Alderman v. State
Decision Date | 27 March 1992 |
Citation | 615 So.2d 640 |
Parties | Joe ALDERMAN v. STATE. CR 91-82. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Dennis N. Balske of Balske and Van Almen, Montgomery, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Andy S. Poole, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Joe Alderman, the appellant, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the offense of theft in the second degree. Three issues are raised in this appeal.
The appellant was originally indicted for the offense of theft in the first degree. On September 9, 1991, the case was called for trial and a jury was struck. After the jury was empaneled, but before opening statements and the presentation of any evidence, trial was recessed for lunch. When trial resumed, defense counsel notified the trial court, out of the presence of the jury, that the appellant wished to enter a guilty plea. The prosecutor then stated that he "intend[ed] to file an amended count two stating theft of property in the second degree." PR. 31. 1
In response to specific questioning by the trial judge, the appellant stated that he was 26 years of age and that he had attended college for a year and a half. He further stated that he was not "under psychiatric treatment," was not "experiencing mental or emotional problems," or was not "under the influence of any medication, drugs, or alcohol." PR. 33-34. The trial judge advised the appellant that theft in the second degree is a Class C felony and explained to him the elements of and the correct range of punishment for that offense. PR. 34-36. The trial judge also gave the appellant a detailed explanation of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty. PR. 37-39.
The appellant responded negatively to the trial judge's questions of whether anyone had threatened him or offered him a reward to plead guilty, or promised him that he would be placed on probation or given a suspended sentence. PR. 39-40. After hearing what the prosecutor expected the evidence to show, PR. 40-42, the trial judge accepted the appellant's guilty plea and adjudged the appellant guilty, PR. 43.
During the sentencing hearing held October 11, 1991, the appellant sought to withdraw his plea, alleging that the plea had been induced by misrepresentation. This request was denied by the trial court, and the appellant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, was fined $6,002, and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $3,001. In response to the appellant's application for probation, the trial court stated: "He will be on probation for five years after two years of incarceration." SR. 32. 2
On November 8, 1991, appellate counsel 3 filed a written motion to withdraw the plea. The grounds for this motion were: (1) that the guilty plea was induced by misrepresentation; (2) that there was no factual basis for the plea; and (3) that the appellant's "due process and Sixth Amendment rights were violated at the sentencing hearing," Supp.R. 9, when the trial court permitted the prosecutor to introduce hearsay evidence and then imposed an excessive sentence. The State filed a written response opposing this motion. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw in a written order stating that it had considered both the appellant's motion and the State's response thereto.
The appellant contends that his guilty plea was induced by a misrepresentation on the part of the prosecutor and therefore was not voluntarily and intelligently made.
The appellant was charged with theft by deception in connection with a construction consulting contract that he had with the victims. See Part II below. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor stated that the presentence report 4 was "very much incomplete," SR. 4, and that he had "quite a bit of information" to relate that was "important to the Court," SR. 5. During the discussion on whether the prosecutor would be permitted to provide this information to the court, defense counsel sought a continuance, or, in the alternative, permission for the appellant to withdraw his plea. As grounds for the motion to withdraw the plea, defense counsel stated that he "was given information that proved not to be true," SR. 9, and that this erroneous information caused him to wrongly advise the appellant to plead guilty. The trial court then stated:
SR 10.
The gist of defense counsel's response was that, during the plea negotiations, the prosecutor stated that if the appellant pleaded guilty to the instant offense, he would not be prosecuted for his activities in connection with an investment agreement he had entered into with Ms. Wanda Irby. According to defense counsel:
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that, in the discussion of the plea bargain, he had informed defense counsel that he (the prosecutor) had discussed with an investigator for the Alabama Securities Commission the possibility of investigating the appellant for securities fraud in connection with the investment agreement the appellant had with Ms. Irby. 5 SR. 14. He further stated:
In his affidavit filed in support of the State's response to the motion to withdraw the plea, the prosecutor averred that he did not, at any time, tell defense counsel "that Wanda Irby was independently pursuing or wished to independently pursue or initiate criminal prosecution of the defendant arising from the defendant's involvement in the ... investment agreement." Supp.R. 20.
It is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntarily and intelligently made. E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). It is equally clear that Lepera v. United States, 587 F.2d 433, 436 n. 4 (9th Cir.1978). In the present case, there was conflicting evidence as to whether any misrepresentation was actually made by the prosecutor. However, we think the dispositive question in this situation is not whether a misrepresentation was in fact made, but whether, as the appellant claims, his plea was actually induced by information or misinformation relayed to him. Cf. United States v. Marzgliano, 588 F.2d 395, 399 (3d Cir.1978) ( ); United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir.1990) (), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122, 111 S.Ct. 1079, 112 L.Ed.2d 1184 (1991).
The trial court, of course, was in the best position to determine whether the plea was induced in any way. Cf. Ex parte Swain, 527 So.2d 1279, 1280 (Ala.1988) ( ). In denying the appellant's oral motion to withdraw his plea made at the sentencing hearing, the trial court made an express "find[ing] that there is no appropriate basis...
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