Alam v. Chowdhury, No. A08-0636.

• Decision Date: 14 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. A08-0636.
• Citation: 764 N.W.2d 86
• Parties: In re the Matter of Mohammed Monirul ALAM, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Salina CHOWDHURY, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

764 N.W.2d 86

In re the Matter of Mohammed Monirul ALAM, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Salina CHOWDHURY, Respondent.

No. A08-0636.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

April 14, 2009.

Paul A. Banker, Brittany Stephens Pearson, Lindquist & Vennum P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, for appellant.

Gregory R. Solum, Edina, for respondent.

Considered and decided by WORKE, Presiding Judge; HUDSON, Judge; and CONNOLLY, Judge.

OPINION

HUDSON, Judge.

On appeal from an amended dissolution judgment, appellant argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by reopening the judgment for fraud on the court, and (2) erred by treating the post-dissolution increase in value of appellant's retirement account as marital property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Appellant Mohammed Monirul Alam and respondent Salina Chowdhury were married on July 29, 1979, in Dahka, Bangladesh. On July 10, 2001, appellant petitioned to dissolve the parties' marriage. He presented respondent with a marital termination agreement (MTA) for her to sign, but she did not sign the MTA and failed to answer to the dissolution petition. A default hearing occurred on October 16, 2001, at which appellant submitted the same proposed MTA that he had presented to respondent. The resulting dissolution judgment divided the parties' assets in a manner consistent with appellant's proposed MTA. The only exception was that appellant agreed to assume full responsibility for several expenses related to the parties' home that were designated in the proposed MTA to be divided evenly among the parties.

The parties continued to live together until August 31, 2004. Appellant subsequently remarried on December 17, 2004. On January 20, 2006, respondent moved to vacate the dissolution judgment. Her supporting affidavit alleged that appellant committed fraud on the court because appellant's proposed MTA overvalued the household property and jewelry awarded to respondent, claimed a $20,000 premarital savings that appellant could not substantiate, and attributed to respondent a "pending inheritance" that she never received. Respondent also claimed that when she refused to sign the proposed MTA, appellant promised her that she would receive an equal share of the parties' assets if she did not contest the divorce. She acknowledged that she was served with the petition for divorce, but asserted that she did not receive any further written notices of proceedings, did not receive a copy of the judgment and decree, and learned about the divorce only after child support payments were deposited into her bank account.

At a hearing on her motion to vacate the judgment, respondent testified consistently with the allegations in her affidavit. Appellant testified that he estimated the value of the household goods and respondent's jewelry to the best of his knowledge. He admitted that he did not give respondent notice of the default hearing and acknowledged that he could not trace his premarital savings. He also acknowledged that he did not know whether respondent had actually received an inheritance but said that she was supposed to receive one, which is why he labeled the inheritance as "pending." Appellant denied promising respondent an equal share of their assets.

The district court determined that respondent's testimony was credible and that appellant's testimony was not credible, finding that appellant "intentionally overstated the value of the parties' household goods and jewelry awarded to [respondent]; included in the award of assets to [r]espondent an inheritance which she did not receive ... and claimed a non-marital interest in the parties' joint savings account, which he is unable to prove." As a result, the district court held that appellant "engaged in an intentional course of material misrepresentation and non-disclosure of assets which misled the Court and made the property settlement grossly unfair to [r]espondent." The district court vacated the original judgment and decree, except for the provision terminating the parties' marriage.

After a new trial, the district court issued an amended judgment which, among other things, valued appellant's retirement account as of December 31, 2006, and distributed the entire value of the account as marital property. Appellant requested that the district court amend its valuation and distribution of his retirement account, arguing that the contributions made to the account after October 16, 2001—the date his marriage to respondent was dissolved—were not marital property and should have been awarded solely to him. The district court denied appellant's request. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by reopening the dissolution judgment for fraud on the court?

II. Did the district court err by treating the post-dissolution increase in the value of appellant's retirement account as marital property?

ANALYSIS

I

Appellant challenges the vacation of the dissolution judgment, arguing that the record does not show the existence of fraud on the court. We reject this argument.

A. Timing

Generally, after the time to appeal expires, a dissolution judgment is final unless a party establishes a statutory basis for its reopening. Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subds. 1, 2 (2008). The statutory bases for reopening an otherwise final dissolution judgment include the distinct concepts of fraud and fraud on the court. See Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3) (listing fraud as one of several bases to reopen a dissolution judgment); Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (noting that the subdivision's list of reasons to reopen a dissolution judgment does not limit the court's power "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court"); Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn.1989) (distinguishing fraud from fraud on the court); Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 128-30 (Minn.App.2001) (same), review denied (Minn. Sept. 11, 2001).

A motion to vacate a judgment for fraud must be made within a reasonable time but not more than one year after entry of the judgment. Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. But "[t]he significance of a finding of fraud on the court is that it eliminates the time restriction for bringing a motion to vacate a judgment." Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 165. Here, because respondent moved to reopen the dissolution judgment more than one year after its entry, she had to show fraud on the court for the judgment to be reopened.

B. Fraud on the Court

Fraud on the court involves "an intentional course of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure, having the result of misleading the court and opposing counsel and making the property settlement grossly unfair." Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 165. A district court's decision to reopen the judgment and decree based on fraud on the court will be sustained absent an abuse of discretion. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn.1996). If there is evidence to support the district court's decision, an abuse of discretion will not be found. Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn.App.2001). When evidence relevant to a factual issue consists of conflicting testimony, the district court's decision is necessarily based on a determination of witness credibility, which we accord great deference on appeal. Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn.App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001); see Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.1988) (stating that appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations).

In her affidavit to the district court, respondent alleged that appellant made several misrepresentations to the district court regarding the parties' assets. She also stated that appellant promised her that she would receive an equal share of the parties' assets if she did not contest the divorce. At the hearing on her motion to reopen the judgment, respondent testified consistent with the allegations in her affidavit. While appellant testified to the contrary, the district court found both that respondent's testimony was credible and that appellant's testimony was not credible.

Given the district court's explicit credibility findings, the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support the district court's finding that appellant engaged in a course of material misrepresentation. See Lossing v. Lossing, 403 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Minn.App.1987) (stating that, when reviewing whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, appellate courts view the evidence and its reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the district court's findings). Further, because the district court found that appellant made a series of misrepresentations, the pattern of misrepresentations justifies an inference that the misrepresentations were intentional. See generally, Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn.1978) (stating that a court may infer an intent to injure, as a matter of law, if "the character of the act is such that an intention to inflict an injury can be inferred"); Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn.App.1989) (affirming the issuance of an order for protection where facts existed allowing the inference of present intent by a former spouse to inflict fear of imminent physical harm). Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that appellant committed fraud on the court.

In support of his claim, appellant relies on Kornberg, in which the supreme court held that there was no fraud where the appellant-wife put forth only a general claim that respondent-husband made misrepresentations to the district court. 542 N.W.2d at 388. Appellant suggests that the allegations respondent made in her "sparse affidavit" are similar to the general allegations in Kornberg. But, unlike the wife in Kornberg, respondent's allegations in her affidavit are precise allegations of specific misrepresentations that appellant made regarding the parties' household goods, respondent...