Ahern v. Florida Real Estate Com'n ex rel. O'Kelley

• Decision Date: 17 March 1942
• Citation: 6 So.2d 857,149 Fla. 706
• Parties: AHERN v. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ex rel. O'KELLEY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

6 So.2d 857

149 Fla. 706

AHERN v. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ex rel. O'KELLEY.

Florida Supreme Court

March 17, 1942

Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis judge.

P. H. Odom and Frank M. Lipscomb, both of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Willard Ayres, of Bartow, and L. E. Broome, of Orlando, for appellees.

TERRELL, Justice.

In December, 1939 appellant was informed against by the Florida Real Estate Commission for violating Section 4087, Compiled General Laws of 1927, in that he did obtain money from his clients by fraud and false pretense. He (appellant) filed an answer denying all acts of misconduct charged to him, testimony was taken, the cause was certified to the circuit court where motion to dismiss was denied and a final decree entered suspending his registration as a real estate broker for a period of six months. This appeal is from the order of suspension.

The circuit court based his order of suspension on the following finding:

'The Court finds that the defendant accepted and received from George W and Mary E. Ortegas the sum of $100.00 as a deposit on the purchase of certain real estate in Duval County, Florida, more particularly described in the information, upon the pretense that the defendant represented the owner thereof as her broker. The owner had never listed the property with defendant and he at no time ever presented to her an offer to purchase said property on behalf of Mr and Mrs. Ortegas, or anyone else, but he converted to his own use the aforesaid $100.00.'

It is contended that the order should be reversed because (1) the information does not allege that the acts complained of were willfully and knowingly committed, (2) that the evidence of previous misconduct and a former suspension should not have been admitted, (3) the cause should be dismissed because appellant's license was renewed during the progress of the suspension proceedings, (4) considering the age of appellant and the amount involved, the length of the suspension was too severe.

In answer to the first contention, it is sufficient to say that since the act brought in question was one designed to regulate the conduct of real estate brokers, it is not necessary that the information be cast with that degree of technical nicety required in a criminal prosecution. If a charge of improper conduct as contemplated by the act is stated that is sufficient. State ex rel Williams v. Whitman...