Alcorn v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 29 May 2001 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. S.D. 2001) Kimberly R. Alcorn, Respondent, v. Union Pacific Railroad Company and National Railroad Passenger Corporation, d/b/a Amtrak, Appellants, Curtis Edwards, Respondent. SC82325 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Charles E. Atwell, Judge
Counsel for Appellant: Thomas B. Weaver, Theodore J. Williams, Jr., Jeffrey T. McPherson, Heather L. Reinsch, Dan H. Ball, James W. Erwin and David A. Dick
Counsel for Respondent: Grant L. Davis, Thomas C. Jones, Scott S. Bethune, Timothy L. Brake, John S. Rollins, Robert H. Houske, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., and Anthony L. Dewitt
Opinion Summary: An Amtrak train and a car carrying passenger Kimberly Alcorn collided on Union Pacific Railroad tracks. When Alcorn sued, the jury found Union Pacific and Amtrak liable and the car's driver not liable. The jury awarded damages, which the court remitted to $25 million compensatory and to $50 million punitive against Union Pacific.
Court en banc holds: The remitted compensatory damage award is affirmed. The punitive damage award is reversed.
(1) Missouri statutes do not preempt Union Pacific's common law duty to exercise due care to protect the public at railroad crossings. Section 389.610.4 vests "exclusive power" over railroad crossings with the division of motor carrier and railroad safety. This provision supplements existing law and must be read with its subsection 2, which requires a railroad to "construct and maintain good and sufficient crossings." Nothing in the statute negates the common law duty. The state had not assumed jurisdiction over the crossing. Until the division assumes jurisdiction with respect to this particular crossing, and has made an order with respect to it, the common law duty remains. Union Pacific fails to show the division assumed such jurisdiction.
(2) Alcorn made a case of negligence against Union Pacific.
(A) As to Union Pacific's duty, Union Pacific had notice that the crossing was hazardous. There was ample evidence of sight limitations at the crossing, which is a general type of harm. It was foreseeable that motorists from either direction were at risk.
(B) As to causation, despite Union Pacific and Amtrak's efforts to blame the driver, the jury assessed him zero fault. The evidence sufficed for the jury to conclude inadequate warning was a major cause.
(C) Union Pacific's duty to use reasonable care was not affected by the time necessary to obtain state approval to upgrade the crossing.
(D) The jury instruction did not give the jury a roving commission to find Union Pacific liable. The use of an MAI jury instruction, properly modified for a particular case, contemplates that counsel will advise the jury of details. The verdict director complies with Rule 70.02(b) because it is brief and does not require the jury to find detailed evidentiary facts. The railroad defendants were permitted to give three limiting instructions.
(3) Alcorn made a case of negligence against Amtrak.
(A) There is no federal preemption of Alcorn's claim because her claim involves a specific, individual or local hazard. Although federal law preempts state common law claims based merely on excessive speed, it does not preempt such claim based on the train's duty to slow or stop where a specific hazard exists. The car's unwavering approach, where the engineers knew or should have known collision was imminent, is a specific, identifiable hazard.
(B) The negligence instruction as to Amtrak was not erroneous. It did not permit the jury to render a verdict on speed but, rather, on the car's unwavering approach and the train's ability to brake to avoid the collision.
(C) Amtrak engineers' failure to slow was a cause of Alcorn's injuries, based on the evidence.
(4) An earlier accident and previous "near misses" were relevant to show notice to Union Pacific and Amtrak of the crossing's unusually hazardous condition. Omitting reference to the accident's fatality eliminated inflammatory impact and confined use to notice.
(5) The court did not err in admitting expert testimony and computer calculations regarding the train's stopping distances. Missouri courts have not established specific foundational requirements for computer-generated evidence. There was considerable foundation. The expert was subject to cross-examination.
(6) The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a juror who failed to disclose a lawsuit did not do so intentionally and did not prejudice the railroad defendants.
(7) After the jury returned a verdict finding Union Pacific liable for punitive damages, but before assessing the amount, a juror visited the crossing. The court could cure any problem as to the amount of punitives through remittitur, but it is unnecessary to reach the issue since Alcorn failed to make a case for punitive damages.
(8) Punitive damages require conduct so egregious that it is tantamount to intentional wrongdoing. While there were sight problems at the crossing, there were passive warning devices that Union Pacific believed satisfied its duty to the public. For negligence, the railroad was on notice of the hazard. But there was no clear evidence that Union Pacific knowingly violated an applicable regulation or statute by failing to upgrade the crossing. It was in the process of upgrading, and there is no showing it failed to cooperate with the state. The jury's determination did not equate to a judicial determination that the conduct was tantamount to intentional wrongdoing.
(9) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to further remit Alcorn's compensatory damages. Alcorn suffered extremely serious, painful, debilitating and permanent injuries. The amount in this case (11.5 non-economic to 1 economic) is not manifestly unjust.
Limbaugh and Stith, JJ., not participating.
Kimberly R. Alcorn was a passenger in a car driven by Curtis Edwards, which was hit by an Amtrak train at a railroad crossing on a county road south of Highway 50 between Warrensburg and Sedalia, Missouri. Union Pacific Railroad owned the tracks and crossing. Alcorn suffered serious, permanent injuries and sued Union Pacific Railroad, Amtrak,1 Edwards, and the engineer operating the train, David Grimoldi.
Alcorn dismissed her claims against Grimoldi before trial, and the case was tried against the remaining three defendants. The jury found Union Pacific and Amtrak liable, attributing 75 percent fault to Union Pacific and 25 percent fault to Amtrak. The jury assessed no liability to Edwards. The verdict for compensatory damages was $40,366,517.59. The jury also found Union Pacific liable for punitive damages in the amount of $120,000,000. After defendants' post-trial motions, the trial court remitted the awards to $25,000,000 for compensatory damages and $50,000,000 for punitive damages.
Union Pacific and Amtrak filed their notices of appeal to this Court. The issues include whether Missouri's punitive damages extraction statute, section 537.675,2 violates the United States and Missouri Constitutions. Because this case involves the validity of a statute, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3; see also Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 52-53 (Mo. banc 1999). Union Pacific contends that section 389.610 preempts any common law duty to exercise due care with respect to warnings at railroad crossings and that the state regulatory agency had assumed jurisdiction over the crossing. Amtrak and Union Pacific also argue that Alcorn failed to make a submissible case as to negligence and causation. Accordingly, Union Pacific and Amtrak claim that, as a matter of law, they are not liable to Alcorn.
Union Pacific and Amtrak also assert evidentiary and instructional errors that, they claim, would warrant a new trial.
On the judgment for punitive damages, which was against Union Pacific only, the railroad contends that Alcorn failed to make a submissible case.
For reasons that follow, the judgment against Union Pacific and Amtrak for compensatory damages, as remitted by the trial court, is affirmed. Because this Court concludes that Alcorn failed to make a submissible case for punitive damages, the judgment for punitive damages is reversed.
Kimberly Alcorn was a passenger in a car driven by her boyfriend, Curtis Edwards, on August 29, 1997. At around 4:30 p.m. they were returning from Kansas City to their home in Sedalia. On Highway 50 just east of Warrensburg, Edwards drove his car into a ditch to avoid colliding with another vehicle. Alcorn apparently suffered a bruise on her arm. After this incident, Edwards decided to take back roads.
Edwards turned on to County Road 501. Edwards did not recall ever traveling on this road before. County Road 501 is a gravel road with some S-curves just south of Highway 50. Edwards drove the S-curves without incident and was going approximately 30 miles per hour on a straight section of the road. Edwards testified that he did not see any advance warning devices to indicate that his car was about to cross a set of railroad tracks. While Edwards said he had glanced at Alcorn's arm and was conversing with her while he was driving, he clearly testified that he was paying attention to his driving.
Edwards said that he did not hear the train's whistle, nor did he see the train before the crash. Edwards also did not recall seeing the railroad crossbucks, which is a sign in the shape of an "x" with the words "railroad" and "crossing."
The Amtrak train's crew, David Grimoldi, the engineer, and Kenneth Stoner, the assistant engineer, were operating the four-car passenger train en route from Kansas City to St. Louis as it approached County Road 501. The train was traveling east at maximum throttle, approximately 67 to 68 miles per hour. The...
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