Alexander S. v. Boyd
| Decision Date | 28 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-1950,96-2589,s. 96-1950 |
| Citation | 113 F.3d 1373 |
| Parties | ALEXANDER S.; Alfred S.; Benny B.; Christopher M.; Lafayette M.; Ricky S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; Lesly A. Bowers, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Inez Moore Tenenbaum, individually and as a representative of a class of juveniles, Plaintiff, v. Flora Brooks BOYD, individually and in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice, Defendant-Appellant, and Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; John F. Henry; Frank Maudlin; Kathleen P. Jennings; Joseph W. Hudgens; Karole Jensen; J.P. Neal, individually and in their official capacities as former Board Members for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; South Carolina Department of Youth Services, Defendants, Michael W. Moore, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Party in Interest, v. Richard A. HARPOOTLIAN, in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Amicus Curiae-Movant. Thomas DAVIS, Special Master, Alexander S.; Alfred S.; Benny B.; Christopher M.; Lafayette M.; Ricky S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; Lesly A. Bowers, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Inez Moore Tenenbaum, individually and as a representative of a class of juveniles, Plaintiff, v. Flora Brooks BOYD, Defendant-Appellant, Richard A. Harpootlian, in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Movant, and Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; John F. Henry; Frank Maudlin; Kathleen P. Jennings; Joseph W. Hudgens; Karole Jensen; J.P. Neal, individually and in their official capacities as former Board Members for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; South Carolina Department of Youth Services, Defendants, Michael W. Moore, Director of the South C |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Edward Mobley Woodward, Jr., Woodward, Cothran & Herndon, Columbia, SC, for Appellant. W. Gaston Fairey, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, SC, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Carolyn C. Matthews, Woodward, Cothran & Herndon, Columbia, SC, for Appellant. Rochelle Romosca McKim, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, SC; Nancy C. McCormick, Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc., Columbia, SC; Lesly A. Bowers, Columbia, SC, for Appellees.
Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote a separate opinion in which she concurred in Parts I., II., III.A. and C., IV., and in the judgment. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote a dissenting opinion.
In this appeal we must decide whether the recently enacted limitations on attorney's fee awards set forth in § 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West Supp.1997)), apply to attorney's fees awarded to Plaintiffs, a group of incarcerated juveniles who have successfully challenged the constitutionality of juvenile prison conditions in the state of South Carolina. Section 803(d) provides that no attorney's fees shall be awarded to a "prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility" in an action seeking redress for unconstitutional prison conditions unless:
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's right protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
§ 803(d)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(1)). In addition, any award made pursuant to § 803(d) is limited to an hourly rate no greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established for payment of court-appointed counsel. 1 See § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(3)).
In successive orders, which were consolidated for this appeal, 2 the district court held that the PLRA, enacted on April 26, 1996, did not apply to fee awards for work performed, but not compensated, prior to its enactment. As to fees for work performed subsequent to the PLRA's enactment, the district court held that the PLRA did not limit the fees generated in proving unconstitutional conditions at juvenile detention facilities, as opposed to adult facilities, because juvenile facilities were not covered by § 803(d) of the PLRA. For the reasons set forth herein, we disagree and hold that the attorney's fees limitations set forth in § 803(d) of the PLRA apply to juveniles confined to juvenile detention facilities. Moreover, the provisions apply to all awards of attorney's fee made after April 26, 1996, regardless of when the work was performed, if the plaintiff meets the new standards imposed by the PLRA for determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees in a prison conditions lawsuit. Accordingly, the PLRA limits the fees available to Plaintiffs for proving unconstitutional conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities and for monitoring services ordered by the district court. Because the awards entered by the district court were determined under the pre-PLRA standards, we reverse and remand to the district court for a redetermination under the new standards.
This appeal arises out of ongoing litigation between a group of incarcerated juveniles confined to four South Carolina juvenile detention facilities and the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (the State). First, we review the procedural background of this case.
In 1990, Plaintiffs filed the underlying class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.1997) and three interrelated statutes--the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, see 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485 (West 1990 & Supp.1997); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-96 (West 1985 & Supp.1997); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Supp.1997)--challenging the conditions of confinement of juveniles housed in the Department of Juvenile Justice facilities operated by the State. Plaintiffs alleged that the State violated a number of their constitutional and federal statutory rights. After exhaustive discovery and a three-month bench trial, the district court concluded that certain aspects of confinement violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Plaintiffs, therefore, prevailed in proving that actual constitutional violations occurred in the juvenile facilities. In its order of January 25, 1995, the district court cited constitutional and statutory deficiencies in the areas of fire safety, food services, medical services, programming, overcrowding, and staffing levels. See Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 876 F.Supp. 773, 786-95 (D.S.C.1995). The court also found that the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been infringed upon by the improper use of CS gas, a potent form of tear gas used for riot control, and by the State's failure to adequately identify those Plaintiffs who suffer from a "disability" for purposes of the facilities' educational programs. See id. at 785-88. Accordingly, the district court ordered the State to devise and implement a remedial plan to cure each violation. It also stated its intent to appoint a special master to monitor the implementation of the program. See id. at 803-05. The State did not appeal.
On November 22, 1995, after submissions and arguments, the district court issued an order awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees for work relating to the January 1995 order. The State appealed the fee award, but argued only that the rates, hours, and documents submitted by Plaintiffs were inaccurate. In fact, during oral arguments before this court held two weeks after the effective date of the PLRA, the State specifically disavowed any claim that the PLRA limited the fee award. 4 Finding no error, we affirmed the award. See Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir.1996) (unpublished).
On May 25, 1995, the State submitted its proposed remedial plan in accordance with the January 1995 district court order. The district court approved the plan, which provided, in pertinent part, for an increase in the facilities' security staff. The amount of the staffing increase was expressly dependent upon an anticipated reduction in the juvenile facilities' population.
On August 30, 1995, the district court held a status conference to assess the remedial plan's implementation progress. The court-appointed special master testified that the existing conditions "caused him to fear for the safety of the juveniles." (J.A. at 20.) At this conference, Plaintiffs made an oral motion to increase security staffing at the various juvenile facilities. Plaintiffs subsequently submitted in writing an Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief. Plaintiffs then filed a superseding Motion to Modify the Plan with regards to security staffing needs due to an increase, rather than the anticipated decrease, in the number of juveniles detained in the facilities.
In December 1995, the district court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion to modify the remedial plan to increase staffing. During this hearing, the State agreed to revise its proposed plan. Following the December modification hearing, the district court issued an interim order on February 16, 1996, in which it found that the level...
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