Adoption of Doe, Matter of

• Decision Date: 13 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 72593,72593
• Citation: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 201,543 So.2d 741
• Parties: , 14 Fla. L. Weekly 201 In The Matter Of The ADOPTION OF John DOE, Infant Baby Boy. Bob DOE and Jane Doe, Petitioners, v. Richard ROE and Mary Roe, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 741

543 So.2d 741

57 USLW 2675, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 201

In The Matter Of The ADOPTION OF John DOE, Infant Baby Boy.

Bob DOE and Jane Doe, Petitioners, v. Richard ROE and Mary Roe, Respondents.

No. 72593.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 13, 1989.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 1989.

Chandler R. Muller of Muller, Kirkconnell, Lindsey and Snure, P.A., Winter Park, and Anthony B. Marchese, Tampa, for petitioners.

John L. O'Donnell, Jr. of DeWolf, Ward, O'Donnell & Hoofman, P.A., Orlando, for respondents.

Cynthia L. Greene of Frumkes and Greene, P.A., Miami, Chairman, and Elaine N. Duggar, Tallahassee, Nancy Rainey Palmer, Casselberry, and Cynthia S. Swanson, Gainesville, amicus curiae for The Family Law Section of The Florida Bar.

SHAW, Justice.

We review In Re the Adoption of John Doe, 524 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), to answer a certified question of great public importance. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

The facts of the case are fully set forth in the decision below which quoted extensively from the factual findings of the trial court. Richard and Mary Roe met in Tempe, Arizona, in the summer of 1985, and Mary became pregnant in January 1986. Richard did not want marriage and urged Mary to have an abortion because he was not ready to commit to marriage, felt financial pressure, and was troubled by the whole idea of the marriage. Mary refused to abort and upon loss of employment was reduced to living off public welfare and private charity. During the critical period Richard failed to provide Mary with meaningful emotional or financial support. Nevertheless, they continued to see each other regularly and when the subject of adoption surfaced Richard initially voiced no objection. In July 1986, Mary advised her mother in Florida of her predicament and asked her to seek suitable adoptive parents. This was done and in late July Mary came to Florida to arrange for the Does to adopt her unborn child. Mary continued to maintain contact with Richard and advised him of the adoption arrangements in process. Richard now did not want the child placed for adoption, but still opposed marriage and offered no meaningful support to the now destitute mother. The child was born on 12 September 1986, Mary signed the adoption agreement two days later, and the child was placed in the adoptive home on 15 September. Richard then announced his opposition to the adoption, proposed marriage to Mary, and came to Florida where he signed an acknowledgment of paternity and the child's birth certificate. The adoptive parents refused to voluntarily relinquish the child and went forward with an adoption petition in October. Richard and Mary married in November 1986. After a May 1987 trial, the court entered judgment approving the adoption. The trial judge found that Mary voluntarily consented to the adoption, that Richard's prebirth actions estopped him from opposing the adoption and that his consent was not required because he had legally abandoned the child. Without relying on the finding as the basis for judgment, the court also found that the best interests of the child would be served by the adoption because of bonding between the child and the adoptive parents. On appeal, the district court approved the factual findings of the trial court, agreed that Mary had voluntarily consented to the adoption, but held as a matter of law that Richard's prebirth conduct could not be used as a basis for abandonment and that his consent was therefore required under chapter 63, Florida Statutes (1985). The district court preserved the status quo, pending acceptance or denial of jurisdiction and ultimate disposition by this Court. The district court also concluded that there was no clear authority in Florida on the issue of prebirth abandonment and certified the following question of great public importance.

CAN THE FAILURE OF A PUTATIVE UNMARRIED FATHER TO ASSUME SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES AND MEDICAL EXPENSES FOR THE NATURAL MOTHER WHEN SHE REQUIRES SUCH ASSISTANCE AND HE IS AWARE OF HER NEEDS, BE A BASIS FOR A TRIAL COURT TO EXCUSE HIS CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD, ON THE GROUNDS OF ABANDONMENT OR ESTOPPEL, PURSUANT TO SECTION 63.072(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985).

524 So.2d at 1044.

We first address the issue of the natural mother's consent to the adoption. The adoption here was performed through an intermediary. Pursuant to law, the natural mother was interviewed and counseled by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on 12 August 1986. During the interview, Mary said she was an unmarried parent with one previous child and could not financially support two children as a single parent. She identified Richard Roe as the natural father but said, while he did not deny paternity, he had furnished no meaningful financial support and eschewed responsibility for the child. The terms of the consent, its finality, and irrevocability were explained to Mary and she indicated she understood. Mary said she had thought through her decision and, while it was difficult, she believed adoption was best for everyone. After the birth of the child, Mary executed a consent to the adoption on 14 September 1986 and the child was placed with the adoptive parents on the following day. Within days, Mary attempted to withdraw her consent, maintaining that she had consented under the duress of her personal circumstances and that, with Richard's later agreement to marriage, she now wished to keep the child. The trial judge found that Mary was fully aware of the consequences when she voluntarily executed the consent, that the consent had not been obtained by fraud or duress, and that she could not thereafter revoke her consent. We agree with and adopt the rationale of the district court below in affirming the trial court on this point.

The trial court found the natural mother gave up the baby because of generalized social and financial pressures, but that no one exerted coercion, duress or fraud to procure her consent. Absent a finding of fraud, duress, or undue influence, a natural parent's consent to an adoption is valid and irrevocable upon execution of the written consent. This same rule exists in most other jurisdictions in an effort to balance the welfare and rights of the child and both sets of parents involved in an adoption. If consents to adoption were freely made voidable, the stability of adoptive families and the institution of adoption itself would be threatened.

Id. at 1041 (footnotes omitted).

Having determined that the natural mother's consent to adoption was valid and could not be revoked, we turn to the more troublesome issue of whether the natural father's consent to the adoption could be waived under the circumstances present here. The trial court found, and the district court agreed, that because of bonding of the child to the adoptive parents, the child would be psychologically damaged if it were removed from the adoptive home at that stage of the proceedings. The court held, nevertheless, "that the best interest of the child is not a relevant factor unless the child was legally available to be adopted." Id. at 1041 (footnote omitted). This broad statement requires qualification. The issue here was whether the natural father's conduct prior to acknowledging paternity on 19 September 1986 constituted abandonment, or, restated, whether the natural mother had the sole right and authority before that date to consent to the adoption. At that time, the child had only been with the adoptive parents for a period of days and bonding was minimal. Thus the child's best interest as evidenced by subsequent bonding to the adoptive parents was not a significant consideration in this case. This must be the rule because, otherwise, a tentative placement or erroneous judgment would be effectively unreviewable and we would have adopted a rule that physical custody, because of subsequent bonding, is determinative in contested adoptions. However, this does not mean that the best interests of the child as evidenced by bonding to the adoptive parents is not relevant under other circumstances. For instance, there may well be circumstances where a natural father does not acknowledge or declare a parental interest in the child until after the child has been with the adoptive parents for a significant period of time during which substantial bonding has occurred. In such a case bonding would be a material consideration on the issue of abandonment. The child's well-being is the raison d'etre for determining whether a child has been abandoned by a parent or parents. A finding of abandonment under chapter 63 means, for whatever reason, the parent or parents have not provided the child with emotional and financial sustenance and, consequently, the well-being of the child requires severing the parent's legal custody or relationship with the child. Abandonment under chapter 63 is not a criminal prosecution for the purposes of punishing parents, it is a civil proceeding intended to serve the best interests of the child. ¹ This recognition of the overarching importance of the child's well-being is consistent with federal case law which "has emphasized the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (constitutional protection of parental rights does not bar state from denying legitimation and granting adoption based on best interests of child).

The parties next dispute the certified question of whether an unwed father's failure to assume prebirth support responsibilities and medical expenses for an unwed natural mother who requires such assistance may constitute abandonment of the unborn child under chapter 63. Section 63.062(1) provides:

(1) Unless consent is excused by the court, a...