Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, Nos. 2007–SC–000609–TG.

• Decision Date: 26 April 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 2007–SC–000609–TG.
• Citation: 361 S.W.3d 867
• Parties: Beverly L. MILLER, Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF the COURTS, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

361 S.W.3d 867

Beverly L. MILLER, Appellant,

v.ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF the COURTS, Appellee.

Nos. 2007–SC–000609–TG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

Dec. 22, 2011.Rehearing Denied April 26, 2012.

Thomas E. Clay, Clay, Frederick, Adams, PLC, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Appellant.

Cynthia Blevins Doll, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Lisa Catherine Dejaco, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion of the Court by Special Justice JOHN T. McGARVEY.

This matter is before the Court on transfer from the Court of Appeals of an appeal of the decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court in an action brought by an employee of the Court of Justice alleging violation of her due process rights and of the state's whistleblower statute in the termination of her employment in the Jefferson Circuit Court Clerk's Office. Appellant, Beverly L. Miller (“Miller”), appeals from the Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing her claims against the Administrative Office of the Courts as being barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the issues in question had already been decided in federal court. We reverse the decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing Miller's claims, and remand to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. Background

Miller was employed in the Jefferson Circuit Court Clerk's office, first as the “Jury Pool Manager” and later as the “Professional Services Supervisor.” Her employment was terminated in 2001. The specific facts leading up to her termination are not necessary to resolution of this matter, but they are recounted in the various opinions rendered by the federal courts that originally heard her causes of action. See Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. Civ. A. 3:01 CV–339–S, 2005 WL 1244988 (W.D.Ky. May 23, 2005) (memorandum opinion), aff'd, 448 F.3d 887 (6th Cir.2006); Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. Civ. A. 3:01 CV–339–S (W.D.Ky. June 23, 2004) (memorandum opinion); Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. Civ. A. 3:01 CV–339–S, 2001 WL 1792453 (W.D.Ky. Sept. 11, 2001) (memorandum opinion).

After her termination, Miller filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky alleging various causes of action, including violation of her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, violation of her free speech rights, and, by pendant jurisdiction, a violation of Kentucky's whistleblower statute, KRS 61.102 et seq. The original defendants in that action included the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”), which is the administrative agency of the Court of Justice; Tim Vize (“Vize”), the Chief Court Administrator for the Jefferson Circuit Court and Appellant's supervisor, in both his individual and official capacities; and the Hon. Tom Wine, Chief Judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court, also in his individual and official capacities (“Judge Wine”). After Judge Wine's term as Chief Judge ended, Miller also named his replacement, Judge James Shake (“Judge Shake”), in his official capacity.

The AOC was dismissed from the district court action on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. See Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. Civ. A. 3:01CV–339–S, 2001 WL 1792453 (W.D.Ky. Sept. 11, 2001) (memorandum opinion). The claims against Vize, Judge Shake, and Judge Wine remained before the federal court at that time.

Once the AOC was finally dismissed as a party to the federal lawsuit, Miller filed a state court action against it (but none of the other federal defendants), alleging her termination violated both her due process rights under Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky's whistleblower statute. The matter was held in abeyance in the Jefferson Circuit Court pending resolution of the federal action.

The federal district court later dismissed the federal law claims against Vize and Judge Wine in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment grounds and in their individual capacities on the basis of qualified immunity, except to the extent prospective injunctive relieve was sought. Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. Civ. A. 3:01 CV–339–S (W.D.Ky. June 23, 2004) (memorandum opinion). As to the First Amendment claim, the court held that no constitutional violation had occurred, id. slip op. at 9; as to the due process claim, the court held that the officials' decisions had been reasonable, id. slip op. at 11. The state law claims against them remained pending, as did the federal claim against Judge Shake. Those claims, too, were finally dismissed in 2005, the federal claims against Judge Shake on Eleventh Amendment grounds and the state law claims against Vize and Judge Wine in part on Eleventh Amendment grounds (i.e., their official capacities) and in part on the merits (i.e., their individual capacities). See Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. Civ. A. 3:01 CV–339–S, 2005 WL 1244988 (W.D.Ky. May 23, 2005) (memorandum opinion).¹ The decision of the district court was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in Miller v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887 (6th Cir.2006).²

When the dismissal of Miller's claims in the federal action became final, the AOC moved for dismissal in the state court of Miller's whistleblower and state due process claims based on the theory that res judicata serves as a bar to the state court action. By Order of July 2, 2007, the Jefferson Circuit Court sustained the AOC's motion on the grounds of res judicata. The decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court found that the decisions of the federal district court dismissing the action initiated by Miller against the AOC were grounded on the same facts as the action she brought in the Jefferson Circuit Court, which precluded the state court action.

This Court accepted transfer of the case to decide whether the trial court was correct in concluding that res judicata and related doctrines barred the state court action.

II. Analysis

A. The Law of Res Judicata: Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion

The doctrines of res judicata and issue preclusion must both be examined in this case. Before turning to the requirements of the doctrines, it is first necessary to clarify what we mean by the various terms used for the doctrines. Res judicata is also known as claim preclusion. The doctrine prohibits the relitigation of claims that were litigated or could have been litigated between the same parties in a prior action. Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, is a related doctrine. It allows the use of an earlier judgment by one not a party to the original action to preclude relitigation of matters litigated in the earlier action. Though technically different doctrines, the terms res judicata and collateral estoppel (and claim and issue preclusion) are sometimes used interchangeably.

Res judicata, being the older term, is also sometimes thought of as an umbrella doctrine that contains within it both claim and issue preclusion. See, e.g., Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 464–65 (Ky.1998) (“The doctrine of res judicata is formed by two subparts: 1) claim preclusion and 2) issue preclusion.”). Claim preclusion “is synonymous with res judicata in its strict sense.” Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 159 (2d ed.1995). Nevertheless, the term “claim preclusion” is often preferable to the term “res judicata,” if only for the sake of clarity and to use a term that parallels “issue preclusion.” See, e.g., Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465 n. 2 (“In this opinion we employ the term claim preclusion to refer to the doctrine which bars subsequent litigation of a cause of action which has previously been adjudicated. The term issue preclusion is employed to refer to the doctrine which prohibits issues which were adjudicated in a previous lawsuit from being relitigated in a subsequent lawsuit. Res judicata is the Latin term which encompasses both issue and claim preclusion and is not to be used as synonymous with either individually, but rather equally with both. Collateral estoppel is a term used by some to refer to issue preclusion, but for simplicity's sake, we shall not use it in this opinion.”); see also Allen D. Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62 Mich. L.Rev. 33, 33–34 (1963–64) (urging use of the terms claim and issue preclusion). As used below, especially in quotations from earlier decisions, res judicata is used primarily to mean claim preclusion.

Res judicata, in the sense of claim preclusion, “is basic to our legal system and stands for the principle that once rights of the parties have been finally determined, litigation should end.” Slone v. R & S Mining, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Ky.2002). Or as the term has been more thoroughly defined:

“[T]he doctrine of res judicata prevents the relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent appeal and includes every matter belonging to the subject of the litigation which could have been, as well as those which were, introduced in support of the contention of the parties on the first appeal.”

Huntzinger v. McCrae, 818 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky.App.1990) (quoting

Burkett v. Board of Ed. of Pulaski County, 558 S.W.2d 626, 627–28 (Ky.App.1977)) (alteration in original). The very purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to preclude repetitious actions. Harrod v. Irvine, 283 S.W.3d 246, 250 (Ky.App.2009). Three elements must be met for the rule to apply: (1) there must be an identity of parties between the two actions; (2) there must be an identity of the two causes of action; and (3) the prior action must have been decided on the merits. Id.

Res judicata, again in the strict sense of claim preclusion, is a similar but necessarily distinct doctrine from issue preclusion. “[A] close cousin to the doctrine res judicata is the theory of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 954 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Ky.1997)....