Aldabbagh v. Arizona Dept. of Liquor Licenses and Control
| Decision Date | 27 November 1989 |
| Docket Number | CA-CV,No. 2,2 |
| Parties | Ussama ALDABBAGH, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR LICENSES AND CONTROL; Philip J. MacDonnell, Superintendent; Arizona State Liquor Board; Ray Johnson, Chairman; Darryl Dobras, Vice Chairman; Manuel Amado, Member; Leo Recker, Member; Ann Abbey, Member; Kay McKay, Member; Mary Beth Zanes, Member, Defendants/Appellees. 89-0106. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Allen, Kimerer & LaVelle by Sarah McGiffert and Merrick Firestone, Phoenix, for plaintiff/appellant.
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by R. Elizabeth Teply, Phoenix, for defendants/appellees.
Ussama Aldabbagh appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his civil complaint for damages and injunctive relief against defendants Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses and Control (the Department), Department Superintendent Philip J. MacDonnell, Arizona State Liquor Board (the Board), and Board members. Aldabbagh's complaint alleges that actions of these defendants violated his constitutional and civil rights and that they engaged in other tortious conduct injurious to his business. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
The complaint states that all facts set forth in the complaint are pertinent to each claim. 1 Ussama Aldabbagh owned three Phoenix area establishments serving alcoholic beverages and providing exotic dancer entertainment. Various law enforcement officials conducted raids on Aldabbagh's bars and arrested some employees. The police officers told one employee that they knew Aldabbagh was involved with illegal firearms, drugs, and prostitution. The police attempted to persuade the employee to provide them with information about Aldabbagh's business dealings.
Aldabbagh's limousine driver was stopped by police, fingerprinted, and told, "you people are involved in organized crime." Another employee was told she would not be jailed for selling drugs if she would inform on Aldabbagh. One employee, following a drug-related arrest, was Maricopa County Sheriff's deputies have checked dancers at Aldabbagh's businesses for compliance with dress requirements. At times, police officers parked in front of one of Aldabbagh's bars and entered the bar at least four times per week for an unspecified length of time.
"forced" to carry a tape recorder and was instructed to obtain incriminating statements from Aldabbagh that would result in the loss of his liquor license. Department investigators told a former employee that if he would help the Department, the Department would help him "get" Aldabbagh. Several other employees were arrested for various crimes and were subsequently questioned about Aldabbagh's activities.
The complaint also alleges that the defendants placed a "racially derogatory sign" in the Department's elevator and on two occasions mailed "racially derogatory and threatening mail" to Aldabbagh. MacDonnell allegedly made defamatory statements about Aldabbagh to the press. The complaint concludes that the defendants' actions were motivated by invidious prejudice against Aldabbagh because of his race and national origin. The complaint, however, fails to specify Aldabbagh's race or national origin.
The complaint states that the defendants conspired with unnamed defendants to put Aldabbagh out of business, through harassment of Aldabbagh and his employees. The incidents of harassment include the previously-mentioned police activities, the sign in the elevator, the mail, and the statement to the press.
Three persons who had unfavorable business dealings with Aldabbagh supplied information to the Department. These persons claimed that Aldabbagh was involved in the sale of illegal drugs and prostitution. The complaint alleges the Department harassed Aldabbagh to substantiate these claims, which eventually resulted in the revocation of Aldabbagh's liquor licenses.
On February 6, 1987, Aldabbagh filed this civil action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 2 Aldabbagh filed an amended complaint. On April 15, 1988, the trial court granted defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, stating:
1. Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from bringing this action for damages and injunctive relief by virtue of this court's previous findings and rulings.
2. Defendants are not persons which [sic] can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3. Defendant MacDonnell is immune from suit by virtue of A.R.S. § 12-820.
Aldabbagh now appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his amended complaint.
On appeal, Aldabbagh argues that (1) the amended complaint is not barred by collateral estoppel, (2) the Superintendent and Board members are not immune from suit in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) the Superintendent's and Board members' alleged conduct falls outside the immunity provided for by Arizona statutes, (4) Aldabbagh's claims against the Superintendent for defamation fall outside the immunity provided for by Arizona law, and (5) Aldabbagh is entitled to injunctive relief. Defendants argue that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, arising from the disposition of Aldabbagh's appeal of the Board's revocation of his liquor licenses, 3 precludes Aldabbagh from raising the issues presented in the matter before us.
When testing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, well-pleaded material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted, but conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions of fact are not. Folk v. City of Phoenix, 27 Ariz.App. 146, 150, 551 P.2d 595, 599 (1976); Rule 12(b), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S. The court must
[162 Ariz. 418] determine whether the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, sufficiently sets forth a valid claim. Anson v. American Motors Corp., 155 Ariz. 420, 421, 747 P.2d 581, 582 (App.1987). Questions of law decided by the trial court are reviewed de novo. Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 114, 412 P.2d 47, 51 (1966).
The trial court held that Aldabbagh was collaterally estopped from bringing the present action for damages and injunctive relief because of the court's previous findings and rulings. We disagree.
Collateral estoppel is a doctrine of issue preclusion which prevents a party from relitigating an issue identical to that previously litigated to conclusion on the merits. Gilbert v. Board of Medical Examiners, 155 Ariz. 169, 174, 745 P.2d 617, 622 (App.1987). In Gilbert, Division One of this court stated:
The elements necessary to invoke collateral estoppel are: the issue is actually litigated in the previous proceeding, there is a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, resolution of such issue is essential to the decision, there is a valid and final decision on the merits, and there is a common identity of the parties.
Id., citing Chaney Bldg. Co. v. Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 716 P.2d 28 (1986).
The trial judge considered the pleadings and arguments of counsel. The parties' written motions contained extensive references to the superior court's review of the Liquor Board's administrative decision. Aldabbagh, in his response to the motion to dismiss, included documents from the other proceeding as exhibits. These documents consisted of his motion to reconsider, the Liquor Board's response to the motion to reconsider, and his reply to their response. 4
The record does not show that the trial judge considered the transcript and record of the revocation proceeding. Had the judge done so, defendants' motion to dismiss necessarily would have been treated as a motion for summary judgment. Rule 12(b), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S.; Allison v. State, 101 Ariz. 418, 421, 420 P.2d 289, 292 (1966). Without an examination of the record, however, the trial court could not have determined whether all the elements existed to invoke collateral estoppel. The court could not have determined whether the issue was actually litigated, whether there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether resolution of the issue was essential to the previous decision. See Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846, 91 S.Ct. 93, 27 L.Ed.2d 84 (1970). The court therefore erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of collateral estoppel.
In reviewing the complaint, however, we find that Aldabbagh has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted as to Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, and part of 10. Claims 3, 5, 6, and part of 10 state a claim.
Claim 10 alleges that the deliberate actions of the named defendants violated § 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 The trial court ruled that the defendants are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree.
Aldabbagh's complaint lists as defendants the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control, Department Superintendent MacDonnell, the Arizona State Liquor In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58 (1989), the Supreme Court held that in a state court action for damages, states and state officials acting within their official capacities are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Will, however, does not bar an action against the state or state officials for injunctive relief. Claim 10 may proceed as to injunctive relief only.
[162 Ariz. 419] Board, and the Board members. Claim 10 seeks compensatory damages. The complaint states that the Department and Board are agencies of the state and that the individuals named are state officials.
Claim 8 alleges that Aldabbagh was damaged by the defendants' deliberate conduct, which conduct was motivated by animosity toward Aldabbagh's race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 6 Section 1981 guarantees the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Estate of Aten By and Through Kitchens for and on Behalf of Aten v. City of Tucson, 2
...novo. Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 114, 412 P.2d 47, 51 (1966); Aldabbagh v. Arizona Dept. of Liquor Licenses & Control, 162 Ariz. 415, 418, 783 P.2d 1207, 1210 (App.1989). Summary judgment may be affirmed on appeal on grounds not explicitly considered below. Gibs......
-
Cullen v. Koty-Leavitt Ins. Agency, Inc.
...law in a complaint, standing alone, are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Aldabbagh v. Ariz. Dep't of Liquor Licenses & Control, 162 Ariz. 415, 417, 783 P.2d 1207, 1209 (App.1989) ("When testing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, well-pleaded material allegat......
-
Fillmore v. Maricopa Water Processing Systems, Inc.
...and "interfer[ed] with [his] business expectations ... with the Schmitts...." See, e.g., Aldabbagh v. Ariz. Dep't of Liquor Licenses & Control, 162 Ariz. 415, 421, 783 P.2d 1207, 1213 (App.1989) ("injurious falsehood is the publication of a matter derogatory to the plaintiff's business ... ......
-
Fillmore v. Maricopa Water Proc. Systems
...and "interfer[ed] with [his] business expectations ... with the Schmitts...." See, e.g., Aldabbagh v. Ariz. Dep't of Liquor Licenses & Control, 162 Ariz. 415, 421, 783 P.2d 1207, 1213 (App.1989) (injurious falsehood "is the publication of a matter derogatory to the plaintiff's business ... ......