Ajirogi v. State

• Decision Date: 30 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 5907,5907
• Citation: 583 P.2d 980,59 Haw. 515
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: Harold H. AJIROGI and Teruko Ajirogi, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellant. Robert FURUTA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellant. Civ.

Page 980

583 P.2d 980

59 Haw. 515

Harold H. AJIROGI and Teruko Ajirogi, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellant.

Robert FURUTA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellant.

Civ. No. 5907.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Aug. 30, 1978.

Rehearings Denied Sept. 20, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The liability of the State for negligence in exercising control over persons in its custody is to be judged under the principles of tort liability which determine the liability of private individuals in the same circumstances, but the purpose of the detention and the foreseeable risks of setting the detained person at liberty are to be considered in determining what constitutes the exercise of reasonable care.

2. The duty of the State to exercise care in the control of persons in its custody is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by failure to exercise such control and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made failure to exercise such control unreasonably dangerous.

3. Court orders directed to administrators of a State mental hospital and orders by such administrators to hospital staff, with respect to the custody of a resident of the hospital, do not in themselves create duties of care owed by the State to members of the community in which the hospital is located.

4. Whether facts permitted a finding that the risk of negligent operation of a stolen automobile by an escaped resident of a State mental hospital was sufficiently foreseeable to create duty of care and consequent liability on the part of the State was a question of law.

5. Foreseeability of an attempt on the part of a resident of a State hospital to escape, to steal an automobile and to commit a burglary is insufficient to establish a duty of care to prevent the negligent operation of a stolen automobile by the resident following an escape, absent foreseeability that the resident would operate the automobile in a negligent manner.

6. Knowledge on the part of the State of two incidents of dangerous operation of automobiles by resident of State mental hospital, occurring four years earlier, was insufficient to show knowledge of a propensity on the part of the resident to operate automobiles dangerously.

Charlotte E. Libman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, State of Hawaii, for defendant-appellant.

Herbert K. Shimabukuro, Honolulu (Nishimura, Lee & Shimabukuro, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees Ajirogis.

David H. White, Honolulu (Okano, Noguchi & Wong, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee Furuta.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and KOBAYASHI, MENOR and KIDWELL, JJ., and SODETANI, Circuit Judge, in place of OGATA, J., recused.

KIDWELL, Justice.

This case involves one of society's most baffling problems: that of the borderline mental patient. Plaintiffs-appellees seek to recover from the State for injuries resulting from an escapade by such an individual (hereafter referred to as T). In a bench trial, the trial court found that the State had been negligent in permitting T to escape from the State hospital for the mentally ill (hereafter the State hospital) and was liable for the injuries subsequently caused by his operation of a stolen car. The State appealed from a judgment awarding damages to appellees. We reverse.

I.

The accident in which appellees were injured occurred on September 1, 1972. At that time, T was a 23 year old single male who had been admitted to the State hospital several times for examination or treatment of mental disorders. When he was 12 he was voluntarily admitted to the State hospital for the mentally retarded (hereafter Waimano Home) after having been in five foster homes. He was discharged from Waimano Home a year later as non-retarded and was thereupon adjudged mentally ill and ordered by a district magistrate to be hospitalized in the State hospital. After about two years he was transferred to the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility. In 1968 he was readmitted to the State hospital and shortly after his 20th birthday was given a full discharge. The clinical summary prepared at the time of the discharge notes that "his course in the hospital was indeed stormy" and that on several occasions he went AWOL and was returned by the police after burglaries had been committed, but that charges were usually dropped. He was readmitted barely two months later on physicians' certificates which recorded their diagnoses as "psychotic, acute, undetermined type", but was discharged from the hospital a few days later as "improved".

During the period of the last mentioned admission and discharge, T was under examination pursuant to court order to determine his criminal responsibility under a charge of larceny in the first degree. A panel of three physicians reported that T had been on the date of the alleged offense (June 21, 1969) as well as on the date of the report (September 12, 1969), "acting under mental derangement rendering him incompetent to discern the nature and criminality of the act done by him". The panel also reported that T was "incompetent to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own condition in reference to such proceedings and to assist his attorney in making a rational defense". By order filed September 25, 1969 in Cr. No. 39852, the First Circuit Court committed T to the State hospital as insane. ¹ Leaves of absence other than discharge were authorized by the court on February 10, 1970. The hospital's files indicate that T was absent without leave on March 31, 1970 and was next heard of on the mainland, from which he was returned on December 20, 1971. He again became AWOL on December 23, 1971, fled to the mainland and was returned in police custody to Halawa jail. Apparently because of a suicide attempt, T was returned to the State hospital on March 22, 1972. He was conditionally discharged to Halawa jail on June 2, 1972 upon a finding, as recorded in the records of the State hospital, that "he does not have any psychosis".

T was indicted on July 12, 1972, in Cr. No. 44452, First Circuit Court, for robbery in the second degree and on July 17, 1972 was ordered transferred to the State hospital for a mental examination. The formal order for T's examination, appointing three physicians to conduct the examination and directing that T be placed in detention in the State hospital for the purposes of the examination, was issued on August 3, 1972. The report of the panel, dated August 29, 1972 and filed September 15, 1972, found that although T "has a definite personality disorder and also (is) of borderline mental intelligence", he was not insane or suffering from any disorder which would affect his ability to know right from wrong on the day of the alleged crime (January 25, 1972) and on the date of the report was sane, able to comprehend his own condition and to assist his attorney in making a rational defense. T's counsel renewed his motion for a mental examination, with the result that a new panel was appointed, composed of two of the former panel together with a substitute for the state-employed psychiatrist designated by the director of health.

By letter dated April 13, 1973 and filed April 24, 1973, the new panel reported a joint diagnosis of T's physical and mental condition as borderline mental retardation together with mild to moderate diffuse and chronic cerebral dysfunction. Two of the panel added a diagnosis of malingering and disorder of impulse control. One of the panel added his diagnosis of possible Ganser's syndrome in an emotionally unstable personality. The panel agreed that T did not lack the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense, and that he did not lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, but that he did lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The panel reported that T presented a "mild to moderate" risk of danger to himself or to the person or property of others, "chiefly as a result of his inability to control situations that he himself may initiate". The dispositions of T which the panel suggested as tenable were prison confinement with consideration being given to the prison hospital and outpatient treatment at a mental health center. Return to the State hospital was not suggested by the panel.

On June 1, 1973, a stipulation was filed in Cr. No. 44452, signed personally by T as well as by T's counsel and by counsel for the State, in which it was agreed that T lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and that, due to his mental disability, T constituted a threat to person and property. By the stipulation it was further agreed that T be confined in an appropriate rehabilitation institution. On June 18, 1973, a judgment of acquittal was entered in Cr. No. 44452, and T was ordered placed in the State hospital, with release or transfer forbidden except upon order of the court.

The critical date in this narrative is August 29, 1972. On that date, T was residing in a part of the State hospital designed for the keeping of patients in detention, although he was permitted to leave his room under the surveillance of a designated attendant. Due to the negligence of this attendant, as found by the trial court, T was allowed to go unescorted and out of the direct line of the attendant's sight to dispose of a paper lunch plate and wooden utensils in a waste basket located near an open door which gave access to the hospital grounds. T bolted through the door, the attendant failed to pursue him diligently and he effected his escape. Four days later T was operating a stolen car at an excessive speed on the wrong side of the roadway, while fleeing from the scene of a burglary, and crashed head-on into a car occupied by appellees. The trial court found that this conduct of T was reasonably foreseeable by the State, as...