Airport v. Town of East Haddam.
Decision Date | 16 August 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 18488.,18488. |
Citation | 24 A.3d 1205,302 Conn. 70 |
Parties | GOODSPEED AIRPORT, LLCv.TOWN OF EAST HADDAM. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kenneth Rosenthal, with whom were John Bashaw, New Haven, and, on the brief, Daniel Klau, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).John S. Bennet, Essex, for the appellee (defendant).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.EVELEIGH, J.
The plaintiff, Goodspeed Airport, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the decision of the trial court denying relief on its claim seeking classification and assessment of certain of its real property as open space. Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. East Haddam, 115 Conn.App. 438, 439–40, 973 A.2d 678 (2009). On appeal, following our grant of certification,1 the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that: (1) 13.08 acres of the plaintiff's property were ineligible for open space classification; and (2) the plaintiff, notwithstanding the ongoing improper classification of its property by the defendant, the town of East Haddam, was not entitled to judicial relief from the improper assessment of 43.04 acres. We agree with the plaintiff, and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following facts and procedural history are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. “The present matter arises from three related tax appeals involving the plaintiff's 57.12 acre parcel located at 15 Lumberyard Road in East Haddam. The property contains a commercial utility airport that occupies 14.08 acres of the parcel. The airport has existed at this location since 1964 and operates under a special exception to the [defendant's] zoning regulations. The remaining 43.04 acres contain open fields located entirely within a flood plain.
Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. East Haddam, supra, 115 Conn.App. at 440–42, 973 A.2d 678.
The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court. “On appeal [before the Appellate Court], the plaintiff claim[ed] that the [trial] court improperly (1) denied the plaintiff any relief for the defendant's wrongful refusal to grant an open space classification and (2) concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to [open space] classification [of the 13.08] additional acreage of its property ... pursuant to ... § 12–107e.” Id., at 439–40, 973 A.2d 678. The Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that “a taxpayer who alleges aggrievement by the denial of an application for open space classification still must sustain the initial burden of proving that the denial has resulted in an overassessment of his property”; id., at 446, 973 A.2d 678; and that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy that burden. Id., at 450–51, 973 A.2d 678. As to the additional 13.08 acres for which the plaintiff sought open space classification, the Appellate Court concluded that such acres were ineligible for open space classification. Id., at 456–57, 973 A.2d 678. This certified appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the 13.08 acres were ineligible for open space classification. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court's decision denying open space classification for the 13.08 acres is contrary to § 12–107e, the defendant's 1981 plan of development (plan), and prior decisions of this court. The defendant disagrees, claiming that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the 13.08 acres were ineligible for open space classification under both § 12–107e and the plan because the land is the site of the plaintiff's operating commercial airport. We agree with the plaintiff.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review applicable to the plaintiff's claim. In concluding that the 13.08 acres were ineligible for open space classification, the trial court construed and applied the plan and pertinent statutory provisions. Accordingly, our review of the trial court's conclusions is plenary. See Aspetuck Valley Country Club, Inc. v. Weston, 292 Conn. 817, 822, 975 A.2d 1241 (2009); Griswold Airport, Inc. v. Madison, 289 Conn. 723, 731, 961 A.2d 338 (2008). In addition, in examining the meaning of a particular statute, we are guided by fundamental principles of statutory construction. See General Statutes § 1–2z; see also Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 308, 943 A.2d 1075 (2008) ( ). Finally, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carmel Hollow Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 149, 848 A.2d 451 (2004).
Pursuant to General Statutes § 1–2z, we begin with the text of the relevant statutory scheme governing the classification of land as open space. Section 12–107e provides in relevant part:
Pursuant to the statutory scheme, three elements are essential to a successful application seeking to classify land as open space. First, the land must be included in an area designated as eligible for open space classification in the municipality's plan of conservation or development. General Statutes § 12–107e (a). Second, the owner of the...
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