People v. Herne

• Decision Date: 15 October 2013
• Citation: 973 N.Y.S.2d 546
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Amanda HERNE, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

973 N.Y.S.2d 546

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

v.Amanda HERNE, Defendant.

County Court, Franklin County, New York.

Oct. 15, 2013.

Derek P. Champagne, Esq., Franklin County District Attorney, Malone.

Vaughn N. Aldrich, Esq., Attorney at Law, Hogansburg.

ROBERT G. MAIN JR., J.

The Mohawk Nation, in general, and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, in particular, have a long and storied history. Among many other things, this has resulted in the enactment of an express state legislative provision creating the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police on the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation at Akwasasne, New York. The provision is codified at Indian Law § 114. An interpretation of the statute's jurisdictional provisions, as they relate to the facts and circumstances of the instant criminal prosecution, is the sole issue before this Court.

Defendant stands indicted in this matter for aggravated driving while intoxicated, driving while intoxicated, and speed not reasonable and prudent. The first two counts are felonies, and the third is a traffic offense. By a stipulation in lieu of motions, the parties agreed that the threshold issue of the jurisdictional provisions of Indian Law § 114 would be considered by this Court prior to any other judicial determination respecting this matter. The Court approved the stipulation, directed the submission of memoranda of law by the parties, and heard oral argument on this singular issue.

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the memoranda of law, considered the oral arguments of the parties, and conducted its own research. Curiously, this is an issue of first impression.

The Facts

The parties agree upon certain fundamental facts. As far as pertinent to this determination, the parties agree that the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police were dispatched to a motor vehicle accident on St. Regis Road in the Town of Bombay in Franklin County. In local parlance, the traffic accident occurred in what is locally called the "Hogansburg Triangle", a geographic area that is subject to certain Native American land claims. The parties do not controvert that the accident scene to which the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police responded was outside the boundaries of the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation. Neither party contended that the accident scene, and subsequent arrest at the scene, was within one hundred (100) yards of the boundary of the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation (see Criminal Procedure Law § 140.10[2][a] ). Personal injury was apparent; an ambulance was called to the scene. Based upon the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police officers' observations, an arrest occurred for felony charges leading to the indictment.

Statutory Construction

The Court's review and analysis is governed by due deference to the separation of powers between the branches of state government and its obligation to strictly construe creatures of statute such as the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police.

Basic and axiomatic tenets of statutory construction require that the language of the legislation be carefully considered and given its plain and obvious meaning wherever possible. Put another way, where the statutory language is unequivocal, and the intent is clear, the Court must accord such legislative language its obvious intent.

"It is a general rule of statutory construction, however, that courts are obligated to interpret a statute to effect the intent of the Legislature according to the plain words used by the Legislature. Courts are not to legislate under the guise of interpretation" ( People v. Gabbidon, 10 Misc.3d 728 at 730, 803 N.Y.S.2d 905 [citations omitted ] ).

In Matter of M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437, 447, 813 N.Y.S.2d 349, 846 N.E.2d 794 [2006], the Court of Appeals clarified this undertaking.

"[The Court's] task—as it is in every case involving statutory interpretation—is to ascertain the legislative intent and construe the pertinent statutes to effectuate that intent. We begin with the statutory text, which is the clearest indicator of legislative purpose ( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583 [1998] ). If the language ... is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning' ( State of New York v. Patricia II, 6 N.Y.3d 160, 162, 811 N.Y.S.2d 289 [2006], quoting Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 N.Y.2d 86, 91, 735 N.Y.S.2d 873, 761 N.E.2d 565 [2001] ). When the terms of related statutes are involved, as is the case here, they must be analyzed in context and in a manner that harmonize [s] the related provisions ... [and] renders them compatible' ( Tall Trees, 97 N.Y.2d at 91, 735 N.Y.S.2d 873, 761 N.E.2d 565 )."

In County Lawyers' v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721, 955 N.Y.S.2d 835, 979 N.E.2d 1162 [2012], the Court of Appeals provides additional guidance.

"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature" ( Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 359 N.E.2d 1338 [1976] ; see also Matter of M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437, 447, 813 N.Y.S.2d 349, 846 N.E.2d 794 [2006] ). To that end, in our present interpretation of County Law § 722, we must look first to the statutory text, which is the clearest indicator of legislative intent ( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] ). We are also guided in our analysis by the familiar principle that a statute must be construed as a whole and that its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other ( People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 199, 422 N.Y.S.2d 33, 397 N.E.2d 724 [1979] ).

The foregoing guidance from case law is also consistent with the provisions of McKinney's Statutes § 94, which states that "[t]he legislative intent is to be ascertained from the words and language used, and the statutory language is generally construed according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction."

Case law addressing the obligation to strictly construe entities and rights created by statute that did not exist at common law are legion. Somewhat anachronistically, such entities are referred to as "creatures of statute." This principle has been long established in our law. Examples include, but are not limited to:

"Adoption is a creature of statute, and, as such requires strict observance of the statutory requirements" ( Matter of Adoption of Jessica X.X., 77 A.D.2d 381, 383, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 [3d Dept. 1980] affd., 54 N.Y.2d 417, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 430 N.E.2d 896 [1981] affd. sub nom. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 [1983 ] );

"A summary proceeding is a creature of statute and there must be strict adherence to statutory requirement" ( PAK Realty Assoc. v. RE/MAX Universal, Inc., 157 Misc.2d 985, 986, 599 N.Y.S.2d 399 [Civ. Ct. 1993] );

"A mechanic's lien is a creature of statute. The provisions of the Lien Law must be strictly complied with..." ( Mineola Rd. Oil Corp. v. Walsh, 137 N.Y.S.2d 342, 343 [Sup. Ct. 1954] );

"An action alleging wrongful death, unknown at common law, is a creature of statute requiring strict adherence to the four corners of the legislation" ( Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of New York, 25 A.D.3d 90, 92, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 [2d Dept. 2005] );

"As an initial matter, the workers' compensation system is the creature of a comprehensive statutory scheme [citations omitted]. Thus, the terms of its governing statutes, including the lien and offset provisions at issue here, should be strictly construed in light of their legislative purpose ( Shutter v. Philips Display Components Co., 90 N.Y.2d 703, 707–08, 665 N.Y.S.2d 379, 688 N.E.2d 235 [1997] ); "The office of commissioner of deeds is entirely the creature of the statute. Its creation, its powers, its duties, its compensation, and its term is wholly the work of the legislature. * * * Corporations are the creatures of legislation. They have no powers except what are conferred upon them by their charter. Their charters are the breath of their existence, they are what give them life, and they must live and act according to the rule laid down for them in those creative instruments, and other rules laid down by the power which created them. The grant of power, too, by such acts is liable and subjected to a strict construction" ( Parker v. Baker, 7 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 98 [N.Y. Ch. 1840] ).

As are the foregoing various and sundry entities detailed, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police is, in fact, a creature of statute. Thus, the enabling legislation must be, and will be, strictly construed.

Arguments of Counsel

As previously noted, counsel submitted memoranda of law and were accorded a full opportunity to be heard at oral argument on the threshold jurisdictional issue before the Court. Defense counsel and the Chief Assistant District Attorney were articulate in their arguments. This is an issue of first impression that is of some significance for the areas in New York State bordering the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation.

Defendant argues, in essence, that the statute creating the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police must be narrowly construed and strictly limits the police power of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police. Put another way, the defense argued that, absent "hot pursuit", the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police lack police powers outside of the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation rendering the instant arrest without authority and what should be deemed a nullity.

The People rely upon the "police officer" definition at Criminal Procedure Law 1.20(34)(u), read in conjunction with the arrest power provisions of Criminal Procedure Law § 140.10(3). The People contend that those charged with "crimes" such as those charged in the first and second counts of the indictment are susceptible to arrest by officers of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police as a consequence of the interplay of the cited subdivisions. T...