Aikman v. County of Westchester, 04 Civ. 7543(SCR).

• Decision Date: 03 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04 Civ. 7543(SCR).,04 Civ. 7543(SCR).
• Citation: 491 F.Supp.2d 374
• Parties: James AIKMAN, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Westchester County Police Department, P.O. Edward Devlin, P.O. Kenneth Hasko, Det. Mark Carey, P.O. "John Doe, No. 4" (defendant "John Doe, No. 4" identified further as a police officer involved in the stop, search, custodial detention and arrest of the plaintiff on December 1, 2003 in Eastchester, New York), Sgt. "John" Luciano, "P.O. John Doe, No. 6," "P.O. John Doe, No. 7," "P.O. John Doe, No. 8," (defendants Luciano and "John Doe, No. 6" through "John Doe, No. 8" identified further as police officers employed by the defendant County and police department who were involved in surveillance activities in the vicinity of 955 Yonkers Avenue, Yonkers, New York, on or about December 7, 2003), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

491 F.Supp.2d 374

James AIKMAN, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Westchester County Police Department, P.O. Edward Devlin, P.O. Kenneth Hasko, Det. Mark Carey, P.O. "John Doe, No. 4" (defendant "John Doe, No. 4" identified further as a police officer involved in the stop, search, custodial detention and arrest of the plaintiff on December 1, 2003 in Eastchester, New York), Sgt. "John" Luciano, "P.O. John Doe, No. 6," "P.O. John Doe, No. 7," "P.O. John Doe, No. 8," (defendants Luciano and "John Doe, No. 6" through "John Doe, No. 8" identified further as police officers employed by the defendant County and police department who were involved in surveillance activities in the vicinity of 955 Yonkers Avenue, Yonkers, New York, on or about December 7, 2003), Defendants.

No. 04 Civ. 7543(SCR).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

June 3, 2007.

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Joseph Lanni, Law Office of Joseph P. Lanni, P.C., Larchmont, NY, for Plaintiff.

Shannon Sarles Brady, White Plains, NY, Lara K. Eshkenazi, Nicole L. Gueron, U.S. Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

ROBINSON, District Judge.

In this action, James Aikman (the "Plaintiff') brings suit against the County of Westchester ("Westchester") and several members of the Westchester County Police Department ("Police Defendants"). This suit stems from an incident where Plaintiff, who is African-American, was pulled over for a traffic violation, detained, and searched. Plaintiff, who brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), alleges six causes of action, claiming deprivations of his constitutional rights. This opinion addresses Defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

I. Background

On December 1, 2003, while Plaintiff was driving in Yonkers, New York, Police Defendants stopped Plaintiffs car. Plaintiff was driving with a broken side-view mirror in violation of New York State law.¹ Police Defendants subsequently held Plaintiff at the scene while they searched his car. Plaintiff alleges that Police Defendants conducted surveillance on him before the traffic stop, used the broken mirror as a pretext to pull him over, and stopped him because he is African-American. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff further alleges that Police Defendants, inter alia, held him against his will, assaulted, humiliated, and selectively enforced the laws against him. (Am.Compl. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff contends that Westchester engages in a pattern, policy, or practice of racial profiling, selective enforcement, and unreasonable searches and seizures. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 58, 62.)

II. Analysis

A. Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint "shall contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "The statement should be plain because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41-42 (2d Cir.1988).

B. Standard of Review

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court "must view all allegations raised in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party ... and `must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint.'" Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., Inc., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993)). In doing so, a court is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985). The court's consideration is limited to the factual allegations in plaintiffs' complaints, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated into the complaint by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, and "documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Brass v. American Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir.1991)).

A court must deny a motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Because the complaint must merely allege facts which confer a cognizable right of action, "`[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" York v. Ass'n of the Bar, 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). "Dismissal ... is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised," Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42.

The Second Circuit has stressed that "[t]his standard is applied with particular strictness when the plaintiff complains of a civil rights violation,'" Shechter v. Comptroller of City of New York, 79 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir.1991)), and it is clear that notice pleading is sufficient to allege such a § 1983 violation. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160; see also Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir.1998); Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.1994). Thus, "[a] claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only need allege that some person acting under color of stale law deprived the claimant of a federal right." Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983).

C. Defendant County of Westchester

Plaintiff has alleged that Westchester violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting him to an unreasonable search and seizure, and deprived him of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment through racial profiling and selective enforcement. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Westchester's motion to dismiss is denied.

To make a claim under § 1983, a "plaintiff must [first] allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).

A municipality "can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Plaintiff's allegations against Westchester are contained in the fifth and sixth causes of action in the amended complaint, both brought pursuant to § 1983. The fifth cause of action alleges that the officers' conduct was "derived from an official policy, pattern, and/or practice of the County of Westchester ... to conduct traffic stops" that violated Plaintiffs right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 57-58.) The sixth cause of action alleges that the officers violated Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection by selectively enforcing laws based on race. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 61-62.)

Plaintiffs allegations that Westchester has a pattern or practice of depriving certain people of their constitutional rights satisfies Leatherman's notice pleading requirement.

D. Defendant Police Officers

Plaintiffs claims against Police Defendants are contained in the first through fourth causes of action. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 19-55.) The first and second causes of action are brought pursuant to § 1983 and allege that Police Defendants violated Plaintiffs Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by, inter alia, subjecting him to an excessive and unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. The third cause of action is brought pursuant to § 1985(3) and alleges an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The fourth cause of action is also brought pursuant to § 1985(3) and alleges Police Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his rights to equal protection.

As Plaintiffs amended complaint does not specify in which capacity Police Defendants are being sued, this Court will analyze the complaint as if it was made against the Police Defendants in both their individual and official capacities

1. Defendant Luciano's Deputization as a DEA Officer

First, we will consider if Defendant James Luciano, who was both a Westchester County police officer and deputized as an officer with the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 878, was properly served. To properly serve a federal government employee who was sued in his individual capacity, a plaintiff must serve both the employee and the government. Fed R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(B); Armstrong v. Sears, 33 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that "service upon the United States is not required in actions against federal agents in their individual capacities"). Defendant Luciano argues that his status as a DEA deputy makes him an employee of the federal government and the claims against him must be dismissed because the government was never served.

Law enforcement officers deputized under § 878 are "federal employees" only if they fall under certain "narrow" exceptions detailed in 5 U.S.C. § 3374(c). See Felix v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 89 Civ. 2410, 1991 WL 251660, 41, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEIS 16549 at...