Adoption of Jessica XX, Matter of

Decision Date11 December 1980
PartiesIn the Matter of the ADOPTION OF JESSICA "XX" * . JONATHAN "YY" *, Appellant, v. LORRAINE "WW" * et al., Respondents, Robert Abrams, as Attorney General, Intervenor-Respondent-Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

GREENBLOTT, Justice Presiding.

Petitioner seeks to have the adoption order vacated on the ground that he is the natural father of the child and, as such, should have received notice of the adoption proceeding and been afforded an opportunity to be heard. He claims that section 111-a of the Domestic Relations Law is unconstitutional on the ground that it denied him due process and equal protection of the law, since the statute did not require him to be served with notice of the adoption proceeding.

Petitioner and respondent Lorraine lived together for approximately two years prior to the birth of the child Jessica, the subject of this proceeding. Petitioner claims that Lorraine disappeared, taking the baby with her. In August, 1977, Lorraine married Richard, and a year later respondents commenced adoption proceedings in the Ulster County Family Court. Approximately 26 months after the birth of Jessica, petitioner although he had never supported the child, filed a paternity petition in the Westchester County Family Court seeking to be adjudicated the father of Jessica. On March 7, 1979 the Ulster County Family Court signed the adoption order and two days later denied petitioner's motion to vacate the adoption order from which petitioner appeals.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the interests of unwed fathers in the custody of their children are "cognizable and substantial" (Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1213, 31 L.Ed.2d 551). It therefore determined that a state could not, consistent with due process requirements, presume that unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents and that parental unfitness could only be established on the basis of individualized proof (id., at 653-658, 92 S.Ct. at 1216).

The Stanley decision was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as requiring that, although the consent of a putative father to the adoption of his child born out of wedlock was not necessary, notice and an opportunity to be heard must be afforded an unwed father before his parental rights may be terminated (see, e. g., Matter of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 331 N.E.2d 486, app. dsmd. sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042, 96 S.Ct. 765, 46 L.Ed.2d 632). To provide the constitutional safeguards mandated by the Stanley decision, the Legislature enacted section 111-a of the Domestic Relations Law (L. 1976, ch. 665, effective January 1, 1977) providing that notice of an adoption proceeding must be given in seven situations.

Petitioner does not contend that he falls within any of the seven categories. However, he contends that his commencement of the paternity action in Westchester County was the equivalent of filing a notice of intent to claim paternity. We disagree. Adoption is a creature of statute, and, as such requires strict observance of the statutory requirements. (See Matter of Eaton, 305 N.Y. 162, 111 N.E.2d 431; Matter of Fitzsimmons v. Liuni, 51 Misc.2d 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817, revd. on other grounds 26 A.D.2d 980, 274 N.Y.S.2d 798.) We are constrained, therefore to conclude that petitioner has failed to comply with the requirements of section 111-a of the Domestic Relations Law. Nor do we find any constitutional infirmity in this section. We add, parenthetically, that petitioner could have insured his right to notice by signing the Putative Father Registry created by section 111-a and section 372-c of the Social Services Law. He failed to do so.

Six weeks after the adoption order was granted, the United States Supreme Court held that section 111 (subd. 1, par. (c)) (not § 111-a) of the Domestic Relations Law was unconstitutional since it treated unmarried parents differently because of their sex, in violation of the equal protection clause (Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297). Thus, an unwed father, like an unwed mother, may now veto an adoption of his child merely by refusing to give his consent, absent a showing of abandonment, neglect or surrender (see Matter of Mitchell (Onondaga Dept. of Social Servs.), 70 A.D.2d 367, 421 N.Y.S.2d 443; Matter of Cecilie Ann T, 101 Misc.2d 472, 421 N.Y.S.2d 167; Matter of Anthony John P, 101 Misc.2d 918, 422 N.Y.S.2d 570).

We hold that Caban is not entitled to retroactive effect in view of the well settled legal doctrine that final dispositions should not be disturbed by a subsequent change in the decisional law (Childs v. Childs, 69 A.D.2d 406, 419 N.Y.S.2d 533). Petitioner's motion to vacate the adoption order was made nearly two months after the Caban decision and approximately three and one-half months after the adoption order became final. We agree with the statement made by Mr. Justice Stevens in Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 415-416, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1780-1781, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (dissenting opinion):

The adoption decrees that have been entered without the consent of the natural father must number in the millions. An untold number of family and financial decisions have been made in reliance on the validity of those decrees. Because the Court has crossed a new constitutional frontier with today's decision, those reliance interests unquestionably foreclose...

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7 cases
  • Swayne v. LDS Social Services, Civ. No. 87-C-0591G.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Utah
    • September 3, 1987
    ... ...         J. THOMAS GREENE, District Judge ...         This matter came on for hearing on July 27, 1987 on defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's motion for a ... adoption agency affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; John Doe and Jane Doe, who ... re Adoption of Martz, 102 Misc.2d 102, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979), aff'd, In re Adoption of Jessica "XX", 77 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 430 N.E.2d ... ...
  • Lehr v. Robertson
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 27, 1983
    ...102 Misc.2d 102, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979). The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court affirmed. In the Matter of the Adoption of Jessica "XX", 77 App.Div.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1980). The majority held that appellant's commencement of a paternity action did not give him any right to rece......
  • People v. Herne
    • United States
    • New York County Court
    • October 15, 2013
  • Micah HH, In re
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • May 13, 1999
    ...690 N.Y.S.2d 309 ... 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 4580 ... In the Matter of MICAH "HH", 1 an Infant ... Linda "K" 1 et al, Respondents; ... Vancito "TT",1 Appellant ... article 7, determined, inter alia, that respondent's consent was not required prior to the adoption of Micah "HH" ...         Micah "HH" (hereinafter the child) was born in 1993. Shortly ... , and, as such requires strict observance of the statutory requirements * * * " (Matter of Jessica XX, 77 A.D.2d 381, 383, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772, affd. 54 N.Y.2d 417, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 430 N.E.2d 896, ... ...
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