Aiello v. Collier
| Decision Date | 15 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:21-CV-00067 |
| Parties | DANIEL AIELLO, Plaintiff, v. BRYAN COLLIER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART BRYAN COLLIER'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Daniel Aiello, a Texas prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this action against Bryan Collier, the Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) in his official capacity. This case involves Plaintiff's efforts to grow his hair long in accordance with his religious beliefs. Since filing this action, TDCJ has modified its grooming policy which now allows Plaintiff to grow his hair long. Plaintiff's claims are moot.
Pending before the Court are Bryan Collier's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (D.E 105) and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E 110).
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court GRANT in part and DENY in part Collier's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss. Because this action is subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the undersigned further respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED as moot. If this M&R is adopted as written, the Court should enter final judgment and close this case.
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Plaintiff alleges in this action he is a Christian who would prefer to take the Nazarite Vow. According to Plaintiff, a major tenet of the Nazarite Vow references the right to grow one's hair long. Plaintiff alleges that TDCJ's grooming policy interferes with his ability to practice his Christian faith through the taking of the Nazarite Vow. Plaintiff asserts claims for (1) violation of his right to equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) for discrimination under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.
In his original complaint (D.E. 1-1, p. 4), Plaintiff referenced Goodman v. Davis, No. 2:12-cv-166 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (Goodman), which was a consolidated case filed by three Native American prisoners in this Court under RLUIPA. After a three-day bench trial, District Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos granted these prisoners an exemption from TDCJ's grooming policy which allowed them to wear their hair long. (Goodman, D.E. 322).
On May 17, 2021, the undersigned issued a Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R), recommending that the Court only retain Plaintiff's equal protection and RLUIPA claims challenging TDCJ's hair policy against Collier in his official capacity for injunctive relief. (D.E. 16). District Judge Ramos adopted the M&R. (D.E. 34).
After Collier filed his answer on June 29, 2021 (D.E. 24), Plaintiff filed several dispositive motions, which were each construed as motions for summary judgment. (D.E. 38, 46, 56, 87). Relying on the Court's final judgment in Goodman, Plaintiff primarily contended that his equal protection and RLUIPA rights have been violated, that he should be exempted from TDCJ's grooming policy, and that he should be allowed to grow his hair long. (D.E. 38, pp. 2-5; D.E. 46, p. 4; D.E. 56, pp. 2-7; D.E. 87, p. 1). District Judge Ramos denied each motion, concluding that Plaintiff had offered no evidence sufficient to eliminate any disputed issues of material fact regarding his RLUIPA and equal protection claims. (D.E. 57, pp 9-10; D.E. 95, p. 8).
On July 7, 2022, Collier filed a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (D.E. 105). On November 4, 2022, the Court received Plaintiff's response to Collier's Motion to Dismiss. (D.E. 117). Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the merits of his claims. (D.E. 110). Collier filed a response to the summary judgment motion. (D.E. 112).
Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the court lacks statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The burden of proof is on the party asserting jurisdiction, which is the Plaintiff in this case. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom., Cloud v. United States, 536 U.S. 960 (2202).
In examining a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact that may be in dispute. Id. “Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Id. (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff's uncontroverted factual allegations are taken as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“The court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time, either in the answer, or in the form of a suggestion to the court prior to final judgment.” Garcia v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, No. 3:21-CV-2233-G, 2022 WL 3349151, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2022) (citing 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1350 (3d. ed. 2004)). Thus, Collier's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, submitted after the service of his answer, is treated as a suggestion that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case. See id. The court must dismiss a civil action if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Collier contends that: (1) Plaintiff's § 1983 equal protection claim seeking money damages against him in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim against him is precluded as well under the RLUIPA statute. (D.E. 105, p. 3). While not addressing Collier's Eleventh Amendment argument, Plaintiff argues that damages are available under RLUIPA. (D.E. 117, p. 4).
A review of the record in this case reveals that Plaintiff does not seek monetary damages in connection with his equal protection and RLUIPA claims. In his original complaint, Plaintiff only sought “permanent injunctive relief from [the] TDCJ grooming policy” so that he could grow his hair long and loose. (D.E. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff then testified at the Spears hearing that he did not seek monetary damages in this case. (D.E. 19, pp. 23). In response to the undersigned's question as to whether he seeks any type of money damages, Plaintiff responded:
Your Honor, I'm not asking for any of that. The only thing I ask for is the attorney fees, the filing fees, expert witness testimony, ... and research of paralegal fees on my behalf for researching the law.
Furthermore, in screening this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court retained only Plaintiff's equal protection and RLUIPA claims against Collier in his official capacity for injunctive relief. (D.E. 34, p. 2). Plaintiff has not moved to amend his complaint at any time to seek monetary damages against Collier in his official capacity.
Under the Court's Scheduling Order (D.E. 28), the deadline to amend his complaint to add any claim for damages has long since expired. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Collier's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims seeking money damages against Collier in his official capacity (D.E. 105) be DENIED as unnecessary.[1]
Collier contends that Plaintiff is barred from bringing a RLUIPA claim against Defendant in his individual capacity. (D.E. 105, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff responds that RLUIPA does in fact authorize individual capacity suits. (D.E. 117, p. 4). As noted above, the Court retained only Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim against Collier in his official capacity for injunctive relief. (D.E. 34, p. 2). Plaintiff has not moved in a timely fashion to amend his complaint and assert a RLUIPA claim against Collier in his individual capacity. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Collier's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's individual capacity RLUIPA claims against Collier (D.E. 105) be DENIED as unnecessary.[2]
A court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where a case becomes moot. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S 66, 78-79 (2013). “A case becomes moot-and therefore no longer a Case or Controversy for purposes of Article III-when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, L.L.C. v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If a dispute has been resolved or if it has evanesced because of changed circumstances, including the passage of time, it is considered moot.” American Med. Ass'n v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). In other words, when the controversy between parties “has resolved to the point that they no longer qualify as ‘adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation,' [courts] are without power to entertain the case.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 324 (...
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