Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones
| Decision Date | 20 August 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 14146,14146 |
| Citation | 596 A.2d 414,220 Conn. 285 |
| Parties | AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY v. Margaret Billings JONES, Administratrix (ESTATE OF Catherine MANFREDI), et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Lois Tanzer, with whom, on the brief, was Robert E. Kiley, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
Steven L. Seligman, with whom were Lester Katz and, on the brief, James A. Armentano, Hartford, for appellee (named defendant).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, COVELLO, BORDEN and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether an insurance company may use collateral estoppel to bar the heirs of a homicide victim from relitigating the issue of the criminal defendant's intent to cause the injuries that resulted in the victim's death.
The defendant, Russell F. Manfredi (Manfredi), was convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree for the killing of his wife, Catherine Manfredi. The named defendant, Margaret Billings Jones (Jones), is the administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The plaintiff, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Manfredi's insurer at the time his wife was killed, brought this declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of its obligation to pay damages awarded to Jones against Manfredi in a wrongful death action. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment claiming that, as a result of the criminal verdict, the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of Manfredi's intent, a crucial aspect of its claim that it had no obligation to pay under its policies. That motion was denied. Jones subsequently moved for summary judgment, claiming that the state court was an inappropriate forum for the declaratory judgment action to determine the plaintiff's liability. After that motion was granted, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming error in regard to both of the trial court's rulings on the motions for summary judgment. This court transferred the case to itself pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We now reverse both of the rulings on the summary judgment motions.
The litigation in this case results from the killing of Catherine Manfredi by her husband, Russell Manfredi, on March 8, 1985. The facts concerning that incident are more fully set forth in State v. Manfredi, 17 Conn.App. 602, 555 A.2d 436 (1989), aff'd 213 Conn. 500, 569 A.2d 506, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 62, 112 L.Ed.2d 37 (1990). In the criminal case, Manfredi pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a 1 and was tried by a jury of twelve. He elected to testify, and admitted to the jury that he had caused the death of his wife by striking her on the head with a baseball bat. He denied, however, that he had intended to cause her death. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(2). 2 That verdict required the jury to have found that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Manfredi had intentionally caused the death of his wife, and also to have found that he suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the killing. He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.
Following the death of the decedent, Jones was appointed administratrix of her estate. In that role, on March 20, 1985, Jones brought a wrongful death action in the Superior Court against Manfredi. The plaintiff's motion to intervene in that suit was denied. On December 16, 1988, a default judgment was entered against Manfredi, and on January 18, 1989, he was ordered to pay damages in the amount of $450,000 to the estate of his deceased wife.
At the time of his wife's death, Manfredi was the named insured on a homeowner's insurance policy and a personal excess indemnity insurance policy, both of which were issued by the plaintiff. Although these policies provided coverage to Manfredi for bodily injury claims, both contained language limiting coverage only to those injuries that were not intentionally caused by the insured. Because of its potential liability for Manfredi's fatal injuries to his wife, the plaintiff, on November 26, 1986, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court. That action is the subject of this appeal.
The complaint asserted that the insurance policies provided by the plaintiff did not cover the injuries suffered by the decedent because Manfredi intended to injure her. On December 18, 1986, Jones moved to strike the complaint, arguing that pursuant to Practice Book § 390(c) 3 the declaratory judgment action was inappropriate and that the parties should seek redress by "some other form of procedure." The motion to strike was denied. On November 9, 1987, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, claiming that the finding by the jury in Manfredi's criminal trial that he had intentionally caused the death of his wife collaterally estopped both Manfredi and Jones from relitigating the issue of Manfredi's intent. The trial court, O'Neill, J., denied that motion on the basis that Manfredi's intent presented a question of fact that was inappropriate to determine by a motion for summary judgment. This ruling presents one of the bases of this appeal. On November 9, 1987, a default judgment was entered against Manfredi in the declaratory judgment action.
On April 11, 1989, during the pendency of the declaratory judgment action, Jones filed suit in the federal District Court for the District of Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175 4 requesting that the judgment in the wrongful death action be enforced against the plaintiff. On June 7, 1989, the plaintiff moved to stay the federal proceeding pending a decision on the collateral estoppel question in the state court. After the motion for a stay was denied without prejudice, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in the federal court raising the same collateral estoppel issue that it had raised in the state court. Upon receipt of the motion, the federal court, on February 8, 1990, sua sponte, stayed the federal proceeding "to await resolution of the parallel state action."
On February 23, 1990, Jones moved for summary judgment in the state court declaratory judgment action. In support of her motion, Jones claimed, as she had in her earlier motion to strike, that "some other form of procedure" was more appropriate than the state declaratory judgment action. Although the federal court had stayed the action in that court in anticipation of the state court's resolution of the issues, Jones suggested that the federal court was the more appropriate forum to hear the case. On July 2, 1990, the trial court, Maloney, J., granted Jones' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action was "superfluous" in light of the pending federal action. Presumably, this was a determination under Practice Book § 390(c) "that the parties should be left to seek redress by some other form of procedure...." 5 It is that ruling that provides the second of the bases for this appeal.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted Jones' motion for summary judgment and denied its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argues that Jones' motion should not have been granted because: (1) her claims were inappropriate for a motion for summary judgment and were more properly the subject of a motion to strike; (2) under the doctrine of the law of the case she was precluded from reasserting claims raised in a prior motion to strike; and (3) the state court was the proper forum, and its declaratory judgment action the better procedure to decide the issues raised. 6
The plaintiff further claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant its earlier motion for summary judgment. With respect to this claim, the plaintiff asserts that the motion should have been granted because: (1) both Manfredi and Jones failed to comply with Practice Book § 380 7 in opposing the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; (2) there is no issue of material fact with respect to Manfredi's intent to injure his wife because that issue was conclusively determined by his criminal jury and principles of collateral estoppel bar him from relitigating that issue; and (3) because Jones is in privity with Manfredi, collateral estoppel bars her from relitigating the issue of his intent. 8
We first address the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly granted Jones' motion for summary judgment. At the time that she moved for summary judgment in the state court, she had previously filed an action pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175 in the federal district court to compel the plaintiff to pay the damages awarded to the decedent's estate in the wrongful death action against Manfredi. The state court granted her motion, reasoning that to allow the federal court to decide the collateral estoppel issue in connection with Jones' lawsuit was a more appropriate procedure than the state declaratory judgment action. The plaintiff asserts that the declaratory judgment action was the proper procedural vehicle and that the state court was the proper forum. We agree.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we must decide whether the trial court erred in determining that there was no "genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 384; 9 Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 111, 491 A.2d 368 (1985); D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980). Despite the fact that Jones entitled her motion "Motion For Summary Judgment," we conclude that both the substance of the motion and the trial court's ruling on the motion demonstrate that it is more accurately described as a motion to strike. The motion...
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