Alexander v. City of Duluth
| Decision Date | 23 October 1899 |
| Docket Number | 11,873 - (204) |
| Citation | 80 N.W. 623,77 Minn. 445 |
| Parties | E. P. ALEXANDER v. CITY OF DULUTH and Others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for St. Louis county by plaintiff, a resident and tax payer in defendant city, against the city of Duluth, and its mayor, comptroller, and clerk, and the president and members of its common council to enjoin the issue of bonds. From an order, Moer, J., sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Constitution -- General Laws for Cities -- Classification by Population.
So much of section 36 of article 4 of the state constitution as relates to the classification of cities on the basis of population authorizes the legislature to classify, for the purpose of general legislation, cities on the basis of population, although such basis would not otherwise be germane to the purpose or subject-matter of the proposed law but, other than this, the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of article 4, relating to special legislation, are not affected thereby.
Constitution.
While it is true, as a general rule, that classification with a view to the enactment of general laws cannot be based upon existing circumstances only or those of a limited duration yet a distinctive class may be based upon existing conditions, when the purpose of the law is temporary only.
Laws 1899, c. 50 -- Bonds for Floating Debt -- Constitution.
Laws 1899, c. 50, authorizing cities of a designated class to issue bonds to take up their floating indebtedness, construed, and held to be a general law, and constitutional, for the reason that its purposes are temporary and remedial only.
L. C. Harris, for appellant.
Population is not a proper basis of classification for an act of this character. There is no necessary or natural relation between population of cities and the condition of their floating indebtedness. State v. City, 42 N.J.L. 486. If population be a proper basis, the act is nevertheless unconstitutional, because its provisions are limited to cities having the required population at a given time. The act must operate not only equally and uniformly on all members of the class at the time of enactment, but must operate on all members that will grow into the class. State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 551; State v. Mayor, 45 N.J.L. 297. The act is unconstitutional because it is limited to cities that proceed to act under it within six months, and also to cities having a floating indebtedness at the date of its passage. The act thus makes an arbitrary and unreasonable distinction between members of the same class. There may be subdivisions of classification under proper circumstances, but the distinctions must be based on substantial grounds and not on arbitrary reasons. Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 272.
J. B. Richards, attorney for city of Duluth, for respondent.
In view of the constitutional amendment (Laws 1899, p. vi.), the act is constitutional. Independently of the amendment, the special features of the act make it proper. State v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126. The act legislates for a whole class, and is merely limited in time of duration; that is, it is a temporary general law. People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388; Potter's Dwarris, St. 74; 2 Bouvier, Law Dict. 573. A general law relating purely to existing conditions may be passed for temporary purposes only. Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479; State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 548; Flynn v. Little Falls E. & W. Co., 74 Minn. 180; State v. City of Thief River Falls, 76 Minn. 15; Iowa v. Soper, 39 Iowa 112. See In Matter of New York, 70 N.Y. 327; In re Church, 92 N.Y. 1; People v. Square, 107 N.Y. 593; Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N.Y. 459; In re People, 146 N.Y. 357; Haskel v. City, 30 Iowa 232. The act is not unconstitutional on the ground that no city can take advantage of it after six months. State v. Cooley, supra; Cobb v. Bord, supra.
This is an action to enjoin the city of Duluth from issuing and negotiating its bonds to the amount of $500,000 to take up its floating indebtedness. The plaintiff appealed from an order sustaining a general demurrer to his complaint.
The defendant claims that it is authorized to issue the bonds by Laws 1899, c. 50. Is this statute constitutional? This is the only question for our decision meriting special consideration, and the answer to it must be in the affirmative. The provisions of this statute may be summarized as follows:
Section 1. The common council of any city, at any time having a population of more than 50,000 according to the last state census, is authorized to issue and sell the bonds of any such city for the purpose of taking up and funding its floating indebtedness. Section 2 provides for the manner of issuing the bonds. Section 3. No city shall be permitted to issue bonds for funding any of its floating indebtedness except such as exists at the date of the approval of this act, nor shall any such city be entitled to avail itself of the provisions of this act unless it shall proceed to do so within six months from the date of such approval. Section 4. Any city, which has already reached the limit of its bonded or other indebtedness, which avails itself of the provisions of this act, shall thereafter have no power to create any obligation which shall bear interest, except such as may be in renewal of an obligation now existing, and no officer or officers of such city shall have power to draw any order on its treasury, or issue any evidence of indebtedness, other than a bond, unless there is then sufficient money in the treasury to the credit of the fund out of which it is payable to pay the same, together with all unpaid claims previously audited against the fund. Every order or evidence of indebtedness issued contrary to the provisions of this section shall be void in the hands of everybody. Section 5. This act shall be in force from and after its passage.
The plaintiff claims that this act is unconstitutional, because it is special legislation prohibited by sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the state constitution. The specific objections which he urges against the validity of the act are: First, it adopts an improper basis of classification, namely, population; second, it is based upon existing circumstances only, and is limited to the members of the class at the time of its enactment.
1. The plaintiff, in support of his first objection, urges that the attempted classification of cities on the basis of population is not germane to the subject-matter or purpose of the act, for the reason that there is no natural connection or relation between the number of people in a city and the propriety or necessity of funding its floating indebtedness.
The constitutional prohibition of special legislation on a particular subject does not deprive the legislature of the power to classify it if the basis of classification is germane to the purpose of the law. Population may be a basis of such classification, if germane to the subject or purpose of the proposed law. The subject of classification on the basis of population has been an embarrassing one for the courts, for the reason that numerous and complex considerations enter into it, and in practice it is often difficult to determine whether there is any natural relation between the population of cities of a given class and the subject-matter of the law classifying them. This difficulty has been eliminated by the adoption of an amendment to the constitution, -- section 36, art. 4 (Laws 1899, p. vi.), -- the here material provisions of which are these:
"The legislature may provide general laws relating to affairs of cities, the application of which may be limited to cities of over fifty thousand inhabitants, or to cities of fifty and not less than twenty thousand inhabitants, or to cities of twenty and not less than ten thousand inhabitants, or to cities of ten thousand inhabitants or less, which shall apply equally to all such cities of either class."
It is manifest that the purpose of this amendment was not practically to repeal sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the constitution, as to cities which might be classified pursuant to its provisions, but that its object was to enable the legislature to make population a basis of classification, although there might not be any natural relation between the subject-matter of the proposed law and the number of people in the classified cities. We accordingly hold that the amendment authorizes the legislature to classify, for the purpose of general legislation, cities on the basis of population therein specified, although such basis would not have previously been germane to the purpose or subject-matter of the proposed law, but that otherwise the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of article 4 are not affected by the amendment. It follows that the plaintiff's first objection is answered by the constitution, and must be overruled.
2. The plaintiff, in support of his second general objection, that the act is based upon existing circumstances only, and is limited to the members of the class at the time of its enactment, urges that the provisions of the act are limited to cities having the required population at a given time, -- the date of the last state census; also to cities having a floating indebtedness at the date of the passage of the act, which proceed to act upon such provisions within six months from such date. It must be conceded that such are the provisions of the act, and that it does not necessarily operate alike upon all cities having a population of more than 50,000 at the date of the passage of the act, nor upon cities which thereafter acquired such population.
The rule is well settled that classification with a view to the enactment of general laws...
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