Alabama Department of Corrections v. Montgomery County Commission, No. 1051455 (Ala. 6/27/2008)

• Decision Date: 27 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 1051455.,1051455.
• Parties: Alabama Department of Corrections and Richard Allen v. Montgomery County Commission
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1

Alabama Department of Corrections and Richard Allen v. Montgomery County Commission

No. 1051455.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Decided June 27, 2008.

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court, (CV-04-1433).

MURDOCK, Justice.

The Alabama Department of Corrections ("the DOC") and Richard Allen, its commissioner, appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the Montgomery County Commission ("the Commission") entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and dismiss the appeal in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Betti Jo Day was convicted of theft of property in the second degree by the Montgomery Circuit Court on September 17, 2003. On November 6, 2003, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered the following sentence based on that conviction:

"The Court, having considered the pre-sentence Investigation Report, and having asked the Defendant if she had anything to say prior to sentence, and the Defendant having her say, she is sentenced to the Department of Corrections for 15 years. Pursuant to Split Sentence Act, 15-year sentence suspended conditioned upon Defendant serving 3 years in the Department of Corrections followed by supervised probation for 3 years, or until all conditions are met. 3-year¹ incarceration period postponed (REVERSE SPLIT) until November 9, 2004, at 9:00 A.M., at which time Defendant shall appear and show cause why prison sentence should not be implemented.

"In the meantime, Defendant [is] placed on supervised probation for 3 years, or until all conditions are met, on the following conditions:

"1. Refrain from any illegal activity.

"2. Pay Court costs & $50 to the Victims' Compensation Fund at the rate of $30 per month beginning 12-1-03, with receipts to be provided to probation officer.

"3. Submit to random drug screens.

"4. Comply with all other conditions set out by Probation Officer.

"5. Continue under the care of a psychiatrist and take all medications as prescribed.

"Defendant to appear for review to show cause why prison sentence should not be implemented on 11-09-04, at 9:00 A.M."

On February 26, 2004, Day's probation officer issued an order authorizing the sheriff of Montgomery County to take Day into custody for violating the conditions of her probation. Although the record is not clear, it appears that the violation was based on another charge of theft against Day. Upon her arrest, Day was held at the Montgomery County Detention Facility ("the county jail"). A hearing was held before the Montgomery Circuit Court on March 4, 2004, at which time the court declared that she was delinquent and tolled her probation. The circuit court scheduled a probation-revocation hearing for March 11, 2004. On March 11, 2004, the circuit court noted that Day appeared with her attorneys for the revocation hearing but that her attorneys were concerned that Day might not be competent to proceed and that they intended to file a motion for a mental evaluation. The circuit court rescheduled the probation-revocation hearing for April 22, 2004.

In April 2004, while being held at the county jail, Day required and received medical treatment at a hospital. The cost of this treatment, together with the expenses for medical treatment she had received in March 2004, was $126,864.93. The Commission sent letters to the DOC on April 8, 2004, and April 15, 2004, in which it expressed the position that, because Day had been sentenced to the custody of the DOC, Day's medical expenses were the responsibility of the DOC. The Commission cited Ala. Code 1975, § 14-3-30(b), which provides, in part:

"When an inmate sentenced to the custody of the [DOC] and the [DOC] is in receipt of a transcript of such sentence, is being housed in a county jail, and the inmate develops a medical condition which requires immediate treatment at a medical-care facility outside the county jail, the [DOC] shall be financially responsible for the cost of the treatment of the inmate.... When an inmate sentenced to the custody of the [DOC] and the [DOC] is in receipt of a transcript of such sentence, is housed in a county jail, and the inmate develops a medical condition or has been diagnosed as having a medical condition which, in the opinion of a physician licensed in Alabama, would require treatment or a medical procedure or both, involving a cost of more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), the inmate shall be transferred within three days to a state owned or operated correctional facility or to the physical custody of the [DOC] as determined by the Commissioner of the [DOC]. The inmate shall receive treatment in the same manner as other state inmates. Nothing in this subsection shall be interpreted to relieve the [DOC] of its responsibility for the maintenance and upkeep, including the payment of medical costs, of an inmate sentenced to the custody of the [DOC], nor shall this subsection be interpreted as conferring any additional responsibility upon a county for the maintenance and upkeep, or the payment of medical costs, of any inmate sentenced to the custody of the [DOC]."

On April 14, 2004, the circuit court noted that Day was in the hospital and that the court-ordered mental evaluation indicated a need for inpatient evaluation and treatment. The circuit court postponed the April 22, 2004, probation-revocation hearing.

On May 27, 2004, the Commission sued the DOC in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring that the DOC, rather than the Commission, was responsible for the payment of the medical expenses incurred in treating Day. On July 20, 2004, the DOC filed an answer in which it denied the material allegations of the complaint.

On August 5, 2004, the circuit court noted that Day was competent to proceed and scheduled the probation-revocation hearing for August 26, 2004. Following the hearing, the Montgomery Circuit Court found, based on Day's guilty plea to a new charge of theft of property, that Day had violated one of the conditions of her probation by failing to refrain from illegal activity. The court revoked Day's probation and ordered that she begin serving the three-year period of incarceration of her split sentence in the custody of the DOC concurrently with the sentence she received based on her guilty plea to the new theft-of-property charge.

On November 18, 2005, the Commission filed a motion for a summary judgment in which it argued that, under Ala. Code 1975, § 14-3-30(b), the DOC was obligated to cover Day's medical expenses, which, according to the Commission, now totaled $127,032.93.² On March 2, 2006, the circuit court signed an order denying the motion, holding that § 14-3-30(b) did not apply to the case: "The undisputed facts of this case clearly demonstrate that Day was on supervised probation at the time of her hospitalization. Day was not in the custody of the [DOC]; her sentence in the [DOC] had been suspended."³

On March 2, 2006, the Commission filed an amended complaint in which it added Richard Allen, the commissioner of DOC, as a defendant, in his official capacity. The amended complaint sought an order from the court requiring Allen "to perform his legal duties" under § 14-3-30(b) and "to reimburse [the Commission] for its payment of [Day's] medical bills that were the financial responsibility of" the DOC.

The DOC filed a motion for a summary judgment on March 31, 2006. On May 11, 2006, the Commission filed a cross-motion for a summary judgment. On May 31, 2006, the circuit court granted the Commission's motion and entered a summary judgment in its favor. In its order granting the Commission's motion, the circuit court stated, in pertinent part:

"In its March 2, 2006 order, this Court ruled that inmate Day was not in the custody of the [DOC] at the time of her hospitalizations because she was on probation. The Court also denied the [Commission's] original motion for summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law that the DOC was financially responsible for the medical bills at issue in this case. ... Since the entry of the March 2, 2006 order, the Court has reviewed the case of Thomas v. State, 552 So. 2d 875 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). In Thomas, the court held that all legal sentences for felonies are sentences to imprisonment in the penitentiary, and that the fact that some sentences are suspended or probated `relates only to the terms of their execution and not to their basic definitional nature as sentences to imprisonment in the penitentiary.' Id. at 876-77. Therefore, under Thomas, an inmate sentenced to the penitentiary who receives probation is still sentenced to the penitentiary; the inmate's sentence has only been probated which relates solely to the execution of the sentence.

"On November 6, 2003, inmate Day was sentenced to the custody of the DOC for a term of fifteen years. The sentence was suspended conditioned upon Day serving three years in the DOC followed by probation. The three year incarceration was also postponed (reverse split) and inmate Day was placed on supervised probation. The suspension and probation related only to the execution of her sentence. Inmate Day was still an inmate sentenced to the custody of the DOC as contemplated by Ala. Code [1975,] § 14-3-30(b). Therefore, under Ala. Code § 14-3-30(b), the medical bills at issue in this case are the financial responsibility of [the DOC] because they were incurred after Day was sentenced to the custody of the DOC on November 6, 2003.

"[The DOC and Allen] argue that DOC cannot be held responsible for medical bills under Ala. Code § 14-3-30(b) until it receives a transcript of the inmate's sentence. According to [the DOC and Allen], DOC did not receive the transcript of inmate Day's sentence until after at least some of the expenses were incurred, and thus DOC is not responsible for the bills at issue in this case. In construing Ala. Code § 14-3-30(b), it is this Court's responsibility to give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. IMED...