Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Bethlehem, (SC 16957).

• Citation: 269 Conn. 120,848 A.2d 451
• Decision Date: 25 May 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 16957).
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: CARMEL HOLLOW ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. TOWN OF BETHLEHEM.

269 Conn. 120

848 A.2d 451

CARMEL HOLLOW ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. TOWN OF BETHLEHEM.

(SC 16957).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 5, 2003.

Officially released May 25, 2004.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Zarella and Parker, Js.

Michael A. Zizka, for the appellant (defendant).

David R. Schaefer, with whom, on the brief, was Carolyn W. Kone, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

In this tax appeal,¹ the principal issue is whether the trial court properly concluded that a town assessor may not deny an application to classify as forest land subdivided land that the state forester has designated as forest land pursuant to General Statutes § 12-107d² solely on the basis of the assessor's determination that the use of the land has changed. The plaintiff, Carmel Hollow Associates Limited Partnership, filed an appeal in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a³ and 12-119⁴ from the decision of the board of assessment appeals of the defendant town of Bethlehem denying the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the board of assessors (assessor) to deny the plaintiff's application for forest land and farm land classification so as to reduce the assessment of its property. Following a hearing, the trial court found for the defendant as to the farm land classification and for the plaintiff as to the forest land classification. The court ordered a reduction in the assessment of the property for which the forest land classification had been sought and a refund to the plaintiff of any overpayment of taxes, with interest and costs, with respect to that property. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from that portion of the trial court's judgment that was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties have stipulated to the following facts. In 1986, the town planning commission approved subdivision plans filed by the plaintiff for fourteen⁵ building lots on approximately 91.5 acres of land and approximately 13.6 acres of open space. In 1988, the planning commission approved subdivision plans filed by the plaintiff for seven building lots on approximately 39.7 acres of land and approximately 5.9 acres of open space. The two subdivisions are adjacent to each other and are known as Carmel Hollow I and Carmel Hollow II, respectively.⁶

On October 18, 1990, the state forester⁷ approved the plaintiff's application for the designation of approximately 106.2 acres within Carmel Hollow I and Carmel Hollow II as forest land pursuant to § 12-107d (a). The record reveals that the defendant did not appeal from the state forester's decision to designate the property as forest land as it was permitted to do under § 12-107d (f). Shortly thereafter, the assessor approved the plaintiff's application for the classification of approximately twenty-five acres of Carmel Hollow I as farm land pursuant to General Statutes § 12-107c (a).⁸ As a result, all of the land within the two subdivisions was classified as either forest land or farm land on the defendant's 1990 grand list.⁹

The plaintiff sold lots in the two subdivisions in 1994, 1997 and each subsequent year until 2002. At the time of trial in July, 2002, the plaintiff continued to own four lots in Carmel Hollow I and six lots in Carmel Hollow II.¹⁰ All of the lots that the plaintiff still owned remained in a natural state and unchanged in actual use from their use in 1990.

In August, 1998, the assessor sent a letter to all of the owners of land classified as farm land or forest land pursuant to §§ 12-107c and 12-107d, respectively. The letter stated that the assessor was in the process of conducting a revaluation of property throughout the town and that the owners of property previously classified as farm land or forest land must complete a new application, as "an informational update only," indicating the current status of the classified property. The letter also requested that the owners complete a brief questionnaire indicating whether they had subdivided or sold any such property subsequent to its classification. Thereafter, the plaintiff completed the questionnaire and the application and returned them to the assessor.

In January, 1999, the assessor sent a second letter to the owners describing a new policy with respect to property classified as farm land or forest land within a subdivision. Under that policy, subdivided land on which no lot had been sold would be considered an inactive subdivision and would continue to be classified as farm land or forest land. Correspondingly, subdivided land on which lots had been sold would be considered an active subdivision and would be eligible for farm land or forest land classification subject to certain conditions.¹¹

The plaintiff applied to continue the classification of its unsold lots on the 1999 grand list as farm land or forest land. The assessor denied the plaintiff's application, and the unsold lots were assessed on the basis of their highest and best use as of October, 1999,¹² despite the fact that the state forester had not cancelled its designation of those lots or portions thereof as forest land. The record does not indicate that the defendant ever sought, or that the plaintiff paid, a conveyance tax because of the purported change in use of the property at the time the assessor denied the plaintiff's application to continue the classification. The plaintiff appealed to the board of assessment appeals from the assessor's decision to deny the plaintiff's application. The board of assessment appeals denied the appeal. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to §§ 12-117a and 12-119.

The trial court sustained the plaintiff's appeal as to the forest land classification, but dismissed the appeal as to the farm land classification.¹³ With respect to the property classified as forest land, the trial court determined that, under the "clear language" of § 12-107d (c), "unless the state forester has cancelled the designation of forest land, the assessor `shall' classify the land as such. There is nothing ... to suggest that the state forester cancelled the forest land designation as to any of the property owned by the plaintiff on October 1, 1999." Consequently, the trial court concluded that the "actions of the assessor in declassifying the forest land and computing an assessment based on that declassification resulted in an excessive assessment and disregarded the statutory provision for determining valuation, specifically, § 12-107d." The court thus ordered the defendant to classify all of the property still owned by the plaintiff in Carmel Hollow II and 34.34 acres of the remaining property in Carmel Hollow I as forest land for purposes of the particular assessments under appeal¹⁴ and to assess the property accordingly. This appeal by the defendant followed.

I

The defendant argues that the trial court improperly sustained the plaintiff's appeal with respect to the continued classification of the unsold lots as forest land because the assessor was entitled to terminate the classification pursuant to General Statutes § 12-504h¹⁵ without seeking prior approval from the state forester. We disagree.

Because this issue raises a question of statutory interpretation, our review is plenary. E.g., Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 266 Conn. 338, 345, 832 A.2d 611 (2003). "A fundamental tenet of statutory construction is that statutes are to be considered to give effect to the apparent intention of the lawmaking body." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 309, 592 A.2d 953 (1991). "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."¹⁶ Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154, § 1. In the present case, the defendant relies on § 12-504h, a provision contained in the real estate conveyance tax scheme. See General Statutes § 12-494 et seq. The provisions that govern our resolution of the issue, however, are contained in the property tax assessment scheme, specifically, General Statutes §§ 12-107a through 12-107e, which pertain to the assessment and classification of property as farm land, forest land and open space land. It is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of the relevant statutory provisions and from the statutory scheme itself that the assessor was not empowered to deny the application of the plaintiff to continue the classification of its property as forest land without the cancellation of the forest land designation. Accordingly, the defendant's claim has no merit.

The statutory scheme relating to the designation and classification of forest land for tax assessment purposes is contained in chapter 203 of the General Statutes, entitled "Property Tax Assessment," and begins with a declaration of policy that encourages conservation of the state's natural resources when threatened by local development pressures. General Statutes § 12-107a provides in relevant part: "It is hereby declared (a) that it is in the public interest to encourage the preservation of farm land, forest land and open space land in order to maintain a readily available source of food and farm products ... to conserve the state's natural resources and to provide for the welfare and happiness of the inhabitants of the state, (b) that it is in the public interest to prevent the forced conversion of farm land, forest land and open space land to more intensive uses as the result of economic...