Adoption of Vaida
| Decision Date | 30 May 1978 |
| Citation | 34 Or.App. 631,579 P.2d 313 |
| Parties | In the Matter of ADOPTION OF Timothy Patrick VAIDA, a minor. Michael Ellsworth CURRAN and Debora Gilliland Curran, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Rose Elena VAIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
W. Bradford Jonasson, Jr., Oregon City, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Santos & Schneider, Oregon City.
Richard C. Goss, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Oregon Legal Services, Oregon City.
Before SCHWAB, C. J., and LEE, RICHARDSON and JOSEPH, JJ.
Petitioners appeal an order of the circuit court denying their petition for adoption of a child born October 22, 1975, to respondent, who was then unmarried. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in permitting respondent to revoke her written consent to adoption.
Respondent was sixteen years old and living with her mother when the child was born. She had attended school through the tenth grade, receiving low marks. When the child was three months old, respondent took him to the natural father. She discovered that the father had recently fathered another baby out of wedlock by a second woman and would not take responsibility for her and their child. Shortly thereafter she left the child with her mother and went to California. She later returned for the child, and they lived in California for several months.
In the latter part of 1976, respondent and the child returned to Oregon. They lived with her mother again for a short time, but after a quarrel they moved into the home of another woman, where they remained for approximately a month. The child had been ill frequently during his first year, and respondent had begun to feel that she was not giving him proper care. There was no evidence that the child was abused or neglected. Respondent discussed with several persons the possibility of giving the child up for adoption or placing him in a foster home until she was better able to care for him.
One of the persons with whom respondent discussed the child was petitioner Michael Curran, who was a frequent visitor in the home where she was living. Soon after they met, he and respondent began having sexual relations. He was 26 years old at the time, respondent 17. He took an interest in the child and suggested that respondent give the child to him. He was engaged to be married to another woman approximately the same age as respondent. He informed respondent that he was unable to have children of his own, and said that he would give the child a good home. Respondent at that time rejected the idea.
In late January, 1977, respondent turned eighteen, went on welfare and moved into her own apartment. In late February, all her money was stolen and she was faced with eviction. She took a job with a travelling carnival intending to live in a van with a man who also worked for the carnival. She was concerned about her ability to care for the child under those conditions. On February 20, the day before she moved from her apartment, respondent took him to petitioners' apartment. Later that day she delivered to petitioners all of his clothing, toys and baby pictures. She said that she did not want anything to remind her of him.
Mr. Curran contacted an attorney, and on March 3, 1977, he and respondent went to the attorney's office. On the way there, respondent testified, Curran told her that he wanted her to sign a document which would give him authority to consent to medical care for the child. Respondent was not represented at the meeting. She was given a document to read which, in addition to authorizing petitioner Michael Curran to consent to medical treatment, stated in material part:
Respondent asked the meaning of several words which she did not understand. The attorney read the document to her and explained several terms. The attorney also had respondent speak on the telephone to a Children's Services Division adoption investigator. The investigator did not, however, review the document with her; she referred to the document, in general, as "leading to adoption." Respondent then signed it.
Respondent testified that she did not understand the document. She said it was her understanding that she was giving petitioner authority to consent to medical treatment and that the adoption process would take six months, during which time she could change her mind and get the child back if she "(got) her head on straight."
Shortly after the signing of the consent form, the man with whom respondent was living was arrested, and she left for California. She was there reunited with the man to whom she is now married, whom she had met several years before. She discussed the child with him and showed him the document she had signed. He explained its significance to her. She said she had changed her mind and wanted the child back. She immediately wrote a letter to Curran, accusing him of tricking her. In May, 1977, respondent attempted unsuccessfully to get an appointment with a legal aid office in California. She also sought the assistance of private counsel but found that was too expensive. She bought a bus ticket to return to Oregon, but was hospitalized and did not make the trip. In July, she finally succeeded in getting a private attorney. On July 21, her attorney notified petitioners' attorney that respondent no longer wanted to go forward with the adoption.
On September 9, 1977, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition for adoption and objections thereto. In addition to the foregoing testimony, there was evidence that in order to expedite the adoption, petitioners had married in April, rather than in May as they had planned. Mrs. Curran had quit her job and they had moved into a more suitable apartment. The child was well integrated into petitioners' family, and...
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Daniel C., Matter of
... ... manifestations of public discontent with the judicial result in the notorious Baby Lenore case where a mother who revoked her consent to adoption was successful in obtaining an order for the child's return (see People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 ... upon the natural parent's consent requires strict scrutiny of the circumstances of the execution of the consent (see Matter of Adoption of Vaida, 34 Or.App. 631, 579 P.2d 313) ... The consent, by reason of its notice function, should be tailored to the capacities and ... ...
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Stubbs v. Weathersby
... Page 893 ... 869 P.2d 893 ... 126 Or.App. 596 ... In the Matter of the Adoption and Change of Name of Yasha ... Raynae Weathersby, a Minor ... Carl STUBBS and Yvonne Stubbs, Respondents ... Thomaszine WEATHERSBY, Appellant ... See Curran v. Vaida, 34 Or.App. 631, 636, 579 P.2d 313 (1978). The Stubbses have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that mother gave her consent to ... ...
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Adoption of BGD, Matter of
...will serve to deprive that withdrawal of legal effect." Small v. Andrews, 20 Or.App. 6, 530 P.2d 540 (1975). See also Adoption of Vaida, 34 Or.App. 631, 579 P.2d 313 (1978), wherein it was "Knowing and voluntary consent by a child's parent or parents is the basis of the adoption process. Th......
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Adoption of Baby Girl J., Matter of, 29561
...give due regard to the findings of the trial court, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. In Curran v. Vaida, 34 Or.App. 631, 637, 579 P.2d 313, 315 (1978), we noted "(k)nowing and voluntary consent by a child's parent or parents is the basis of the adoption process. The ......