManager effective February 28, 1999, and she was rehired part-time in the same position effective April 1, 1999.

Effective July 1, 1999, Miller's “position title” was reclassified from Jury Pool Manager to “Professional Services Supervisor.” On July 26, 1999, Miller requested to go full-time in her job effective September 1, 1999. So on September 1, 1999, the AOC personnel manager confirmed to Miller in a letter that she was then a “full-time employee” “as a 'Professional Services Supervisor' with the working title 'Jury Pool Manager.' ” Her duties remained the same. After that, as before, Miller consistently referred to herself, and also signed documents, as “Jury Pool Manager” or as “Jury Pool Administrator.”

Miller's employment with the COJ ended when she was terminated by Jefferson Circuit Chief Judge Tom Wine in a letter dated April 24, 2001.

There is no indication in any document in Miller's COJ/AOC personnel file that her employment status was ever anything other than at will. Never did the word “tenure” or “tenured” or any equivalent (like “classified” or “covered”) appear. Over the course of Miller's employment, her merit status was variously expressed in writing in her personnel file as “at the pleasure of the Court,” “unclassified,” or “not covered,” each of which indicates at-will, non-tenured employment.

For her entire employment with the Jefferson Circuit Court, Miller's duties always included only the function of jury pool management. Traditionally jury pool management has been performed directly by trial court administrators everywhere in Kentucky except Jefferson County where, since 1976, the function was separated for the Jefferson County jury pool.² The Jefferson Circuit Court Chief Judge had the administrative authority to delegate to the Trial Court Administrator the responsibility for overseeing the jury pool management function.

B. Miller's whistleblower status.

Miller's claim under KRS 61.102 is that she was terminated for alleging, over the period September 2000 to April 2001, both in person and in writing (by letter and tendered grievance papers) that the AOC job descriptions for Chief Court Administrator and Court Administrator included jury pool management duties, which had not been the case in Jefferson County since 1976. Miller alleged that because of the job descriptions, AOC erroneously believed that the Jefferson County Chief Court Administrator and Court Administrator actually performed jury management functions in Jefferson County, leading to what she felt was inadequate support for the jury pool management function in Jefferson County in 2000 and 2001.

Miller explained in an affidavit in this case:

In September, 2000, Robyne Ryan (Assistant Jury Pool Manager) and I decided to pursue an explanation for AOC's refusal to provide support for jury operations. We decided to pursue the validity of talk that circulated in the early 1980's that Tim Vize, the District Court Administrator at the time, claimed to perform my job in order to justify an increase in his salary from AOC. We suspected the talk had some basis because of the inordinate amount of support provided by AOC to Jefferson County Court Administrators in relation to the duties they perform.

And Miller's April 2001 grievance papers expressed her theory this way:

Over several years, I have requested numerous times AOC assign our office additional staff. Our requests have been continually denied. Though the workload in the jury pool has more than doubled, we still operate with the same number of employees as we did in 1977.

The job descriptions of Chief Court Administrator, Circuit Court Administrator and District Court Administrator assign performing “the highly responsible duties of jury management” as one of the two major functions of each position.

As you know, for over 20 years, the Court Administrators in Jefferson County have not performed these duties assigned by AOC.

The AOC job descriptions for the Chief Court Administrator and Court Administrator positions that Miller cites contain the following identical language that is material to Miller's whistleblower claim:

Characteristics of the Class:

Under administrative direction of the Chief District and Circuit Judge, performs highly responsible duties in caseflow management and jury management; acts as general liaison among court officials, the public, and the Central Administrative Office of the Courts system.

Examples of Duties:

...

Assists in the calling, pooling and coordination of jurors, answers public inquiries, and individual juror complaints and questions, distributes and handles juror questionnaires.

III. Analysis

A. Standard of Review.

Summary...