Alan R., In re

• Decision Date: 07 June 1982
• Citation: 132 Cal.App.3d 601,183 Cal.Rptr. 325
• Parties: In re ALAN R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALAN R., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 21065.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 325

183 Cal.Rptr. 325

132 Cal.App.3d 601

In re ALAN R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALAN R., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 21065.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

June 7, 1982.

Johnson & Thompson and Richard R. Johnson, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Eddie T. Keller and Maria J. Fonseca, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

PUGLIA, Presiding Judge.

Following denial of his motion to suppress (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 700.1), the minor, Alan R. (appellant), admitted the allegation in the petition charging possession of marijuana (Health & Saf.Code, § 11357, subd. (c)). The sole issue is whether the juvenile court properly denied his motion to suppress. We conclude it did and affirm the judgment.

In early 1980 appellant was placed on probation for burglary (Pen.Code, § 459). When he failed to comply with a probation condition that he make restitution, appellant was ordered to participate in the Shasta County Juvenile Hall work project for 10 days.

The work project is conducted during the day on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. The project site is a partially fenced field adjacent to the juvenile hall. Apparently, most of the wards in the program live at home and have been ordered to participate as an alternative to juvenile hall commitment. However, wards who live at juvenile hall also participate.

In the morning of July 31, 1981, appellant reported to the work project site bringing with him a nylon duffle bag. Normally the juveniles left their belongings at a nearby garage. Cloy Cockrell, a supervisor, testified that the nylon duffle bag was "at all times" within approximately 20 feet of appellant. Later in the morning Cockrell received information from another juvenile, stipulated to be an unreliable source, that appellant was in possession of marijuana. After discussing the matter with her co-workers, Cockrell relayed this information by telephone to appellant's probation officer, Mr. Pontarolo. She told Pontarolo that appellant had kept a bag near him all morning, which was "very unusual." Prior to the incident appellant had admitted to Pontarolo that he used marijuana and other drugs. In fact he had admitted using drugs "just a day or two before" when he had been involved in an automobile accident. Pontarolo believed a pattern of drug involvement was "starting to develop."

Pontarolo arrived at the worksite around noon. Without consulting appellant, Pontarolo picked up the nylon bag and proceeded to the garage area. Through the duffle bag's flimsy exterior he felt what he believed to be "other bags inside the duffle bag ... like lid[s] of marijuana." Inside the garage Pontarolo unzipped the duffle bag and observed several baggies of marijuana. He then took appellant into custody.

As appellant correctly notes, a probationer retains many of his civil rights, including the protection of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. (People v. Jasso (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 955, 963-964, 82 Cal.Rptr. 229; People v. Myers (1972) 6 Cal.3d 811, 816, 100 Cal.Rptr. 612, 494 P.2d 684.) (A consent to search provision was not a condition of appellant's probation.) However, the protections afforded persons by the Fourth Amendment in a free society are not applied in the same manner to persons being held in lawful detention by the government, regardless of probationary status. In Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 60 L.Ed.2d 447, the United States Supreme Court weighed the privacy interests of pretrial detainees against the institutional need for prison security and upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge the practice of strip searching every inmate after he received a contact visit with a person from outside the institution. The court noted, in determining the reasonableness of such searches, that "Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." (Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 481.) The rule we gather from Bell is that the reasonableness of a search in a detention environment must be determined by balancing the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.

Appellant contends that juvenile hall authorities are bound by the traditional requirement of probable cause in conducting a search. However, case law demonstrates the contrary to be true. In respect to those who are lawfully detained, governmental authorities can conduct routine administrative searches without any "cause" at all as long as reasonable and justified by legitimate state interests. (Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447; see generally In re Jordan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 930, 103 Cal.Rptr. 849, 500 P.2d 873; In re Jordan (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 116 Cal.Rptr. 371, 526 P.2d 523; In re...