Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, 6420

• Decision Date: 17 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 6420,6420
• Citation: 64 Haw. 327,640 P.2d 1161
• Parties: Adeline AHUNA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS of the State of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1161

640 P.2d 1161

64 Haw. 327

Adeline AHUNA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS of the State of Hawaii,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 6420.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 17, 1982.

As Amended March 16, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The question whether a private action may be brought against the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands to enforce the trust obligations imposed by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act is not the jurisdictional sort which the court raises on its own motion and will not be addressed when raised for the first time on appeal.

2. A judgment or decree should be construed reasonably and as a whole so as to give effect to the intention of the court. Effect must be given not only to that which is expressed but also to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied by the judgment or decree.

3. Judgment ordering Department of Hawaiian Home Lands to issue "a lot as close to Lot 91 as possible" meant a ten-acre lot.

4. The primary purpose of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was the rehabilitation of native Hawaiians.

5. A review of the history of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act leads to the conclusion that the federal government set aside certain public lands to be considered Hawaiian home lands to be utilized in the rehabilitation of native Hawaiians, thereby undertaking a trust obligation benefiting the aboriginal people, and the State of Hawaii assumed this fiduciary obligation upon being admitted to the Union as a state.

6. The extent or nature of the trust obligations of the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands may be determined by examining well-settled principles enunciated by the federal courts regarding lands set aside by Congress in trust for the benefit of other native Americans.

7. The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands has the obligation to administer the trust solely in the interest of the native Hawaiian beneficiaries. The Department and Commission breached their fiduciary duty to eligible native Hawaiian beneficiary and violated the trust obligations imposed by the Hawaii Constitution by giving undue weight to the interests of the State, the County of Hawaii, and the citizens or taxpayers of Hawaii in general in determining to withhold certain acreage from a lease issued to the beneficiary.

8. The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands has the trust obligation to use reasonable skill and care to make trust property productive, and trustees must act as an ordinary and prudent person would in dealing with his or her own property. The Department and Commission breached this duty by refusing to lease a full ten-acre lot to an eligible native Hawaiian beneficiary which left almost four acres of agricultural land in an unproductive state because of a mere possibility that it may be subject to use in the extension of a highway.

George K. K. Kaeo, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Hilo (Thomas E. Cook, Deputy Atty. Gen., Hilo, with him on the opening brief), for defendant-appellant.

Ben H. Gaddis, Legal Aid Society, and Andrew C. Levin, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before RICHARDSON, C.J., OGATA, LUM and NAKAMURA, JJ., and FONG, Circuit Judge, in place of MENOR, J., disqualified.

RICHARDSON, Chief Justice.

This appeal seeks to determine whether an order filed on September 14, 1976, by Judge Kubota in the circuit court of the Third Circuit properly implemented a prior order filed on February 5, 1971 in the same case. ¹ Defendant-appellant Department of Hawaiian Home Lands specifically appeals from that portion of the 1976 order directing it, inter alia, to issue a lease to plaintiff-appellee Wallace Beck of the full ten acres in Lot 92 situated in the Panaewa Hawaiian homestead area on the island of Hawaii. Appellant contends it has complied fully with the 1971 order by awarding appellee a lease to approximately 6.5 acres of Lot 92. After examining the record and reviewing relevant legal and equitable precepts, we affirm the judgment of the court below because the prior order implicitly directed appellant to issue a lease to a ten-acre lot as close to appellee's present lot as possible or to show cause why such a lot could not be issued. Appellant neither issued such a lease nor adequately demonstrated why it was not possible to do so.

I.

A.

This action was initially filed on August 13, 1970, by a number of native Hawaiians ² who were qualified under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, (hereafter HHCA) ³ to lease Hawaiian home lands for agricultural purposes at Panaewa, Hawaii. The action generally sought review under the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act and a declaratory judgment that the policy of the Department of awarding agricultural lots at Panaewa on a permissive use basis contravened the HHCA and that the Department was obligated to issue leases to available agricultural tracts to all native Hawaiian applicants who were qualified to perform the conditions of the lease. The trial court dismissed the class action aspect of the complaint and the action was heard as an action on behalf of the named plaintiffs (appellee Beck being one of these named persons).

On February 5, 1971, Judge Menor issued a Decision and Order finding the use permit system practiced by appellant in violation of the HHCA. ⁴ In addition, the court fashioned specific relief for each of the plaintiffs in the order. In most cases, appellant was instructed either to award a lease of a specific lot to the individual plaintiff ⁵ or to act upon the lease application of the plaintiff and explain any rejection of that application to the court. ⁶ The court thus retained jurisdiction to insure the proper implementation of its Decision and Order.

The claims of all plaintiffs except appellee Beck have been resolved and are not at issue on appeal. As to appellee, the order by Judge Menor provided that the Department issue "a lease to a lot situate as close to Lot 91 as possible, or show cause why the same should not be issued."

B.

Appellee desired a lease to an additional lot adjoining his Lot 91. The court found appellee particularly interested in lots that were then zoned for industrial use. ⁷

Appellant attempted several times to satisfy the 1971 order by offering appellee lots outside the area zoned industrial. In February of 1972, appellee requested a lease to Lot 92 which was adjacent to his present Lot 91 and zoned industrial. Appellant, however, was reluctant to award leases to lots within an industrial zone because those lots could be used for general leasing purposes. General lease revenues contributed significantly to the Department's budget.

In early 1973, appellant petitioned the County of Hawaii to rezone Panaewa farm Lots 91-97 from industrial to agricultural use; in December 1974, the County rezoned Lots 91 and 92 for agricultural use. Subsequently, in January of 1975, appellant informed appellee Beck of the rezoning. Appellee believed this notice of the zoning change represented an assent to his request for Lot 92 and began to make improvements thereon. ⁸

In the meantime, at a meeting in mid-1975, appellant considered the County's construction of the Puainako Road Extension (herein Extension), a proposed highway to be developed across Hawaiian home lands. Appellant approved the Extension in concept but reserved the right of final approval upon review of a detailed design thereof. Commission Minutes, May 30, 1975. As planned, the Extension was to occupy about 3.5 acres of Lot 92. Appellant subsequently decided to award approximately 6.5 acres of Lot 92 to appellee and to retain approximately 3.5 acres because the parcel would be affected by the proposed Extension.

The question of whether appellee was entitled to the full ten acres of Lot 92 was then brought before Judge Kubota in the Third Circuit. Judge Kubota generally concluded that appellant had a fiduciary obligation to place beneficiaries of HHCA such as appellee on the land to the fullest extent possible, that appellant failed to show good cause why appellee should not be awarded the full ten acres of Lot 92, and that appellant abused its discretion by excluding 3.5 acres of Lot 92 from the lease.

Consequently, the court ordered appellant to issue appellee a lease of the full ten acres of Lot 92, basically upon the same terms contained in appellant's standard lease form. The court, however, further ordered that such lease include a cancellation clause for the portion of Lot 92 subject to use for the construction of the proposed Extension, as well as provisions for the compensation of appellee upon condemnation and for relocation expenses.

II.

Our analysis first addresses procedural matters. Appellant contends that there was no basis for a private right of action against the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands to enforce the trust obligations imposed by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. ⁹

The question of whether a private action may be properly brought under the circumstances of the case is generally not considered under subject matter jurisdiction, and is not of the jurisdictional sort which the court raises on its own motion. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278-79, 97 S.Ct. 568, 571-572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Haldorson v. Blair, 449 F.Supp. 1025 (D.Minn.1978). Since the question was raised by appellant for the first time on appeal, the issue was not properly brought before us and we do not express an opinion on that issue.

We now consider the substantive issues on appeal. The first question we examine concerns the intent of Judge Menor's order with respect to appellee Beck. Only after we have grasped the contemplation of the court can we decide whether Judge Kubota properly implemented its order.

It is well settled that a judgment or decree, like any other written instrument, should be construed reasonably and as a whole so as to give effect to the intention of the court. Smith...