Albright v. Christensen

• Decision Date: 17 December 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 20-11453
• Parties: Sandra ALBRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. Carl CHRISTENSEN, MD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

507 F.Supp.3d 851

Sandra ALBRIGHT, Plaintiff,

v.Carl CHRISTENSEN, MD, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 20-11453

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed December 17, 2020

Edward J. Stechschulte, Kalniz Iorio and Reardon Co. LPA, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.

John J. Ramar, Ramar & Paradiso, PC, Troy, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [13]

LAURIE J. MICHELSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Sandra Albright, a resident of Ohio, suffers from chronic pain as a result of a car accident many years ago. Albright became addicted to opioids. In 2017, Albright was referred to Dr. Carl Christensen, a Michigan doctor who specializes in addiction medicine and pain management. Albright was admitted to a hospital in Michigan to undergo a one-week opioid detoxification supervised by Dr. Christensen. Albright now alleges that Dr. Christensen and his medical practice were negligent during her treatment.

In lieu of an answer, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Albright's complaint must be dismissed for failure to comply with Michigan law requirements for filing a medical malpractice suit. Albright argues that her suit is for negligence, not medical malpractice, and even if it is classified as a medical malpractice suit, the Michigan requirements do not apply in federal court. The Court finds that Michigan's notice and waiting-period requirements under Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.2912b are substantive state law that apply in federal court. Because Albright failed to comply with those requirements, and the statute of limitations has now expired, her case will be dismissed with prejudice.

I.

Reading between the lines of Albright's complaint, it appears she became addicted to opioids as a result of attempts to manage chronic pain from a car accident. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Albright was referred to Dr. Carl Christensen and his practice Christensen Recovery Services in Canton, Michigan for treatment of her opioid addiction. (Id. ) After an initial consultation, Dr. Christensen developed a treatment plan beginning with a one-week detoxification that would include the use of a suboxone induction. (Id. at PageID.3.)

On May 30, 2018, Dr. Christensen conducted a conference call with Albright's case manager, Albright's sister, and Dr. Christensen's practice manager. (Id. ) The participants finalized plans to begin Albright's detoxification the following week.

(Id. ) Albright, who was not on the call, claims she was not informed of this treatment plan. (Id. ) During the call, Dr. Christensen was also apparently informed that an independent medical examiner recommended that Albright be forced off all of her medications immediately. (Id. )

Albright was admitted to Saint Joseph Mercy Hospital on June 4, 2018 to begin the detox. (Id. ) Dr. Christensen started Albright on a "Dilaudid PCA" (apparently a pain relief method in which the patient controls the amount of pain medication administrated by a pump) and a "substitution therapy with phenobarbital" (where opioids are substituted with prescribed sedatives). (Id. )

Dr. Christensen met with Albright the next two days to attempt to discuss the treatment plan, but Albright was anxious and tearful, and Dr. Christensen apparently stopped the discussion. (Id. at PageID.3–4.)

On June 7, Dr. Christensen attempted to give Albright a dose of suboxone (a combination of buprenorphine and naloxone ). (Id. ) According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, buprenorphine is a treatment for opioid use disorder which reduces cravings and withdrawal symptoms by binding to opioid receptors in the body. See Medications to Treat Opioid Use Disorder Research Report , National Institute on Drug Abuse (June 2018), at 3, https://perma.cc/Y9CU-58U3.

Albright alleges that she had an immediate reaction "including, but not limited to, muscular spasms/contortions, pain, and feelings of temporary paralysis and being completely out of it." (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Dr. Christensen administered a second dose of suboxone the next day, and Albright again had an immediate negative reaction. (Id. )

As a result of these reactions, Albright refused further suboxone treatment. (Id. ) Dr. Christensen ordered Albright to be discharged the next day, June 9, 2018. But, "due to her condition, she was not released for discharge by another doctor for several days after." (Id. )

Albright avers that she continues to suffer from shaking, muscle spasms, and emotional distress as a result of her treatment. (Id. )

Albright filed this lawsuit against Dr. Christensen and Christensen Recovery Services on June 4, 2020. Albright alleges that Dr. Christensen was negligent in his treatment of Albright and in failing to obtain her informed consent. (Id. at PageID.20–22.) This Court's jurisdiction over Albright's state-law claims is premised on complete diversity of the parties. (Id. at PageID.17.) In lieu of an answer, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Albright's suit must be dismissed for failure to comply with Michigan's rules for filing a medical malpractice lawsuit, Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.2912b and § 600.2912d. (ECF No. 13.)¹

II.

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. "A fact is material only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit." Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care Sys. , 355 F.3d 444, 451–52 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). And "a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Scott v. First S. Nat'l Bank , 936 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).

III.

There are two related questions at issue here. First, are Albright's negligence claims actually medical malpractice claims? If so, do Michigan's requirements for filing a medical malpractice claim apply in federal court? The Court begins with the first question, how to characterize Albright's claims.

A.

Defendants argue that Albright's negligence claims are nothing more than thinly veiled medical malpractice claims. Under Michigan law, the substance of a claim rather than how it is labeled determines whether it is a malpractice claim. See Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. Corp. , 460 Mich. 26, 594 N.W.2d 455, 464 (1999) ("[A] complaint cannot avoid the application of the procedural requirements of a malpractice action by couching its cause of action in terms of ordinary negligence." (modification in original; internal citations omitted)); Adam v. Sisters of Bon Secours Nursing Care Ctr. , No. 2007-001381, 2011 WL 3903146, *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011) (holding gross negligence claim subject to malpractice requirements).

The test for determining whether a claim is actually for medical malpractice has two parts: (1) "whether the claim pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional relationship," and (2) "whether the claim raises questions of medical judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience." Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr. , 471 Mich. 411, 684 N.W.2d 864, 871 (2004). "If both these questions are answered in the affirmative, the action is subject to the procedural and substantive requirements that govern medical malpractice actions." Id.

As for the first element, Albright herself admits that her claims occurred "within the course of a professional relationship with Dr. Christensen." (ECF No. 10, PageID.58.) But Albright argues that the second element is not met because a jury could rely on common knowledge and experience to determine whether Dr. Christensen was negligent for continuing the buprenorphine induction procedure after Albright experienced a negative reaction. (Id. at PageID.59.)

It is true that in some cases "[n]o expert testimony is necessary to determine whether [medical staff] should have taken some sort of corrective action" to reduce a known risk. Bryant , 684 N.W.2d at 876 (finding that plaintiff could bring an ordinary negligence claim against staff at a nursing home who failed to take any corrective action to reduce the risk of recurrence after a resident almost asphyxiated herself by getting tangled in her bedding); see also Trowell v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Centers, Inc. , 502 Mich. 509, 918 N.W.2d 645, 651 (2018) (allowing a negligence claim against an aide who dropped a patient while carrying him unassisted after she had previously dropped the patient while attempting the same action). But this is not one of those cases.

It is clear that administering a buprenorphine induction, knowing the typical side effects, and deciding whether to continue the procedure when negative side effects occur are questions of specialized knowledge and medical judgment. The situation is not analogous to those in Bryant or Trowell , where a defendant discovered a risk obvious to a layperson and failed to take corrective action. Opioid addiction is notoriously difficult to treat. This is evidenced by Albright's week-long hospitalization involving multiple treatments supervised by an addiction specialist. Treatments that are not familiar to the average layperson. The question of whether Dr. Christensen should have continued the buprenorphine induction after Albright experienced a reaction was not a question an average juror would be equipped to answer. See Estate Wrenn, by Wrenn v. Spectrum Cmty. Servs. , No. 339594, 2019 WL 845711, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2019) ("Knowing how to correctly monitor and supervise patients requires specialized and particularized knowledge to, for example, understand the patient's specific needs, identify risks faced by the individual patient, and understand how a patient's disease may influence behavior."); Jones v. Corr. Med. Servs.,...