Adoption of Baby Girl K, In re
| Decision Date | 21 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 8504-2-I,8504-2-I |
| Citation | 26 Wn.App. 897,615 P.2d 1310 |
| Parties | In re the ADOPTION OF BABY GIRL K. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Malcolm L. Edwards, Robert G. Sieh, Edwards & Barbieri, Seattle, for appellants prospective adoptive parents.
James G. Leach, Joseph D. Murphy, Geraghty & Vanderhoef, Seattle, for appellant Burden Bearers-Social Services.
John David Nellor, Vancouver, for appellant natural father.
John D. Blankinship, Montgomery, Purdue, Blankinship & Austin, Seattle, for respondent natural mother.
The mother of Baby Girl K filed a petition to revoke the written surrender of her child to a licensed 1 child placement agency, Burden Bearers-Social Services (Burden Bearers). The father of the child, as well as Burden Bearers, resisted the petition. The trial court sustained the challenge and ordered the child returned to her mother. Both the trial court and this court stayed the order pending a decision on appeal. By stipulated order, the prospective adoptive parents intervened after entry of judgment, and they joined Burden Bearers and the child's father in this appeal from that judgment. We reverse the trial court and hold that the surrender of the child was lawful and irrevocable.
The biological parents were married about 3 weeks prior to the birth of their daughter, Baby Girl K. On July 23, 1979, after the mother's eighteenth birthday, the parents met with a social worker from Burden Bearers. The baby was almost 2 months old, and the parents felt they were neither emotionally nor financially able to adequately care for her. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss placing the baby for adoption.
During the meeting, as an alternative to surrendering their child, the parents considered placing the child temporarily in a foster home while they tried to resolve their marital problems. Living with the mother's parents was suggested as another alternative. Separation of the parents and welfare to aid the child were discussed. The social worker proposed waiting a few days before making their decision. These options were rejected, and the parents decided to sign the surrender agreements.
The mother read the surrender instrument several times. The social worker told her it was irrevocable and explained that "irrevocable" meant that she could not change her In the morning of July 24, 1979, the mother telephoned Burden Bearers and renounced her surrender of custody. This was satisfactory to the agency, and the mother was told that the prospective adoptive parents would be informed that the child was unavailable. That afternoon, however, the mother again telephoned and asked for the proceedings to go forward.
mind. She signed it and thereby agreed to place her child with Burden Bearers for adoption pursuant to former RCW 26.37.010. 2 The father signed a similar agreement. The baby remained in the custody of the biological parents after they signed these documents
On July 25, 1979, Burden Bearers filed the surrenders and a verified petition for an order authorizing the parents' relinquishment of permanent custody pursuant to RCW 26.36.010. On that day, the court entered an order authorizing the relinquishment, permanently depriving the natural parents of all parental rights in the child, awarding permanent custody to Burden Bearers and authorizing Burden Bearers to consent to the adoption of the child. The order also authorized the prospective adoptive parents to file a petition for adoption.
On July 26, 1979, the child was picked up by Burden Bearers from the home of the maternal grandparents. She was subsequently placed in the home of the prospective adoptive parents.
On July 27, 1979, the mother, through an attorney, gave notice to Burden Bearers' attorney that she was withdrawing her written surrender and demanding the return of her child. On that day, she signed and verified a petition for rescission of her surrender. The petition was filed a few days later, after she commenced a separate dissolution proceeding against her husband. The petition for rescission alleged in part:
On Monday, July 23, 1979, the petitioner was induced to sign a consent to the adoption of her daughter by fraud and duress of her husband, . . . and by fraud and overreaching practiced by the adoption agency, Burden Bearers. That agency purported to perform a counselling service for the petitioner and her husband, but in fact it amounted to an intensive sales campaign for relinquishment of the baby for adoption by a recipient selected by that religious organization.
The trial court found no fraud or overreaching by Burden Bearers and did not rule with respect to the alleged fraud and duress by the natural father. 3 Instead the trial court determined that the natural mother did not fully understand and appreciate the legal effect of the instrument she signed to surrender her child. The court's conclusion of law states:
Because of her inexperience and emotional stress at the time of her signature of said instrument, she was uncertain and undecided as to the advisability of permanent relinquishment of her baby for adoption, and accordingly, her execution of her said instrument was not voluntary, and is void.
Conclusion of Law B. The trial court also concluded the instrument, executed prior to the entry of the order of relinquishment, violated RCW 26.36.010. As a third ground for granting the petition, the trial court held that the order of relinquishment was void due to the failure to obtain a report from a next friend of the child and the failure to hold a hearing to review such a report.
We first consider whether the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the surrender was void because it was executed prior to the order of relinquishment.
The procedures utilized by Burden Bearers are statutory and the propriety of action taken must be measured against the language of the relevant statutes. In re Adoption of Jackson, 89 Wash.2d 945, 947, 578 P.2d 33 (1978); In re Adoption of Hernandez, 25 Wash.App. 447, 451, 607 P.2d 879 (1980). Prior to its amendment by Laws of 1979, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 165, § 18, RCW 26.37.010 provided in part:
Any benevolent or charitable society incorporated under the laws of this state for the purpose of receiving, caring for or placing out for adoption, or improving the condition of orphan, homeless, neglected or abused minor children of this state shall have authority to receive, control, and dispose of children under eighteen years of age under the following provisions:
(1) When the father and mother or the person or persons legally entitled to act as guardian of the person of any minor child shall, in writing, surrender such child to the charge and custody of said society, such child shall thereafter be in legal custody of such society for the purposes herein provided.
(5) When any child shall have been surrendered in accordance with any of the preceding clauses and such child shall have been accepted by such society, then, (but not otherwise), the rights of its natural parents or of the guardian of its person (if any) shall cease and such corporation shall become entitled to the custody of such child, and shall have authority to care for and educate such child or place it either temporarily or permanently in a suitable private home in such manner as shall best secure its welfare. Such corporation shall have authority when any such child has been surrendered to it in accordance with any of the preceding provisions, and it is still in its control, to consent to its adoption under the laws of Washington. The custody or control of any such child by any such corporation or by any other corporation, institution, society or person may be inquired into, and, in the discretion of the court, terminated at any time by the superior court of the county where the child may be, upon the complaint of any person, and a showing that such custody is not in the interest of the child.
Relevant portions of RCW 26.36.010 provide:
It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, society, association, or corporation, except the parents, to assume the permanent care, custody, or control of any minor child unless authorized so to do by a written order of a superior court of the state. It shall be unlawful without the written order of the superior court having first been obtained, for any parent or parents to in any wise relinquish or transfer to another person, partnership, society, association, or corporation, the permanent care, custody, or control of any minor child for adoption or any other purpose, and any such relinquishment or transfer shall be void.
RCW 26.36.040 reads in part:
No maternity hospital, physician, midwife, or nurse, or any other person shall directly or indirectly dispose of infants by placing them in family homes for permanent care or for adoption, until after the order of relinquishment has been entered.
The parties have exhaustively argued the meaning of these and other statutory provisions. Their application to this case, however, is rather straightforward if we assume, without deciding, that the mother is correct in her argument that RCW 26.36.010 and .040 require a court order to transfer the permanent care, custody and control of a minor child to a licensed child placement agency. See In re Adoption of Hernandez, supra. Under this assumption, the only issue is whether the trial court correctly held that obtaining the written surrender prior to the court order violated RCW 26.36.010. We hold that it was proper to first obtain the written surrender and then obtain the order of relinquishment because, under the facts of this case, the surrender did not "in any wise" transfer the permanent care, custody and control of the child.
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