Iowa Civil Rights Commission v. Woodbury County Community Action Agency, 2-64785

• Decision Date: 30 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 2-64785,2-64785
• Parties: IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant, v. WOODBURY COUNTY COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY, Petitioner-Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 443

304 N.W.2d 443

IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant, v. WOODBURY COUNTY COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY, Petitioner-Appellee.

No. 2-64785.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Jan. 30, 1981.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, and Scott H. Nichols, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent-appellant.

Patrick C. McCormick of Whicher, McCormick, Ford & Gurdin, Sioux City, for petitioner-appellee.

Heard by OXBERGER, C. J., and DONIELSON, SNELL, CARTER and JOHNSON, JJ.

JOHNSON, Judge.

Respondent-agency, Iowa Civil Rights Commission, appeals from district court's order on judicial review reversing the Commission's determination that petitioner-employer, Woodbury County Community Action Agency, discriminated against a potential job applicant on the basis of race. Respondent asserts its decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record. We affirm.

I. Procedural Background. On September 11, 1974, Linda Winston filed a complaint alleging that her employer, Woodbury County Community Action Agency, engaged in the following racially discriminatory actions: failure to post a notice of a new job position; failure to have black persons receive a memorandum about the job position; and failure to take an application from the man who was employed in the new position until after the man was hired.

Following hearing on Winston's complaint, the agency hearing officer found that the employer had violated section 601A.6(1)(a), The Code 1977 (sic), by utilizing a hiring practice having a discriminatory impact, that complainant Winston had met the four elements required to establish a prima facie case, that intent was not a required element, that the employer had failed to rebut complainant's prima facie case by proving either that its hiring practice was rational and neutral or that use of the hiring procedure was a business necessity, and that complainant was entitled to an award of back pay. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission adopted the recommended decision and order of the hearing officer. On the employer's application for judicial review, the district court reversed the Commission's decision. The district court found that the employer did not follow its established hiring practice, but that there was no credible evidence of race or sex discrimination in the record. Respondent Commission's appeal then followed.

II. Scope of Review. Our review of district court's order reversing the Commission's finding of employment discrimination based on race is at law. § 17A.20, The Code 1979; Jackson County Public Hospital v. Public Employment Relations Board, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1979); City of Davenport v. Public Employment Relations Board, 264 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1978). In its exercise of section 17A.19 review powers, the district court acted in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law specified for contested cases in section 17A.19(8)(f). This court's review then is limited to the sole question of whether the district court correctly applied the law. To make that determination, we ask whether the agency action is supported by substantial evidence in the record before the agency when the record is viewed as a whole. § 17A.19(8)(f); City of Des Moines v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 285 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1979). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. City of Davenport, 264 N.W.2d at 311. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would find it adequate for reaching a decision. Id. We are limited to the record made before the hearing officer. § 17A.19(7); Farmers Elevator Company, Kingsley v. Manning, 286 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Iowa 1979). If our conclusions are the same as district court's, affirmance is in order; if not, reversal may be required. Jackson County, 280 N.W.2d at 430.

III. Agency's Findings of Facts. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the following relevant findings of fact. During the summer of 1974, a job program of petitioner-employer Woodbury County Community Action Agency (WCCAA) was being phased out; petitioner was negotiating with the Woodbury County Board of Supervisors and the director of the Comprehensive Employment Training Program (CETA), Bruce Lambertson, to have petitioner's job program absorbed by CETA. Contract negotiations were to be completed by August 26, 1974. Petitioner was to be responsible for filling seven positions, including Operations Supervisor. Lambertson, however, had approval and veto power over petitioner's selections and the power to dismiss individuals in the positions. During this same period of time, the Iowa State Employment Service (ISES) also was negotiating a contract with the Woodbury County Board of Supervisors to provide personnel for the CETA program, particularly for Development Counselors positions and the Operations Supervisor position. Petitioner perceived the ISES as having a different and unfavorable approach to the employment of low-income persons, thereby making it imperative that petitioner be able to select the person for Operations Supervisor.

John Woolridge, ¹ then director of the Neighborhood Youth Corps Program, a part of petitioner's Manpower Program, was slated to move to the Operations Supervisor position when his Manpower Program position was absorbed by CETA. Shortly before this transition was to occur, Woolridge decided not to accept the Operations Supervisor position. Lambertson then informed petitioner through John Derby, petitioner's board chairperson, that the position would go to an ISES candidate if petitioner could not recommend a suitable candidate in the time remaining before the contract deadline. Chairperson Derby asked Lambertson if any of the current staff persons involved in petitioner's Manpower Program would be suitable; Lambertson said none would be suitable.

On August 16, 1974, Woolridge, Chairperson Derby, and Richard Crawford, petitioner's executive director, met in a "brainstorming" session to discuss the Operations Supervisor position. Kevin Beauvais, then a member of petitioner's board of directors, joined the meeting, whereupon his qualifications for and interest in the Operations Supervisor position were reviewed by the group. As a result, Beauvais was scheduled to interview with Lambertson on Monday, August 19th. Following the interview, Lambertson indicated to Crawford that Beauvais was an acceptable candidate.

On August 19th, Crawford, by letter, offered the Operations Supervisor position to Kevin Beauvais. The offer was conditioned on the contract being signed between petitioner and the Woodbury County Board of Supervisors. Beauvais accepted the position on August 23rd. The contract was signed on August 26th and, on the same date, Beauvais filled out an application form for the position. At Crawford's direction, Beauvais entered August 16, 1974, as the date of application.

On August 16th, Crawford dictated a memo announcing to the staff the Operations Supervisor position opening. The memo, which was not typed until August 19th, stated that applicants must have "a few of the following qualifications": 1) experience in supervision of staff; 2) experience in working with grant processing and some knowledge of Manpower Programs. The application deadline was Friday, August 23rd, 1974.

Complainant Linda Winston was employed in August of 1974 as Director of petitioner's Westside Center, located next door to the jobs program being phased out. During conversation with the jobs program staff, Winston learned that an opening for Operations Supervisor was forthcoming. Winston wanted to apply for this position.

By agency policy and practice, a memo was to be sent to all staff announcing available positions and hiring was done only after the closing date for applications. In this case the August 19th memo announcing the Operations Supervisor opening was not received by applicant Winston. One of petitioner's centers may have received it, but others did not. Nor was a public job notice posted.

Complainant Winston, learning that the position had been filled, then asked Crawford about the hiring practices. He informed her that hiring was not a concern of hers. Crawford subsequently asked his secretary to change the August 19th date on the letter to Beauvais, but the secretary refused. Various staff persons then asked Derby why notice of the opening was not given to all centers. Derby and Crawford exchanged angry words in Crawford's office over Crawford's offer of the position to Beauvais before the application deadline. Petitioner's Head Start Director, Janie Moeller, overheard this conversation. With the aid of Crawford's secretary and another person, she then copied the documents relating to the job opening, including the letter offering Beauvais the job, Beauvais' letter accepting the job, and Beauvais' application. At that time, it was not known that Winston would file a civil rights complaint.

IV. Employment Discrimination Theories. We begin our analysis by clarifying the legal standard to be applied to complainant's claim.

Employment discrimination cases may involve either disparate treatment or disparate impact. Geller v. Markham, 481 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D.Conn.1979). The standards for disparate treatment claims are based on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 677 (1973), while the standards for disparate impact claims stem from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158, 164 (1971). The two theories are defined in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), as follows:

(D)isparate treatment is said to define a situation where "(t)he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."...