Agnew v. City of Culver City

• Decision Date: 21 December 1956
• Citation: 147 Cal.App.2d 144,304 P.2d 788
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: R. W. AGNEW, Plaintiff and Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF CULVER CITY, a Municipal Corporation; Hurbert Turton, Electrical Inspector of the City of Culver City; W. E. Loretta, Chief of the Building Department of City of Culver City, Defendants and Appellants and Cross-Respondents. Civ. 21679.

Page 788

304 P.2d 788

147 Cal.App.2d 144

R. W. AGNEW, Plaintiff and Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF CULVER CITY, a Municipal Corporation; Hurbert Turton, Electrical Inspector of the City of Culver City; W. E. Loretta, Chief of the Building Department of City of Culver City, Defendants and Appellants and Cross-Respondents.

Civ. 21679.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Dec. 21, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1957.

Hearing Denied Feb. 13, 1957.

M. Tellefson, City Atty., Culver City, for appellants and cross-respondents.

R. W. Agnew, in pro. per., for respondent and cross-appellant.

VALLEE, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this suit for declaratory relief to determine the validity of Ordinance No. 49, as amended by Ordinance No. 250, of the City of Culver City providing for licensing and regulating electrical contractors and fixing fees to be charged electrical contractors as a condition precedent to engaging in electrical contracting in Culver City and to determine the validity of certain provisions of Ordinance No. 170 of Culver City, as amended by Ordinance No. 230, providing for examinations before the issuance of electrical permits to do wiring, and prescribing methods and material for electrical installations. Plaintiff also sought to have defendants restrained from enforcing certain provisions of the ordinances insofar as they relate to electrical contractors, for damages for refusing to permit him to engage in electrical contracting in Culver City, and for a declaration of his rights.

Plaintiff is an electrical contractor licensed by the Contractors' State License Board under section 7000 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code. Defendant City of Culver City is a municipal corporation. Defendant Turton is the Electrical Inspector of the city and defendant Loretta is the Chief of the Building Department.

Plaintiff applied to the proper official for a permit authorizing him to do electrical work within Culver City at a designated address. He was informed it would be necessary for him to pay a license fee of $100 under Ordinance 49 and to obtain from the Business License Collector a business license to do work as an electrical contractor in the city. Plaintiff refused to pay the fee and to obtain the license on the ground his state license as an electrical contractor authorized him to do work as such in Culver City without conforming to any local ordinances requiring a license or the payment of a fee.

The court found: 1. Plaintiff is authorized to work as an electrical contractor anywhere in the state, subject to the provisions of any local ordinance not in conflict with the Business and Professions Code. 2. Ordinance 49, as amended by Ordinance 250, providing for the enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance by criminal process, imposes an additional burden on plaintiff in carrying on his work as a licensed electrical contractor not contemplated by the State Contractors' License Law, and is in conflict therewith. 3. Ordinance 230, amending Ordinance 170, creating the office of Electrical Inspector and fixing his powers and duties and regulating installation of electrical equipment, etc., is an ordinance adopted by the City Council under its police power, relating to the quality, safety, and character of electrical installations, and is not in conflict with the State Contractors' License Law and does not illegally interfere with the right of plaintiff to carry on his business as an electrical contractor within Culver City.

The judgment declared: 1. Ordinance 49, as amended by Ordinance 250, is invalid and unenforceable against plaintiff insofar as it provides for the enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance by criminal process. 2. Ordinance 230 was a valid and existing ordinance at the time of trial of the action, except to the extent section 4(d) applies to plaintiff. 3. Plaintiff take nothing by way of damages.

Defendants appeal from the judgment as a whole. Plaintiff appeals from that part of the judgment declaring that Ordinance 170, as amended by 230, was a valid ordinance 'except that to the extent Sec. 4(d) applies to the plaintiff' and insofar as it denies him damages.

Appeal of Defendants

While defendants appealed from the judgment in its entirety, the only point urged is that Ordinance 49, as amended by Ordinance 250, is not invalid and unenforceable against plaintiff insofar as it provides for the enforcement of its provisions by criminal process.

Ordinance 49, as amended by Ordinance 250, makes it unlawful for any person to commence or carry on any business specified in the ordinance without first having paid the required license fee and having procured a license certificate so to do from the city and without obtaining the permit, certificate of compliance, or other instrument required by the ordinance. The license fee required was $50 a year or part thereof from local and $100 a year or part thereof from itinerant electricians and electrical contractors. ¹ The amount of the license fee is made a debt to Culver City. Violation of any provision of the ordinance is a misdemeanor. On payment of the required fee it is made the duty of the license collector to issue a license certificate. A permit from the City Council to carry on the occupation is required. ²

Defendants contend the imposition of contractors' license fees is not for regulation but for revenue purposes; that it does not add any regulatory burden on plaintiff to what is already required by state law; and that the penalty is applied for violation of the ordinance in failing to pay the license fee.

The same contention was made in Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal.App.2d 612, 243 P.2d 73. In that case the superior court granted an injunction against the enforcement of provisions of the electrical code of Los Angeles requiring payment of a permit service fee of $100 and the posting of a $1,000 bond by electrical contractors. In affirming the judgment we held: 1. The provision of article XI, section 11, of the Constitution declaring that 'Any * * * city * * * may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws,' is a limitation on the power of municipalities, from whatever source the power is derived. 2. A local ordinance is in conflict with general law if the general law occupies the entire field, leaving no room for local regulations. 3. It was the intention of the Legislature to declare that licensing and regulation of contractors by the state shall be the only licensing and regulation in the state. 4. The licensing of contractors throughout the state is a matter of general and state-wide concern, and is not a municipal affair which concerns only the inhabitants of a chartered city and which is subject to local regulation. 5. The state, by the enactment of the Contractors License Act, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7000 et seq., has adopted a broad and comprehensive plan for licensing contractors throughout the state, and such general law has fully occupied the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation thereon other than for revenue only and for the enforcement of local regulations as to the quality and character of electrical installations. 6. A state license implies permission to the licensee to conduct his business at any place in the state, and this permission should not be circumscribed by local authorities; a city ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements. 7. The challenged provisions of the ordinance were invalid as an attempt to provide a means by which a contractor with a state license may be denied the right to contract or work in the city, and as being in direct conflict with the general state law, which is complete in itself; it nullified the permission given a contractor by the general law to conduct his business at any place in the state. See In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 116, 168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675.

Lynch v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal.App.2d 115, at page 119, 249, P.2d 856, at page 858, says:

'To finally sum up the matter in its legal aspect, appellants' argument tends to give first place to municipal regulatory powers and subjects state control to municipal limitation. This theory of operation is directly contrary to the well established rule, and should not be sanctioned either under so-called police power or otherwise. Nor should a contractor who has been duly licensed by the state be placed in such a confused and burdensome position.'

Notwithstanding the state law which authorizes an electrical contractor holding a state license to contract anywhere in the state, Ordinance 49, as amended by Ordinance 250, limits his right to contract in Culver City unless he pays the city the prescribed fee and obtains a permit from the city. The provisions of the ordinance do not come within the category mentioned in Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal.App.2d 443, 168 P.2d 767--regulations as to the quality and character of installations. They attempt to provide the means by which an electrical contractor with a state license may be denied the right to contract or work in Culver City. The general law is complete in itself. It is not simply prohibitory. It is also permissive. It authorizes contractors licensed by the board to engage in their occupations anywhere in the state. The requirement for the payment of a fee and the obtaining of a permit nullifies the permission given a contractor by the general law to conduct his business at any place in the state. A municipality may not impose a more stringent or additional requirement than imposed by the general law. It clearly appears that the general law and the challenged provisions of Ordinance 49, as amended by Ordinance 250,--the one permitting, the other prohibiting, the same act, except on more onerous terms--are in direct conflict with each other.

Ordinance 49, as amended by...