Administrator, Retreat Hosp. v. Johnson In and For Broward County, 94-3196

• Decision Date: 30 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-3196,94-3196
• Citation: 660 So.2d 333
• Parties: 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1977 ADMINISTRATOR, RETREAT HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. The Honorable W. Clayton JOHNSON of the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit In and For BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, Alan Schreiber, Broward County Public Defender, and Frederick A. Goldstein, Special Assistant Public Defender, Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 333

660 So.2d 333

20 Fla. L. Weekly D1977

ADMINISTRATOR, RETREAT HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. The Honorable W. Clayton JOHNSON of the Circuit Court of the

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit In and For BROWARD COUNTY,

Florida, Alan Schreiber, Broward County Public Defender, and

Frederick A. Goldstein, Special Assistant Public Defender,

Respondents.

No. 94-3196.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Aug. 30, 1995.

Barbara Carey del Castillo of Broad and Cassel, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Charles A. Fahlbusch and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorneys General, Hollywood, for respondent-Judge W. Clayton Johnson.

Alan H. Schreiber, Public Defender, and Diane M. Cuddihy, Assistant Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents-Alan H. Schreiber and Frederick A. Goldstein.

PARIENTE, Judge.

In this combined petition for writs of prohibition and quo warranto, petitioner, Administrator, Retreat Hospital, a psychiatric hospital (hospital), seeks to prohibit the trial court from taking further action in four different habeas corpus proceedings arising out of involuntary placements under the Baker Act and to prevent the Office of the Public Defender from exceeding the scope of its office. The hospital contends that the trial court embarked upon a regulatory review of Baker Act conditions in Broward County without subject matter jurisdiction at the unlawful request of the special assistant public defender.

FACTS

This case began when the hospital sought the involuntary placement of four individual patients under chapter 394 of the Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Baker Act. The four patients had been certified by the hospital for involuntary placement pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes, and were transported to the hospital's facility by private individuals. The Office of the Public Defender was appointed to represent each of the patients in hearings on the petitions for involuntary placement scheduled for December 16, 1993.

One day prior to the hearings, December 15, 1993, the special assistant public defender filed four habeas corpus petitions naming the hospital as respondent, alleging that the patients had been transported to the hospital's facility by someone other than a law enforcement agency in direct violation of section 394.463, under which the patients were being involuntarily held and that, therefore, their confinement was unlawful. That same day, one of the patients was transferred from the hospital's facility to a medical facility. By December 24, 1993, the three other patients On January 11, 1994, the trial court dismissed each of the habeas corpus petitions, finding in each case that no violation of the patients' constitutional rights could arise because "an alleged improper transportation vehicle was used to deliver the patient[s]" to petitioner's facility for treatment. The special assistant public defender timely moved for rehearing on all four dismissals, asserting that he was not challenging the use of improper transportation vehicles, but rather challenging:

had been discharged from the hospital's facility.

[T]he right of a private party to transport a person from their home to a hopital [sic], which may not be the nearest hospital, especially when the same private party executed the certificate of involuntary examination....

The special assistant public defender asserted that this practice was in clear violation of section 394.463, governing involuntary examinations. ¹ He further alleged that although the original patients had been released, the matter was not moot because it was possible of repetition and would otherwise escape judicial review. The four petitions for rehearing were considered by the trial court after which the trial court set a status hearing on the issue of "Chapter 394, Transportation of Patients," specifically on the matter of "involuntary examination involving private transportation from the patient's home to the hospital."

The trial court conducted hearings concerning the propriety of utilizing private transportation, rather than law enforcement officers, to transport persons who meet the criteria for involuntary examination. The cited abuse flowing from this practice, which allegedly occurred in the case of each of the four patients, was that patients were not being transported to the nearest receiving facility by a law enforcement officer as required by statute. After being noticed by the trial court, those present at the hearings included an assistant state attorney, an attorney for the hospital, the hospital's executive director and district program supervisor, an attorney for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, a representative of the private transporting company, two general masters and the special assistant public defender.

The trial court rendered the first of two orders on May 6, 1994, finding that a law enforcement officer is responsible for transporting individuals who are to be involuntarily examined to the nearest receiving facility and that in Broward County the manner in which such individuals were taken to receiving facilities did not comply with the statutory mandate. Pursuant to these findings, the trial court ordered that:

[T]he Sheriff of Broward County, in recognition of his duties with respect to the providing of transportation services under Chapter 394, F.S. shall provide a plan as to how transportation services on a countywide basis will be provided and the date such services will be operational.

The trial court also ordered that:

Any person initiating a certificate or other document which is used to initiate an involuntary examination pursuant to either Secs. 394.463(2) and (3), F.S. shall file with the clerk of courts within 24 hours of its execution the original certificate or other original document.

The trial court directed that another hearing be held within 90 days to ascertain the progress of the plan's development and to review budgetary information and statistical information if necessary. The hearing was set for September 13, 1994.

On the day of the September 13th hearing, the hospital moved to strike all pleadings and papers and to vacate the trial court's order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court was conducting an improper regulatory and advisory inquiry without subject matter jurisdiction because the matters were now moot as a result of the patients' release and because the writs had been dismissed. At the same time, the hospital also moved for reconsideration of the May 6, 1994 order. Both motions were denied by the trial court.

Following the September 13th hearing, the trial court rendered a second order dated September 19, 1994, entitled "Order on Baker Act Transportation and Procedures From Hearing of September 13, 1994 and Administrative Order." The trial court found that the system for transportation for involuntary examinations continued to be flawed. The trial court further noted that 1,287 petitions for involuntary placements (hospitalizations) were filed in Broward County in 1993, nearly twice the number filed in Dade County and three times the number filed for the same period in Palm Beach County. The trial court stated that:

Because of the systemic nature of the issues raised in this matter together with other cases brought to the attention of this court, this order shall also serve as an administrative order and further invokes the investigative powers of Chapter 394 so that the purposes of Chapter 394 can be obtained in an appropriate fashion and the rights of the citizens of this county can be assured.

Despite this broad introductory language, the trial court essentially repromulgated its May 6th order that effective immediately, transportation of everyone pursuant to chapter 394 was to be by a law enforcement officer in strict compliance with the countrywide transportation services plan formulated by the Sheriff of Broward County. However, the trial court additionally ordered "interested attorneys" and "especially those representing the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State Attorney's Office, Office of the Attorney General" to brief it on the following proposals relative to Baker Act proceedings and procedures:

1. All certificates, pleadings or actions of any kind seeking an involuntary examination pursuant to Secs. 394.463(1) and (3) F.S. must be presented to the Circuit Court, Probate Division with appropriate documentation for the consideration of the entry of a court order for involuntary examination. The only exception is when a law enforcement officer, because of a well documented emergency, initiates a certificate.

2. No receiving facility shall accept or admit anyone without a court order or with a valid certificate by a law enforcement officer illustrating a clear emergency and that detention for an involuntary examination is warranted.

LAW

Following entry of this order, the hospital filed this petition claiming that all of the trial court's orders and actions and the actions of the special assistant public defender were in excess of their authority. Our supreme court in English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296 (Fla.1977), explained that the narrow parameters for the writ of prohibition are:

[M]eant to be very narrow in scope, to be employed with great caution and utilized only in emergencies. Prohibition may only be granted when it is shown that a lower court is without jurisdiction or attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction. It is preventive and not corrective in that it commands the one to whom it is directed not to do the thing which the supervisory court is informed the lower tribunal is about to do. Its purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to compel the undoing of something already done.

The supreme court distinguished between a trial court acting in excess of its jurisdiction versus a...