Aldrich v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 08 March 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 264,132 N.Y. 85
• Parties: ALDRICH v. BAILEY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

132 N.Y. 85

30 N.E. 264

ALDRICH

v.BAILEY.

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division.

March 8, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department.

Action by Elizabeth W. Aldrich against Mary E. Bailey. From a judgment of the general term of the supreme court, entered upon a submission of a controversy pursuant to Code Civil Proc. § 1279, in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

VENDOR AND VENDEE-DEFECTIVE TITLE-PENDING ACTION.

A vendee cannot refuse to accept title because of the pendency of an action to set aside for fraud a deed to one of the vandor's predecessors in title, where the vendor is not a party to such action, and there is no averment in the complaint therein that he participated in such fraud, or had any knowledge thereof; 2 Rev. St. p. 137, s 5, providing that fraud shall not vitiate the title of a purchaser for value, unless such purchaser had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor. 8 N. Y. Supp. 435, reversed.

George P. Smith, for appellant.

E. H. Landon and William D. Page, for respondent.

HAIGHT, J.

On June, 11, 1889, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant for a sale of a lot on Sixty-Third street, running through to Sixty-Fourth street on Eleventh avenue, in the city of New York. The defendant now refuses to accept a deed from the plaintiff, and to pay therefor, for the reason that on June 3, 1889, a notice of lis pendens was filed in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York in an action in the supreme court wherein William Paine is plaintiff, and William Noble et al. are defendants, the object of which, as stated in the notice, is to have certain deeds, conveyances, and other instruments, affecting the title to the block of which the plaintiff's lands form a part, declared null and void, etc. Neither the plaintiff nor her grantor were made parties to that action. John Paine was formerly the owner of the block in controversy, and conveyed the same to Elizabeth Noble. The general term held that, under the complaint filed in that action, it may be found that Paine was insane at the time he executed the deed to Noble, and, if he was, his deed was absolutely void, and no title would pass under the authority of Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378. Assuming, for the purposes of this case, that the rule is there correctly stated, and that a deed would be not merely voidable, but absolutely void, when executed by an insane person, yet, under the rule in that case, a deed is absolutely void only when it appears that the person executing it was at the time so deprived of his mental faculties as to be wholly, absolutely, and completely unable to understand or comprehend the nature of the transaction. It consequently becomes necessary to examine the complaint in that action, and determine whether such relief could be granted thereunder. It alleges that ‘on or about May 28, 1885, and for two years and more prior thereto, said Paine, by reason of his extreme old age, physical infirmities, and other causes, was mentally weak, incompetent, unsound of mind, incapable of attending to business personally, and incapable and incompetent to understand and comprehend properly the nature of a business transaction; was entirely under the complete influence aud control of those composing his own household, and particularly of one Sears, his agent; and was physically incompetent and incapable of resisting successfully any disposition of his property that might be recommended, requested, or required of him by said Sears and other members of his household; and that these facts were known to said defendants Noble.’ The complaint further alleges that through force, fraud, and undue influence,...