Akridge v. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 August 1892
• Parties: AKRIDGE v. ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

16 S.E. 81

90 Ga. 232

AKRIDGE v. ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia

August 27, 1892

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The statute touching the ringing of the bell of a locomotive in a city, town, or village, instead of sounding the whistle, is confined to signaling for the approach of crossings. It is not unlawful to make, by whistling, proper and necessary signals of approaching a station, as warning to adjust the switches. Though the case on trial may be subject to some exception to a general rule of law, the court in charging the jury may state the general rule to enable the jury to understand and properly apply the exception. In the present case it does not affirmatively appear that the exception was not given in charge as well as the general rule.

2. In every case of alleged personal injury by negligence, where there was any considerable interval of time between the discovery of the negligence and its injurious effect, the jury ought to be made acquainted with the rule of law which puts the plaintiff on the exercise of ordinary care to avoid the consequences of the defendant's negligence.

3. A railroad company has no right to continue blowing a locomotive whistle in a city, town, or village, for the purpose of giving a signal of approach to the station, after the engineer discovers that a blast of the whistle already given has frightened a horse drawing a vehicle along the public road, and that the horse will probably be more frightened by continuing to blow till the signal is completed, the driver seated in the vehicle being engaged in an effort to control the animal. But it is a question for the jury whether the circumstances were such as to apprise the engineer, or put him on notice, of the peril which would be occasioned by continuing to blow the whistle.

4. There being no direct evidence of the plaintiff's want of skill, or that the horse was vicious, and no circumstances from which the facts were fairly inferable, it was error to charge the jury that if they believed, from the evidence "the sole and real cause of the plaintiff's injury was the wild, vicious, and refractory disposition of the horse he drove, and the plaintiff's inability to control him, or the plaintiff's want of care or skill in the management of him, the plaintiff cannot recover."

5. The court erred in charging the jury, but not in denying any of the requests to charge.

Error from city court of Atlanta; HOWARD...