Adoption of Myers, In re
| Decision Date | 11 February 1954 |
| Parties | , 196 Tenn. 219 In re Adoption of MYERS. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Bess Blake, Nashville, for appellant.
Chiapella & Kirkpatrick, Memphis, for appellee.
This appeal rises from a proceeding in criminal contempt in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The alleged contempt was an incident of an adoption proceeding then pending in that Court. The petition for adoption was being heard under the provisions of Chapter 202, Public Acts of 1951. The young mother of the child, a girl 17 years old at the time of the hearing, had filed her verified, written consent and surrender of the child to a Mr. & Mrs. Myers for adoption before the Chancellor, as required by sections 6-8 of the Act of 1951, and in accordance with section 16 of said Act, an order of reference was had providing for the investigation of the parties and circumstances by the Director of Welfare for Shelby County. The alleged contempt arose out of this investigation.
The mother of the child, Dorothy Agent, reported to Mr. & Mrs. Myers, or to their attorney, that a Mrs. Zelma Dewett, a case worker of the Shelby County office of the State Department of Public Welfare, had called her on the telephone and told her that by surrendering her child for adoption without consulting the Department, she was breaking the law; and ordered her to regain possession of her child and reconsider her consent to its adoption, and told her that if the child was legally adopted it would have to be done through the Department, and under its direction.
Upon the report of this conversation, the lawyer for Mr. & Mrs. Myers filed the petition for citation for contempt against the Director of the State Department of Public Welfare, and against Mrs. Zelma Dewett, the case worker who had made the investigation. The citation issued and a hearing was had before the Chancellor on oral testimony, as result of which the Chancellor found that the Director of the Department of Public Welfare was not guilty of contempt, but that Mrs. Zelma Dewett was guilty and fined her $25 for the offense.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that Court reversed on the ground that the decree for contempt was against the preponderance of the evidence. As is clear from the specific finding of the Chancellor in his decree, and from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the issue is determined by determining the credibility of the mother of the child, Dorothy Agent, as against the credibility of Mrs. Zelma Dewett. If Dorothy Agent is telling the truth about what Mrs. Dewett said to her in the telephone conversation, Mrs. Dewett is guilty of contempt, and if Mrs. Zelma Dewett is telling the truth in denying that she said what Dorothy Agent says she said in that telephone conversation, she is not guilty of contempt.
In a case involving criminal contempt, the Chancellor sits as both Judge and jury, and his decree has the effect of a jury verdict. State ex rel. Estes v. Persica, 130 Tenn. 48, 168 S.W. 1056; State ex rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W. 974.
In a recent case involving criminal contempt, this Court held:
Nashville Corp. v. United Steelworkers, etc., 187 Tenn. 444, 451-452, 215 S.W.2d 818, 821.
The Court of Appeals recognizes this finding of the Supreme Court, but in order to review the credibility of Mrs. Dewett and Dorothy Agent, respectively, it limits the rule to the testimony of 'unimpeached' witnesses. Having done so, the Court of Appeals finds the testimony of Mrs. Dewett credible, and that of Dorothy Agent incredible, and so reverses the Chancellor's decree. No authority is cited by the Court of Appeals for thus limiting the effect of the Chancellor's decision on credibility, and we hold that such limitation is erroneous. There is no difference in this aspect of a case involving criminal contempt, from an ordinary criminal case, except that the Chancellor exercises the power and performs the functions of the jury. This Court has repeatedly held in many recent cases, that the verdict of the jury establishes the credibility of witnesses, and it has never held, so far as we can find, that this rule was limited to witnesses whose credibility was unimpeached or unchallenged.
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Johnson v. State
...Service R. Co., 98 N.J.L 849, 121 A. 741, Talley v. Richart, 353 Mo. 912, 185 S.W.2d 23, or not strictly synonymous, In re Adoption of Myers, 196 Tenn. 219, 265 S.W.2d 12, they are synonymous in their usage by the bench and bar of this state, and by courts in other jurisdictions, and we so ......
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State v. Heath
...in criminal contempt cases, a judge sits as both judge and jury, and his decision has the effect of a jury verdict. In re Adoption of Myers, 196 Tenn. 219, 265 S.W.2d 12. So far as we have been able to determine, the above has been the law in a vast majority of jurisdictions, except where s......
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Allen v. Goldstein
...that the evidence in this case was wholly incredible and in dismissing the bill. Our Supreme Court, in the case of In re Adoption of Myers, 196 Tenn. 219, 265 S.W.2d 12, held that in a case tried without a jury, the question of credibility of the witnesses was exclusively for the judge or c......
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Grant v. State
...of guilt affixed. The burden here then is on defendant to show the preponderance of the proof is against the verdict. In re Adoption of Myers, 196 Tenn. 219, 265 S.W.2d 12; State ex. rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W. We have examined this record under the above rules by wh......