Aleman v. City of Bakersfield
| Decision Date | 30 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | 1:11-CV-2006 AWI JLT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | ERICK EFRAIN ALEMAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, ALLEN RONK, TIMOTHY BERCHTOLD, and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants. |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
This case arises from a confrontation between members of the Bakersfield Police Department and Plaintiff Erick Aleman ("Aleman"). Aleman has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Bakersfield ("the City") and Bakersfield police officers Allen Ronk ("Ronk") and Timothy Berchtold ("Berchtold"). Aleman alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and the Equal Protection clause. Defendants move for summary judgment on the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action, as well as all Monell claims. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
On December 18, 2009, at approximately 11:07 a.m., Bakersfield Police Department ("BPD") Officers Ronk and Berchtold were on patrol in a marked BPD vehicle and in full police uniform. JUMF 1. Ronk and Berchtold observed a Lincoln Navigator that had its front driver'sside window tinted in violation of California Vehicle Code § 26708(a)(1). JUMF 2. The Navigator was stopped at an intersection and remained stopped for about 15 seconds. See Motion To Suppress at 4:10-19. Several weeks prior to December 2009, there had been a large number of burglaries and other crimes committed during the morning hours, of which the officers were aware. See DUMF 2.2 Based on both officers' knowledge and experience, they were aware that burglars would "case" a given area for potential targets prior to committing the actual burglary. See DUMF 3. The officers believed that the Navigator may have been "casing" the area for potential burglary targets because the Navigator was stopped for about 15 seconds, which was an abnormal amount of time in that there was no traffic in to which the Navigator would have to yield. See DUMF 4.3 Because of the tinting on the window, the officers could not see the driver and thus, did not know the driver's race or gender. See DUMF 5.4 The officers followed the Navigator in an attempt to initiate a traffic stop. JUMF 3. The Navigator proceeded driving until it turned into the driveway of a house at 3301 Mission Hills Court. JUMF 4.
Ronk positioned his patrol vehicle behind the Navigator. JUMF 5. Ronk then activated the police vehicles overhead red and blue lights, but did not activate the siren. See DUMF 6; PUMF 3. A records check of the vehicle's registration revealed that 3301 Mission Hills Court was not the address to which the vehicle was registered, rather the Navigator was registered to Aleman at 2901 University Ave. See JUMF 6.
Ronk then observed the driver, later identified as Aleman, exit the driver's side door ofthe vehicle and proceed towards the residence. JUMF 7. Ronk and Berchtold exited their vehicle. See DUMF 7. Aleman was wearing a baggy jacket with a loose fitting shirt and baggy athletic pants, and the officers were concerned that Aleman could conceal weapons on his person. DUMF 8. Aleman did not know that the officers were present, and the officers did not yell at Aleman to stop.5 See Aleman Depo. 22:11-20, 26:1-6. Aleman continued to walk to the front door, opened the front door, shut the door, and said hello to his friends inside. See Aleman Depo. 12:6-11, 26:7-9.
The officers declare that they did not know if Aleman knew the occupants of the house, and believed that Aleman may have been fleeing inside to create a hostage situation. See DUMF 13. Berchtold forced open/broke down the front door and entered the residence. See PUMF 8; DUMF 14; Aleman Depo. 27:2-14. The front door hit Aleman and knocked him down. See Aleman Depo. 12:12-13. Both officers entered and began to hit Aleman with their fists and batons, which had the effect of knocking or dragging Aleman down the hallway of the house and into a bathroom.6 See Aleman Depo. 12:12-13:16, 29:22-30:7; see also Motion To Suppress at 71:4-16 (testimony of Maria Subia). After the struggle ended, Aleman was handcuffed and arrested. See Berchtold Dec. ¶ 15; Ronk Dec. ¶ 15. Neither officer had met, had previous contact, or had even heard of Aleman prior to this incident. JUMF 11. Both officers declare that none of their actions were racially motivated. See Ronk Dec. ¶ 6; Berchtold Dec. ¶ 6.
Aleman was placed in the back of the officers' patrol vehicle and taken to the county jail. See JUMF 8; PUMF 11. In the patrol car, Ronk advised Aleman of his Miranda rights and, when Ronk spoke to Aleman, Ronk noticed that Aleman had red watery eyes, dilated pupils,slight bruxism, shaking extremities, and a strong odor of marijuana about him. See DUMF 17;7 Ronk Dec. ¶¶ 16, 17. Ronk found a clear plastic bag containing about 8 grams of marijuana in the back of his vehicle where Aleman had been sitting. JUMF 9. Aleman admits that this marijuana belonged to him. See JUMF 10. Aleman was booked for violations of Penal Code § 69 (), Health & Safety Code §§ 11357 (possession of marijuana) and 11550 (under the influence of a controlled substance), and Vehicle Code §§ 23152(a) () and 26708(a)(1) (window tinting). DUMF 18.
Ronk completed an offense report, which was approved by supervisory personnel at BPD and submitted to the Kern County District Attorney's Office. PUMF 12. Neither Ronk nor Berchtold had any influence on anyone from the District Attorney's Office about whether to pursue criminal charges against Aleman. See DUMF 24.8 Charges were then brought against Aleman. See Aleman Depo. 14:7-9. However, a motion to suppress was filed and granted, and the charges were thereafter dismissed. See PUMF 13; Aleman Depo. 14:10-15:8.
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009). A dispute is "genuine" as to a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010).
Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Where the non-moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. See James River Ins. Co. v. Herbert Schenk, P.C., 523 F.3d at 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2008); Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then "the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. The opposing party cannot "'rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading' but must instead produce evidence that 'sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008).
The opposing party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2010). While a "justifiable inference" need not be the most likely or the most persuasive inference, a "justifiable inference" must be rational or reasonable. See Narayan, 616 F.3d at 899. Inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation toproduce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2008); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F.Supp.2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004). "A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being simply because a litigant claims that one exists or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial." Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, a "motion for summary judgment may not be defeated . . . by evidence that is 'merely colorable' or 'is not significantly probative.'" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). If the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine...
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