Spoonheim v. Spoonheim
| Decision Date | 21 June 1905 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Steele county; Pollock, J.
Action by P. P. Spoonheim and Anna Spoonheim against Halvor P Spoonheim. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
J. A Sorley, for the appellant.
Intoxication so deep and excessive as to deprive one of his understanding is a good defense to an alleged contract made while the defendant is in that condition. 14 Cyc. 1103; 17 Am. & Eng Enc. Law, 401; Story Eq. Jur., section 231; Wilcox v. Jackson, 1 N.W. 513; Caulkins v. Fry, 35 Conn. 170; Wright v. Fisher, 32 N.W. 605; Van Wyck v. Brashear, 81 N.Y. 260; Peck v. Cary, 27 N.Y. 9; 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 85, and note and cases cited; Young v. Lamont, 57 N.W. 478; Burnham v. Burnham et al., 97 N.W. 176; Schuur v. Rodenback, 65 P. 298; Warvelle on Vendors (2d Ed.), section 75; Bush v. Breing, 6 A. 86; In re Schusler v. Estate, 47 A. 966; Foot v. Tewksburg, 2 Vt. 97; Bates v. Ball, 76 Ill. 108; Schackelton v. Sebree, 86 Ill. 616; O'Connor v. Rempt, 29 N.J.Eq. 156; Dixon v. Dixon, 22 N.J.Eq. 91; Lofthus v. Maloney, 16 S.E. 749; Taylor v. Purcell, 31 S.W. 567; Gardner v. Gardner,, 34 Am. Dec. 345; Coombe's Exr. v. Carthew, 43 A. 1057; Wright v. Walker, 54 L. R. A. 440.
Deed made in a sober interval by an habitual drunkard is good. Ritter's Appeal, 59 Pa.St. 9; Ralston v. Turpin, 25 F. 7.
Neither fraud or undue influence is presumed. They must be shown by satisfactory evidence. Heyrock v. Surerus, 9 N.D. 28, 81 N.W. 36; Burnham v. Burnham et al., 97 N.W. 176; Bumpus v. Bumpus, 26 N.W. 410; Wilcox v. Jackson, 1 N.W. 513; Franks v. Jones, 17 P. 663; Crane v. Conklin, 1 N.J.Eq. 346.
Where intoxication is induced by the other party. Brummond v. Krause et al., 80 N.W. 686; Peckham v. Van Bergen, 8 N.D. 595, 84 N.W. 566; Story Eq. Jur., section 231; Trimbo v. Trimbo, 47 Minn. 389; Pom. Eq. Jur., section 946.
Assuming plaintiff's intoxication as alleged, the transaction was voidable only. Johnson v. Harmon, 94 U.S. 371; 24 L.Ed. 271; Carpenter v. Rogers, 28 N.W. 156.
Accepting the benefits of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as are known, or ought to be known to the person accepting. 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 124; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 102; Warvelle on Vendors (2d Ed.) 101; Joest v. Williams, 42 Ind. 565; Pom. Eq. Jur., sections 820, 897; Wright v. Fisher, 32 N.W. 605; Youn v. Lamont, 57 N.W. 478; O'Connor v. Rempt, 29 N.J.Eq. 156; Whitcom et al. v. Hardy, 76 N.W. 29; Bumpus v. Bumpus, 26 N.W. 410; Pom. Eq. Jur. 965.
Guy C. H. Corliss, for respondents.
Where the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee exists and the latter receives title to the mortgaged property by a subsequent conveyance, the mortgagee has the burden of showing the transaction is in all respects fair. Linnellinnel v. Lyford, 72 Me. 283; Ritchie v. McMulten, 79 F. 522; Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 24 L.Ed. 775; Moeller v. Moore, 50 N.W. 396; Baugher v. Merryman, 32 Md. 192; Odell v. Mantrose, 68 N.Y. 499; Niggeler v. Maurin, 24 N.W. 369; Marshall v. Thompson, 39 N.W. 309; DeLancy v. Finnegan, 90 N.W. 387; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139, 13 L.Ed. 927; Hyndman v. Hyndman, 19 Vt. 10; Hall v. Hall, 44 Am. St. Rep. 696; Bradbury v. Davenport, 46 P. 1062; Jones v. Foster, 51 N.E. 862; Seymour v. Mackay, 18 N.E. 552; Scanlan et al. v. Scanlan, 25 N.E. 652; Cassem v. Heustis, 94 Am. St. Rep. 164; Alexander v. Rodriquez, 12 Wall 323, 20 L.Ed. 407; Cassem v. Heustis, 94 Am. St. Rep. 160; Dougherty v. McColgan, 6 Gill & J. 275.
The deed should be set aside on the ground of surprise. 1 Story Eq. Jur., sections 118, 120, 251; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., section 847; Coffman v. Lookout Bank, 40 Am. Rep. 21; Graffam v. Berhess, 117 U.S. 180, 29 L.Ed. 938.
While a deed is only voidable where the grantor has some intelligence left, yet, if intellectual powers are gone, whether through insanity, idiocy, disease or cripplings of old age, or temporarily through the use of intoxicants and drugs, the deed is void because there is no intelligent personality left to make a deed. German S. & L. Soc. v. LeLashmutt, 67 F. 399; Delafield et al. v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9; Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N.Y. 378; Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N.Y. 85, 30 N.E. 264;; Castro v. Geil, 52 Am. St. Rep. 84; Rogers v. Blackwell, 49 Mich. 192; Estate of Desilver, 28 Am. Dec. 645; Rogers v. Walker, 47 Am. Dec. 470; Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 227; Elder v. Schumacher, 33 P. 175, 13 Cyc. 573.
Plaintiff brought this action to set aside a deed of real property executed and delivered by him to the defendant, his brother, on December 26, 1889. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was at said time in such mental and physical condition through the excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors that he was in danger of sudden death, and that it was agreed between him and the defendant, at defendant's solicitation, that plaintiff should convey the land to the defendant, and that the defendant agreed to convey the same to plaintiff's wife; that plaintiff thereupon conveyed the land to the defendant, but defendant has since refused to convey the land to the plaintiff's wife; that defendant has been in possession of said lands since and including a part of the year 1895, and has appropriated all the crops raised thereon; and that the value of the rents and profits of said land is the sum of $ 1,000 per annum. The answer denies these allegations, except as to possession, and alleges that said deed was given to him as security for money then owing to defendant from plaintiff, and for security for liability incurred by defendant in becoming plaintiff's security on notes given by him to others, and as security for future advances. The defendant also sets forth in the answer a counterclaim in substance as follows: That on September 17, 1894, plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in the sum of about $ 2,284.75 for money loaned, and that these parties had a settlement on that day which resulted in a conveyance of said land by plaintiff to defendant by warranty deed, in consideration of the satisfaction and discharge of all of plaintiff's indebtedness and liability to defendant; that such settlement was fully consummated on that day; and that defendant went into possession of said land and cultivated the same, and has ever since been in possession thereof. The plaintiff interposed a general denial to all the allegations of the reply. The trial court found that the deed of December 26, 1889, was a mortgage, and further found that the deed of September 17, 1894, was given when the plaintiff was entirely incapacitated from knowing what he was then doing by reason of his intoxication, and ordered said deed set aside upon payment by plaintiff to defendant of the amount adjudged to be due and owing to him by plaintiff, after allowing as credit thereon $ 250 per annum, the annual rental value while defendant was in possession. Defendant has appealed from said judgment, and demands a review of the entire case under section 5630, Rev. Codes 1899.
It will be noticed that the trial court found against the plaintiff so far as the allegations of the complaint are concerned. This finding is not expressly challenged by the plaintiff on the appeal, although its correctness is not conceded. It therefore follows that there is no issue to be determined on this appeal as to the relation between the parties arising out of the deed of December 26, 1889. This deed was a mortgage in equity, although an absolute warranty deed in terms. The important issue that remains to be decided is as to the circumstances under which the deed of September 17 1894, was given, and the legal effect under the evidence of the giving of that deed. There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to the circumstances under which the deed was given. Plaintiff contends that he has no memory of the giving thereof, and that, if he signed it, he was so drunk at the time that the deed was void. He further contends that the defendant induced him to begin drinking in August, 1894, and encouraged him in continuing on a long drinking spree, which ended in his becoming incompetent to do any business, that he might procure a deed of this land from him. The evidence shows that plaintiff had been using intoxicating liquors for over three weeks before September 17th. He was intoxicated during a part of every day of that time. He drank large quantities of liquor, and at times was unable to walk at all during that time. He was often drunk, and was not entirely free from the influence of liquor during most of the time. During these days he generally staggered while walking and was boisterous and abusive in his talk. He constantly showed, by his conversation, appearance and actions, that he was on a debauch. He also used morphine occasionally during this time. He neglected his farming affairs and spent money freely. He lived two and a half miles from Hatton and spent much of his time there, but generally went home nights, and often took his liquor home with him and drank during the night. A few days after September 17th he was taken before the insanity board of Grand Forks county on the application of his wife and lodged in jail. He was not committed to the asylum, but was allowed to go home on parole as he states. He was taken before the board, not with a view to having him sent to the asylum, but, as is to be fairly inferred from the evidence, to induce him to stop drinking. The fact of his having been intoxicated during this time is proven by the testimony of his neighbors and the business men of Hatton. Over a dozen witnesses testify to that fact, and from their...
To continue reading
Request your trial