Alaska State Com'n for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab
| Decision Date | 02 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 4229,4229 |
| Citation | 611 P.2d 487 |
| Parties | 37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1369, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,912 ALASKA STATE COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. YELLOW CAB, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. /4277/4313. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Carolyn E. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellant.
James H. Cannon, Rice, Hoppner, Hedland, Fleischer & Ingraham, Fairbanks, for appellee.
Before RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice, CONNOR, BOOCHEVER, BURKE and MATTHEWS, Justices.
In this case, we must consider the requirements for a prima facie case of sex discrimination in an action brought against a private company. We hold that the correct test was utilized by the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (hereinafter "Commission"), and find that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that Wendy Mayer, the real party in interest, established each element of a prima facie case. Consequently, we reinstate the Commission's decision, which was reversed by the superior court, that appellee, Yellow Cab, discriminated against Mayer in her privilege of employment because of her sex in violation of AS 18.80.220(a)(1). 1
On December 10, 1975, Wendy Mayer filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that Yellow Cab discriminated against her because of her sex in violation of AS 18.80.220(a)(1). The Commission held a hearing and found that Yellow Cab had violated AS 18.80.220(a)(1) by its refusal to hire women as cab drivers.
At the hearing, Mayer testified as follows. On December 2, 1975, she went to the office of Yellow Cab in Fairbanks to apply for a job as a cab driver. She asked for a job application as a cab driver. A gentleman whom she believed to be Alan Marshall, Yellow Cab's dispatcher, 2 told her that "they didn't hire women cab drivers." She asked for an application anyway, but he stated that they were locked up and he could not give her one because they did not hire women cab drivers. He also told her that if she wanted to come back at 5:00 a. m. the following day, she could talk to the owner, Mr. Moore, but it would not do any good. She stated that it was common knowledge among cab drivers that Yellow Cab did not hire women. 3 She made no further attempts to obtain an application.
Cathi Carr-Lundfelt, an investigator for the Human Rights Commission, also testified at the hearing regarding her investigation of Mayer's complaint. She spoke with Marshall, Yellow Cab's dispatcher, who stated that he did not remember Mayer, but that several women had asked for an application. He told these women that the firm did not hire women. He also stated that when the women met with Moore, the owner, he would tell them that there were no vacancies although "this was just an excuse." According to Carr-Lundfelt's examination of Yellow Cab's records, Yellow Cab hired three men during the week of December 6 and two during the week of December 12.
Additionally, two women drivers for Checker Cab of Fairbanks testified that it was common knowledge that Yellow Cab did not hire females.
Alan Marshall, a part-time driver and dispatcher for Yellow Cab, testified that whenever anyone came to get a job, he would tell the person to talk to Moore and where he could be found. To his knowledge, during the ten-year period that he has been employed by Yellow Cab, no woman has been hired. He denied telling Carr-Lundfelt that Moore told women who applied that there were no vacancies. It was stipulated that Marshall does not hire, fire, screen or have anything to do with personnel matters. Nevertheless, Yellow Cab's rules and regulations provide that "(d)ispatchers have full authority while on shift to carry out company policy."
Moore, Yellow Cab's managing stockholder, testified on his own behalf. He does all the hiring and firing of personnel and never hires anyone without a personal interview. Although he has no application forms, he considers applicants' past work records and driving experience. He has never hired a female, although he has interviewed several. He stated that the ones he interviewed had no experience and did not know what they were doing. He had, however, hired men who had no previous experience. He did state that if females came along and were capable, he would hire them. He was aware of an impression that Yellow Cab did not hire women.
Mary Knight, another dispatcher for Yellow Cab, stated that whenever anyone asked for a job, she told the person they must speak to Moore. She had never heard Moore state that he would not hire a female.
In July, 1977, the Commission filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission found Yellow Cab in violation of AS 18.80.220(a)(1) because it refused to hire women, including Mayer, as drivers. On July 29, 1977, Yellow Cab filed a notice of appeal to the superior court. In reversing the Commission's decision, the superior court held that Mayer had failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination because she had not "applied" for the job. The court's holding obviated any need to discuss Yellow Cab's other points on appeal which questioned the admissibility of certain statements 4 and the award of back pay to Mayer.
Yellow Cab moved for attorney's fees pursuant to Civil Rule 82, and for costs. When no opposition was filed, the superior court awarded full attorney's fees of $15,225.00 against the Commission and Mayer. After a motion for reconsideration was filed, the superior court awarded $7,500.00 in attorney's fees and $412.96 in costs for a total judgment in favor of Yellow Cab in the amount of $7,912.96.
The Commission filed a notice of appeal, contending that (1) the superior court erred in concluding Mayer failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, and (2) it erred in awarding attorney's fees against the Commission and Mayer. Yellow Cab filed a notice of cross-appeal, contending that the superior court erred in reducing its attorney's fees award.
We have never explicitly discussed what elements constitute a prima facie case of sex discrimination in an action brought against a private company. In the past, when considering the parameters of our anti-discrimination statute, we have examined the relevant federal Title VII decisions for guidance. 5 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 677 (1973), the United States Supreme Court explicated the prima facie case for discrimination by a private company under Title VII. It held that the complainant has the burden to show:
(i) that he belongs to a . . . (class protected by the statute); (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of complainant's qualifications.
This is the standard used by the Commission and we adopt this standard for discrimination cases brought under AS 18.80.220. 6
Yellow Cab concedes that Mayer is a member of a protected class. It disputes, however, that Mayer had "applied, Mayer was qualified, and there were openings."
The Commission made a finding of fact that Mayer had "applied" for a job. The standard of review to be applied by the reviewing court is whether the agency's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 7 Moreover, where the evidence is conflicting, the reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. 8 Thus, the evidence should be viewed in favor of the findings even though the reviewing court might have taken a contrary view of the facts. 9 Although the superior court did not mention which standard of review it applied, it implicitly held that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding. The Commission contends that the superior court erred in holding that there was not substantial evidence to support its finding that Mayer had applied. We agree.
Viewing the evidence in favor of the findings by the Commission, the evidence shows that Mayer went to the office of Yellow Cab to apply for a job as a cab driver. She asked for a job application as a cab driver. The dispatcher, a person who Mayer reasonably believed would know what types of people would be hired, told her that Yellow Cab did not hire women cab drivers. Although the dispatcher denied making such a statement, the denial was directly contradicted by Investigator Carr-Lundfelt's testimony of the statement made by the dispatcher to her. Additionally, Mayer specifically asked for an application, but the dispatcher stated that they were locked up and he could not give her one anyway because they did not hire women cab drivers. He advised her she could talk to the owner, but it would not do any good. Yellow Cab's rules and regulations state that the dispatcher has full authority to carry out company policy. Furthermore, it was common knowledge among cab drivers that Yellow Cab did not hire women and, in fact, Moore was aware of an impression that Yellow Cab did not hire women and has never hired a woman driver. Although Mayer did not file a formal application in the technical sense, we believe that she did "apply" within the meaning of the McDonnell requirement and that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that she did apply. 10
Our conclusion is bolstered by sound authority which dictates:
(W)here a person seeking employment is effectively deterred by the discriminatory policy or conduct of the employer, the complaining party is not required to formally apply for the position in order to seek and obtain relief because of the discrimination.
Banks v. Heun-Norwood, 566 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1977). 11 Here, Mayer could reasonably believe that...
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