Nashville Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO

• Decision Date: 16 October 1948
• Parties: NASHVILLE CORPORATION v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

215 S.W.2d 818

187 Tenn. 444

NASHVILLE CORPORATION v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

October 16, 1948

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; Wm. J. Wade Chancellor.

Suit by the Nashville Corporation against United Steelworkers of America, CIO, and its officers and members, wherein an injunction was granted. From a judgment of contempt finding nine individuals guilty of violating the injunction, they appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

R. H. Brazzell, of Nashville, and Jerome A Cooper, of Birmingham, Ala., for appellants.

Armistead Waller, Davis & Lansden, of Nashville, for appellees.

BURNETT Justice.

This appeal comes to us from a judgment of contempt wherein nine individuals were found guilty of violating an injunction issued by the Chancellor enjoining certain officers and representatives of United Steelworkers of America, CIO, Local No. 4057, and its officers and members 'from in any manner interfering with or attempting to interfere with or molest employees or prospective employees of complainant (The Nashville Corporation), or members of their families, by the use of threats, personal violence, assault, battery or intimidation, or by any other means of like character, calculated or intended to deter or prevent the employees of complainant from carrying out their duties as such employees, or to prevent prospective employees from accepting employment.'

The Chancellor permitted peaceful picketing but limited the number of pickets and designated areas wherein they could picket. He later amended this temporary order so as to enjoin the defendants, their agents, members and associates 'from congregating or loitering within a distance of 100 yards of any outside boundary of complainants plant or premises for the purpose of aiding or abetting the strike.' He further decreed that none of the defendants, etc., should be permitted to act as pickets 'within 100 years of any outside boundary of complainants premises, except as herein expressly provided, and that picketing as herein used includes, but is not limited to, the hailing or accosting of employees or other persons, whether in automobiles, or other vehicles or on foot, on their way to or from complainant's plant or any public or private road, railroad track or other avenue of approach.'

The injunction as amended was issued by the Chancellor on the original bill, the amended bill and numerous affidavits attached thereto as exhibits. Clearly under these pleadings the temporary injunction as issued was justified and demanded by reason of the sworn allegations (greasing of railway tracks into complainants plant, placing and throwing nails into and on complainants property, where automobiles traveled, and other acts constituting a destruction of property and the rights of the complainant) herein.

A few weeks after the above injunction issued a petition for attachment for contempt was filed against various named individuals alleging violation of the injunction. After a full hearing the Chancellor held the nine appellants guilty of contempt.

After the petition for attachment for contempt was served on these appellants they moved to dismiss said attachment because, among other things, the injunction under which it was issued 'violates Art. 1, sections 19 and 23 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee, and Amendments 1 and 14 of the Constitution of the United States, in that such application denies the defendants the right of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and further deprives them, and each of them, of rights of property without due process of law. Said injunction, so applied, is illegal and void.'

It is obvious from what has heretofore been said that the injunction herein is not a blanket injunction but is one properly issued, under the allegations and supporting affidavits, to reasonably restrain the defendants from doing irreparable damage to complainants' business and to protect its employees while in the discharge of their duties. Such supervisory restraint, allowing peaceful picketing under the supervision of the Chancery court is as necessary under our constitutional framework as is the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. These freedoms are not denied but merely supervised under the fair and watchful eye of the Chancellor. On proper allegations and showing, without more, a restraining order of the kind is eminently fair and proper.

We are well aware that picketing, when peacefully and lawfully conducted, is considered an exercise of the rights of free speech. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552, 555, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200. Where does this right end? It was said in the Meadowmoor case, supra: 'But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution.' The same reasoning applies with equal force when the picketing becomes unlawful and the rights and property of others is destroyed, as they were under the allegations and supporting affidavits.

Under a showing such as we have, a court will, if it can consistent with safety, restrain the excesses and permit peaceful picketing to continue. Cases in point include Lisse v. Local Union C.W.W., Cal.App. 24 P.2d, 833; International Pocketbook Workers Union v. Orlove, 158 Md. 496, 148 A. 826; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. Silk Workers, 116 N.J.Eq. 146, 172 A. 551, 92 A.L.R. 1450; Wise Shoe Co. v. Lowenthal, 266 N.Y. 264, 194 N.E. 749; Mays Furs and Ready-to-Wear v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E.2d 279; and Rowe Transfer & Storage Co. v. International Brotherhood, 186 Tenn. 265, 209 S.W.2d 35.

The principal case relied on by the appellants in support of the above insistence is the Thornhill case, supra. This case is clearly distinguishable from the case now before us. In the Thornhill case the Alabama court enjoined all picketing, regardless of whether or not it was peaceful or unlawful, under an Alabama statute. This was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. The court said though [310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 746]: 'We are not now concerned with picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might occasion such imminent and aggravated danger,' etc. There is no suggestion that picketing in support of an unlawful object could not be enjoined.

We, therefore, conclude that the injunction as issued did not violate the constitutional rights of these appellants and that the petition for contempt fully and fairly apprised them of their alleged acts in violation of said injunction.

Regardless of whether or not the injunction was 'irregular or erroneous', 'it must while it continues in force be obeyed.' 28 Am.Jur., sec. 330, p. 504. In a note to the above quoted statement numerous cases are cited as authority therefor. See also Vanvabry v. Staton, 88 Tenn. 334, 12 S.W. 786; Weidner v. Friedman,

126 Tenn. 677, 151 S.W. 56, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 1041; and Underwood's case, 2 Humphrey 46, which are to the same effect. The obvious reason for this almost unanimous holding, is stated by Chancellor Gibson as follows:

'The power to punish for contempt is one

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