Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Co. v. Holmes

• Decision Date: 21 February 1898
• Citation: 75 Miss. 371,23 So. 187
• Parties: ALABAMA & VICKSBURG RAILWAY CO. v. LUCRETIA HOLMES AND LUCRETIA HOLMES v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

23 So. 187

75 Miss. 371

ALABAMA & VICKSBURG RAILWAY CO. v. LUCRETIA HOLMES AND LUCRETIA HOLMES v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 21, 1898

December 1897

FROM the circuit court, first district, of Hinds county HON ROBERT POWELL, Judge.

Plaintiff Lucretia Holmes, sued the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company and the Illinois Central Railroad Company jointly; she recovered a judgment for five hundred dollars against the former company only, the court of original jurisdiction, by its instructions, deciding the latter company not to be liable. The first named company appealed to the supreme court, and the plaintiff appealed to the same court from the judgment discharging the last named company from liability to her.

Affirmed.

Mc Willie & Thompson, for appellant, the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company.

The declaration shows a case in which the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company was entirely without fault. Was it the duty of the conductor to transport plaintiff from Jackson to Meridian on a ticket calling for transportation from the former city to Vicksburg? This cannot reasonably be affirmed. A ticket that calls for transportation to another city in a direction opposite to the one in which the train is going is the same as no ticket at all, and the conductor was under a duty to the company he served to require that plaintiff should either pay her fare or leave the train. A conductor cannot take the word of a passenger that he is entitled to a ticket for the ride in progress, without exposing his company to great imposition. The case of Railroad Co v Riley, 68 Miss. 765, which seems to go to the furthest allowable limit in imposing liability upon the carrier, is no warrant for so doing in the present controversy. Here we have a demand upon a connecting carrier for transportation not only in a direction opposite to the station named in the ticket, but to another station on its line twice as far from the junction of the roads as the one named in the ticket. The fact that the plaintiff offered to show a check for a trunk to be delivered at Meridian in nowise affects the case. It only called for transportation and delivery of a trunk and not of a person, and may not have been given plaintiff, but to some one else. She may have found it or borrowed it of some one on the train. There was no complaint of the manner of plaintiff's ejection from the train. She was told she could not ride on that train, and the porter assisted her to alight with all due civility. The regulation that a passenger must either produce a ticket or pay fare is a reasonable one, and, where compliance is refused, it is the duty of the conductor, in order to avoid the gross impositions that would result, to require the party to leave the train. Frederick v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. 342; Weaver v. R. W. & O. R. R. Co., 3 N.Y.Sup. Ct., 270; Jerome v. Smith, 48 Vt., 230; Townsend v. Railroad Co., 56 N.Y. 295; Railroad Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Shelton v. R. R. Co., 29 Ohio St., 214.

The sale of a through ticket over two or more connecting lines of a railroad is not evidence of a joint contract between said roads, whereby one becomes responsible for the default of the other. Felder v. Columbia, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 264, S.C. 21 So. Car., 35.

There can be no doubt about the liability of the Illinois Central Railroad Company tinder the declaration in the present case. The negligent ticket agent who made the mistake was its servant, and the mistake was made on its line. 41 Hun [N. Y.] S.Ct. Rep., 448. A company which sells and issues tickets to passengers over its own line of road and over lines of road of other companies [known as through tickets], is liable for the safe transportation of such passengers to the point of destination, notwithstanding there may be indorsed or printed on the tickets so sold and issued a notice that the company issuing and selling such tickets shall not be liable except as to its own line. Central R. R. Co. v. Combs, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 298, S.C. 70 Ga., 533, S.C. 48 Am. Rep., 582. The obligation of one carrier to honor tickets over its road, sold by a connecting carrier, is founded altogether upon arrangement or contract between the companies. In the absence of such arrangement, there is no obligation on the part of either company to honor tickets issued by the other. Oregon S. L. & R. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 145; 51 F. 463. A company selling tickets over a road extending beyond its terminus, is liable for the failure of the connecting carrier to transport the passenger, when the cause of the failure was the negligence of the agent of the initial carrier in not properly stamping the through ticket. Griffin v. Utica, etc., R. R. Co., 41 Hun [N. Y.], 448; 3 N.Y.S.Ct. Rep., 155. A company that contracts to carry passengers and their baggage beyond the terminus of its own road, is liable for losses occurring on any part of the route. Weed v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 19 Wend. [N. Y.], 534 [distinguished in Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill [N. Y.], 157]; Reed v. U.S. Express Co., 48 N.Y. 462; Naslind Lock Co. v. Worcester, etc., R. Co., 29 Barb. [N. Y.], 35; Gray v. Jackson, 51 N. H., 9; Dillon v. New York & E. 2. Co., 1 Hill [N. Y.], 251; Green v. N.Y.C. R. Co., 12 Abb. Pr., N. S. [N. Y.], 479; Farmer's & M. Bank v. Champlin Transportation Co., 23 Vt., 186; Perkins v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 47 Me., 573; Washington v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co., 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., 25; 101 N.C. 239; 1 L. R., 890; 7 S. E. R., 789 [quoting Quinby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N.Y. 306]; Thomas v. Rhymmey R. Co., L. R., Q. B., 226; 40 L. J., Q. B., 89; 19 W. R., 477; 24 L. T., 145; Thomas v. Rhymmey R. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B., 226; 39 L. J., Q. B., 226; 22 L. T., 297; 18 W. R., 668; Wright v. Midland R. Co., L. R., 8 Ex., 137; 42 L. J. Ex., 89; 29 L. T., 436; 21 W. R., 460; Great Western R. C. v. Blaeke, 7 H. & N., 967; 8 Jur. N. S., 1013; 31 L. J. Ex., 346; 10 W. R., 388; Wright v. Midland R. Co., supra [followed in Benton v. N. E. R. Co, L. R., 3 Q. B., 549]; 37 L. J. Q. B., 258; 18 L. T., 793; 16 W. E., 1124; 9 B. &S., 824; Thomas v. Rhymmey R. Co., supra.

The agent at Summit, who made the mistake that led to plaintiff's trouble, was the servant of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. That company alone directed and controlled him, and had the right to remove him for incompetency or misconduct. It prescribed his duties, and should have afforded him the time and facilities necessary to their discharge. It did neither of these things. Gracey, the agent, testified that he had the work of both the freight and ticket offices to attend to, and that the mistake was attributable to his hurry anti the number of duties devolving upon him at the time. He also stated that his company had not, until after the occurrence in question, furnished him with the necessary instrument to punch tickets on giving baggage checks. So that by reason of the default and omission of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and its servant, the plaintiff was started off on her journey under the prejudicial conditions that resulted in her mishap, and that the Illinois Central Company knew would so result, for the rule to require passengers to produce their tickets or pay their fare is a universal, as well as a reasonable, regulation, and must have entered into the contemplation of that company when issuing the ticket.

It must at once strike every mind not misled by purely technical reasoning that the carrier responsible for the mistake should be the one subjected to liability for what resulted from it. At all events, it would seem that where both carriers are before the court, and both able to respond in damages, the court should not, by its instructions, select the unoffending party to the transaction as the one to bear the burden of it. There was no express contract between the two companies in relation to through tickets, but by the prevailing custom each was bound to honor the through tickets issued by the other according to the calls of the same. In other words, where an agent of the Illinois Central Railroad Company issued a through ticket to a point on the line of the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company, the latter, through its conductor, is bound, on presentation of the ticket, to honor it according to its calls, its obligation being the same, so far as relates to the holder's right to transportation according to the calls of the ticket, as if its own servant had issued the ticket; but nothing can be more preposterous than to contend that in what transpires previous to or at the time of issuing the ticket detrimental to the purchaser, the Illinois Central Railroad Company's employe is the agent of the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company.

A few illustrations will readily disclose the folly of such a theory. Suppose, in and about the sale of the ticket, the agent at Summit had insulted and maltreated the purchaser after the fashion that Richberger was treated by the agent of the American Express Company in the case reported in 73 Miss. could it be pretended that the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company would be liable in damages on account thereof? Or again, suppose that although the purchaser had called for a ticket to Meridian, the agent gave her one to a point on some other line than that of the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway, say Yazoo City, with what reason could it be urged that the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company was liable for the damages resulting from such mistake? And yet how little, if any, difference would there be between such a case and the one under consideration? The truth is, plaintiff, in the purchase of the ticket, did not deal with the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company; she dealt...