Aipoalani v. Derr

• Decision Date: 27 April 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL 22-00093 DKW-RT
• Parties: HANALEI YUKUTARU AIPOALANI, #53121-509, Plaintiff, v. ESTELLA DERR, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

HANALEI YUKUTARU AIPOALANI, #53121-509, Plaintiff, v. ESTELLA DERR, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 22-00093 DKW-RT

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

April 27, 2022

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND

Derrick K. Watson United States District Judge

Before the Court is a Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint, ECF No. 1 filed by pro se Plaintiff Hanalei Yukutaru Aipoalani.^[1] Aipoalani alleges that officials^[2] at FDC-Honolulu violated the Eighth Amendment by denying him adequate medical care (Count I) threatening his safety (Count II), and housing him in dangerous environmental conditions (Count III). Id. at PagelD # 5-10. Because the Complaint, as explained below fails to state a claim, it is DISMISSED, albeit with partial leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1).

I. STATUTORY SCREENING

The Court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner pleadings against government officials pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018). Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).

Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.

In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants' pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d 2 at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).

II. AIPOALANI'S CLAIMS^[3]

Aipoalani alleges in Count I that he was fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by the time he self-surrendered at FDC-Honolulu on August 11, 2021. ECF No. 1 at PageID # 6. He also tested negative for the virus. Id. At FDC-Honolulu, Aipoalani was initially housed in the “Quarantine unit” with an inmate who was unvaccinated and who had not been tested. Id. That inmate experienced nausea, chills, and headaches between August 11-13. Id. On August 14, officials moved Aipoalani to another cell. Id. Two days later, Aipoalani's former cellmate tested positive for COVID-19, and, the following day, Aipoalani also tested positive for the virus. Id. Aipoalani and at least one other inmate who received positive test results “were immediately moved to health services for isolation and observation.” Id.

Following a rise in COVID cases at FDC-Honolulu in early 2022, Aipoalani tested positive for the virus a second time on January 24, 2022. Id. Officials again isolated Aipoalani, this time in the special housing unit (“SHU”). Id. According to Aipoalani, he suffers symptoms associated with “long-term COVID” including blurry vision, feeling faint and lightheaded, and short-term memory loss. Id.

Aipoalani alleges in Count II that, beginning on August 28, 2021, he shared a cell with an inmate who had “behavioral issues” and who had been “prescribed medication.” Id. at PageID # 7. When not “properly medicated, ” this inmate acted “aggressively” toward Aipoalani. Id. Aipoalani describes his cellmate during these periods as “hostile and demonic.” Id. On three unspecified occasions, Aipoalani asked unidentified officials to move him to another cell. Id. Apparently, these requests were not granted.

Aipoalani alleges in Count III that conditions at FDC-Honolulu are dangerous because of benzene from neighboring Daniel K. Inouye International Airport and “high levels of petroleum . . . in buildings and facilities near and around” the airport.^[4] Id. at PagelD # 9-10.

In his prayer for relief, Aipoalani asks for his sentence and that of his wife “to be fully commuted/reduced to zero, ” to have their convictions “expunged, ” and for three million dollars. Id. at PageID # 11.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Aipoalani marked a box on the Complaint indicating that he is invoking the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1 at PageID # 1.

Section 1343(a)(3) provides that district courts have original jurisdiction of “any civil action authorized by law . . . [t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law . . . of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens . . . within the jurisdiction of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). Courts have described this paragraph as the “jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983[.]” Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 n.4 (1989); Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979).

Section 1983 provides that every person who, “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 therefore “provides a statutory cause of action where state officials acting under color of law violate constitutional rights.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021). Section 1983 “provides no cause of action against federal [officials] acting under color of federal law.” Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1995); Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987) (“There is no valid basis for a claim under section 1983 . . . against federal officials acting under color of federal law.”)

Aipoalani is a federal prisoner in a federal prison who alleges that federal prison officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See ECF No. 1 at PagelD # 5-10. Because Aipoalani does not allege that any Defendant was acting under color of state law, the court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Emory v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Civil No. 05-00671 SOM/LEK, 2006 WL 8451336, at *5 (D. Haw. Aug. 31, 2006) (dismissing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “[b]ecause the Complaint [did] not allege that Defendants acted pursuant to state law or were otherwise clothed with the authority of state law”).

If Aipoalani intends to invoke this court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), he must consider the following legal standards before doing so in any amended complaint.

B. Joinder

Aipoalani alleges that officials at FDC-Honolulu violated the Eighth Amendment by denying him adequate medical care (Count I), threatening his safety (Count II), and housing him in dangerous environmental conditions (Count III). ECF No. 1 at PagelD # 5-10. He names as Defendants the warden, the chief medical officer, and the unit manager. Id. at PageID # 1-2.

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a), governing joinder of claims, a plaintiff may bring multiple claims, related or not, in a lawsuit against a single defendant. To name different defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 20, governing joinder of parties. Rule 20(a)(2) allows joinder of defendants only if the following two requirements are met: (1) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B); Stribling v. Tobias, 690 Fed.Appx. 972, 973 (9th Cir. 2017). Unrelated claims involving different defendants belong in different suits. See What v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 2014 WL 176610, at *4-5 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2014).

Here, there is no apparent connection between the Complaint's three counts other than the fact that the underlying events occurred at FDC-Honolulu. This is not enough to satisfy the joinder rules. See Woods v. Curry, No. C 10-1859 JSW (PR), 2013 WL 12222362, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) (concluding that prisoner improperly joined claims “based on a wide variety of unrelated events that occurred at his prison”). If Aipoalani decides to file an amended pleading, any claim asserted therein must be permitted by either Rule 18 or Rule 20. Aipoalani may state a single claim against a single defendant. Pursuant to Rule 18, Aipoalani may then add any additional claims to his action that are against the same defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 18. Aipoalani may also add any additional claims against other defendants, if those claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions as his original claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2).

Aipoalani may not pursue a combination of unrelated claims against various defendants in a single suit. See Char v. Kaiser Hosp., Civ....