Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kaiser

• Decision Date: 13 May 1903
• Citation: 115 Ky. 539,74 S.W. 203
• Parties: ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. v. KAISER.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

74 S.W. 203

115 Ky. 539

ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. v. KAISER.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 13, 1903

Appeal from Circuit Court. Jefferson County; Common Pleas Division.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Matilda M. Kaiser against the Ætna Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Grubbs & Grubbs, for appellant.

Harris & Marshall, for appellee.

O'REAR J.

Appellee's husband, John A. Kaiser, Jr., effected an insurance upon his life with appellant in the sum of $1,000, payable to appellee within 60 days after proof of death of the insured. The policy contained this provision: "If the insured shall within one year from the date hereof, commit suicide, while sane or insane, *** this policy shall be null and void." Within about a month after the issual of the policy the insured died from the effects of a pistol-shot wound through the heart. He was a young man, about 22 years old had been married about 6 weeks; was apparently in good health, with no evidence of morbidity or insanity. He had recently lost his employment as a laborer in a printing establishment, but his employer had told him that he could return when he desired. He was shown to be indebted in an inconsiderable amount. His domestic relations were shown to be pleasant. In the morning of the day of his death he borrowed a revolver from a friend, with the statement that he was going to certain quarters of the city that evening to make collections. Directly afterward he went to his mother's home, where he was in the habit of going about that hour every morning, passed his sister, and went to the room that he had occupied before his marriage. He removed a part of his clothing, called his sister to go for his mother and tell her to come to him. After his sister had gone but a few feet from the room, she heard the pistol shot, and upon immediately returning found him lying across the bed with a mortal wound, from which he died within a few minutes. There was no witness to the shooting. In this suit by appellee upon the policy appellant relied alone upon the defense that the insured had, within 12 months from the issual of the policy, committed suicide while sane or insane. The issue was joined upon this defense, and was the sole issue in the case. Appellant had the burden of proof in the case, which consisted in showing the foregoing facts, with the additional detail that the deceased's undershirt was powder-burned, and that, when found lying across the bed, the revolver was lying not far from his right hand, with one chamber empty, and the other four loaded. Appellee declined to introduce any evidence, when appellant asked for a peremptory instruction in its behalf, which was refused. The court gave in lieu the following instruction: "Gentlemen of the jury, in this case you should find for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000, with interest from the 4th of May, 1901, unless you shall believe from the evidence that the assured, John A. Kaiser, Jr., shot himself with the purpose of taking his own life. But if you shall believe from the evidence that he shot himself with the purpose and intention of taking his own life, then the law is for the defendant, and you shall so find, whether the said John A. Kaiser, Jr., at the time he shot himself was sane or insane." The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

Appellant's principal contention upon this appeal is that upon the close of its evidence, which was the only evidence offered in the case, the court should have peremptorily directed a verdict for it. This argument is based upon the idea that the evidence showed conclusively that the death of the insured was self-inflicted, and that the attending circumstances with equal clearness indicated a suicidal intent. A very reasonable inference from the circumstances detailed in evidence is that the injury was self-inflicted, nor would it be unreasonable to further infer that the purpose was self-destruction. But these conclusions, or inferences rather, are by no means necessary from the proof and circumstances. They are at best but allowable. The rule in this state governing the granting of peremptory instructions is that, where there is any evidence tending to support the contrary side, or where there is a conflict of evidence upon...